Jernigan-Leysath v. Leysath
| Decision Date | 16 May 2022 |
| Docket Number | Docket Nos. F-02506-20 and F-09264-20 |
| Citation | 75 Misc.3d 1206 (A),167 N.Y.S.3d 382 (Table) |
| Parties | In the Matter of a Proceeding for Support Under Article 4 of the Family Court Act, Edward JERNIGAN-LEYSATH, Petitioner, v. Rhonda LEYSATH and Robbie Leysath, Respondents. |
| Court | New York County Court |
For Petitioner: Kao Pin Lew ; 414 W. 145th Street, New York NY 10031-5202; 212-274-8600; kaopinlew@msn.com
Respondents pro se: Rhonda Leysath and Robbie Leysath
On April 18, 2022, petitioner Edward Jernigan-Leysath ("Petitioner") timely filed an objection to an order entered by Support Magistrate Kevin Mahoney (the "Support Magistrate") on March 22, 2022 (the "March 22, 2022 Order"). Petitioner submitted proof of service of the objection upon the respondents Rhonda Leysath ("Rhonda") and Robbie Leysath ("Robbie") (collectively "Respondents"), who are unrepresented by counsel, with his objection papers. No rebuttal was submitted. Upon reviewing the record, including Petitioner's objection and exhibits thereto, the orders of dismissal and findings of fact issued by the Support Magistrate in both dockets, and the recordings of the hearing held on September 8, 2021, November 22, 2021, and March 22, the court finds that there is insufficient evidence to support the Support Magistrate's finding that Respondents met their burden of establishing constructive emancipation and the objection is granted and the matter is remanded to the Support Magistrate for additional fact finding.
Petitioner was a foster child in Respondents’ home and was subsequently adopted by them in 2016, at the age of fourteen or fifteen.1 On March 4, 2020, Petitioner filed the instant petition seeking to establish support for himself (Docket No. F-02506-20 & F-09264-20).2 Specifically, petitioner alleges that he no longer resides with Respondents, who "currently receive an adoption subsidy for [his] care since [he] was adopted at age 14 though I no longer reside with them." Petitioner cites to Barbara T. v. Acquinetta M. , 164 AD3d 1 [1st Dept 2018] ) in support of his request for an order of support directing Respondents to pay fair and reasonable support in the amount of the adoption subsidy that they receive and that they be required to exercise the option of additional coverage for health insurance in Petitioner's favor.
A hearing was held on September 8, 2021, November 22, 2021, and March 22, 2022 on the question of whether Petitioner had constructively emancipated himself. Petitioner was represented by counsel at the hearing and both Respondents waived their right to counsel and proceeded pro se. Petitioner testified and was cross-examined by each Respondent, and Robbie briefly testified regarding Petitioner's relationship with his counsel and various social workers during and after the adoption proceeding. Rhonda declined to testify on her own behalf. The Support Magistrate thereafter issued findings of fact and orders of dismissal on March 22, 2022.3 The findings of fact indicate that "the basis of Petitioner's request for support is his claim that he had no other choice but to leave the Leysath's home when he was 18 years old, and is thus entitled to a support order paid directly to him by Respondent." The Support Magistrate determined the following:
(Lew affirmation, exhibit A, Docket F-02506-20). The findings of fact for Robbie reiterate these points, with the addition that Petitioner's claim that Robbie's "didn't give him a chance to speak," was found to be a typical response from a teenager faced with age-appropriate discipline (Lew affirmation, exhibit A, Docket F-09264-20).
Upon these findings of fact, the Support Magistrate determined that Petitioner had constructively emancipated himself from the household and both petitions were dismissed for failure to state a cause of action. Petitioner thereafter filed his objections.
Family Court Act § 439 (a) empowers Support Magistrates "to hear, determine and grant any relief within the powers of the Court," in proceedings properly before them. FCA § 439 (e) provides that the Support Magistrate's determination "shall include findings of fact and ... a final order." The parties are permitted by statute to submit "specific written objection," to the order for "review" by a Family Court judge. The review of the Support Magistrate's order is essentially equivalent to an appellate review of such an order (see Matter of Cherrez v Lazo , 102 AD3d 781, 782 [2d Dept 2013] ). The scope of that review, however, is narrow, and confined to whether the Support Magistrate, as the trier of fact, has made the necessary findings of fact and whether, upon review of the record, the findings of fact present a reasonable basis for that order. The determination of the Support Magistrate should not be disturbed unless no fair interpretation of the evidence can support the findings (see Matter of Stone v Stone , 236 AD2d 615, 615 [2d Dept 1997] ; Matter of Reed v Reed , 240 AD2d 951, 952 [3d Dept 1997] ). In applying these legal principles, the scope of the Family Court judge's review consists primarily of an inquiry as to whether the Support Magistrate has made the necessary findings of fact and conclusions of law, and whether upon review of the record, there was a reasonable basis for the Support Magistrate's order. In reviewing an objection to a decision of a Support Magistrate, the Court may remand one or more issues of fact to the Support Magistrate, make its own findings of fact and its own order, with or without an additional hearing, or deny the objection altogether ( FCA § 439 [e] ).
Petitioner argues that the Support Magistrate "incorrectly and wrongly focused on whether the Petitioner emancipated himself by leaving the adoptive home when he turned 18 years old" (Lew affirmation ¶¶ 6-8). Instead, Petitioner relies on Matter of Barbara T. v Acquinetta M. , 164 AD3d 1 [1st Dept 2018] ), and argues that any adoption subsidy received by Respondents attaches to the adoptive child, and he is therefore entitled to receive any subsidy received by Respondents from the time Petitioner left the home or, failing that, from the time he filed the petition for support. Petitioner also argues that, in any event, the evidence presented demonstrates that Petitioner was "kicked out" of the adoptive home by his adoptive parents and did not willingly abandon the home (Lew affirmation ¶¶ 6-8).
It is a fundamental public policy in the State of New York that a parent is obligated to support his or her child until that child reaches the age of twenty-one ( FCA § 413 [1][a] ; Matter of Roe v Doe , 29 NY2d 188, 192-193 [1971] ). When a child is adopted, the natural parents are relieved of this responsibility and the adoptive parents become liable for the child's support ( DRL § 110 ; DRL § 117 [1][a] ; see also Barbara T. , 164 AD3d at 2 []). Nevertheless, emancipation suspends the parent's support obligation ( Roe v Doe , 29 NY2d at 192-193 ). "Children are emancipated if they become economically independent of their parents through employment, entry into military service, or marriage, and may also be deemed constructively emancipated if, without cause, they withdraw from parental control and supervision" ( Matter of Alice C. v Bernard G.C. , 193 AD2d 97, 105 [2d Dept 1993] ).
The burden of proving emancipation is on the party asserting it ( O'Sullivan v Katz , 81 AD3d 480, 480 [1st Dept 2011] ). "A child of employable age and in full possession of their faculties who voluntarily and without cause abandon their home, against the will of their parents and for the purpose of avoiding parental control, forfeit their right to demand support even if they are not financially self-sufficient" ( Matter of Bailey v Bailey , 15 AD3d 577 [2d Dept 2005] ; Roe , 9 NY2d at 192—193; Alice C. , 193 AD2d at 105 ). However, where the parent causes the breakdown in communication with the child, contributes to the deterioration of the relationship, or has made no genuine effort to contact the child, the child will not be deemed to have abandoned the parent ( Jose R. v Yvette-Ortiz M. , 123 AD3d 412, 413 ; [1st Dept 2014]; Matter of Gansky v Gansky , 103 AD3d 894, 895 [2d Dept 2013] ; Matter of Dewitt v Giampietro , 66 AD3d 773, 774 [2d Dept 2009] ; Alice C. , 193 AD2d at 109 ; Lipsky v Lipsky , 115 AD2d 361, 361 [1st Dept 1986] ). Furthermore, if the parent-child relationship deteriorates in whole or in part due to the parent's actions, they must actively try to repair the relationship ( Jose R. , 123 AD3d at 413 ; Matter of Chamberlin v Chamberlin , 240 AD2d 908, 910 [3d Dept 1997] ). Reluctance on the child's part to contact the parent does not constitute abandonment which would relieve the parent of their support obligation ( O'Sullivan , 81 AD3d at 480 ; ...
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