Jetton v. Caldwell County Board of Education, No. COA05-1389 (N.C. App. 8/7/2007)
| Decision Date | 07 August 2007 |
| Docket Number | No. COA05-1389,COA05-1389 |
| Parties | DR. JANICE JETTON, Plaintiff, v. CALDWELL COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, DR. TOM MCNEEL, individually and in his representative capacity, DR. CARYL BURNS, individually and in her representative capacity, JOHN REIMER, individually and in his representative capacity, CRYSTAL WILLIAMS, individually and in her representative capacity, Defendants. |
| Court | North Carolina Court of Appeals |
C. Gary Triggs, P.A., by C. Gary Triggs, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Womble Carlyle Sandridge & Rice, PLLC, by Allan R. Gitter and Bradley R. Johnson, and Groome, Tuttle, Pike & Blair, by Edward H. Blair, Jr., for Defendants-Appellees.
Plaintiff appeals from an order entered 1 April 2005 by the Honorable Richard D. Boner in Caldwell County Superior Court granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants Dr. Tom McNeel("McNeel"), Dr. Caryl Burns ("Burns"), John Reimer ("Reimer"), and Crystal Williams ("Williams"), in their individual and representative capacities. At all times relevant to this case, McNeel was the Superintendent of Caldwell County Schools, Burns was the principal of South Caldwell High School ("the high school"), Reimer was an assistant principal at the high school, and Williams was an administrative assistant at the high school. In a verified complaint filed 11 June 2004, Plaintiff made the following pertinent allegations:
Plaintiff was employed by the Caldwell County Board of Education ("CCBE") as a mathematics teacher and worked at the high school for twenty-six years. In 1999, Plaintiff became an assistant principal at the high school and, on 30 May 2002, she and CCBE entered into a contract for Plaintiff to continue her employment as a school administrator. Plaintiff alleges that before signing the 30 May 2002 contract, she was assured by CCBE's agents that during the duration of her contract, Plaintiff would work as a school administrator.
During her employment as an assistant principal, Plaintiff worked to have a positive relationship with Principal Burns. However, Plaintiff contends that at times Burns refused to speak to her, slammed doors in her face, refused a personal leave request, required her to work additional hours, systematically excluded her from administrative meetings, the decision-making process, and social events, and treated her differently than male employees, especially assistant principal Reimer. Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that Burns told faculty and staff members of the high school that Plaintiff had broken into the high school and stolen important documents and files. With regard to Reimer, Plaintiff asserts that during his tenure at the high school, Reimer interfered with Plaintiff's assigned duties, told Plaintiff that she should not have any communication with the school counselors, and angered the staff when he caused a conflict with student testing procedures.
At the end of the 2002-2003 school year, after Burns announced that she was being transferred to the county office of the Caldwell County Schools, Plaintiff contends that Williams verbally attacked her, telling her that Plaintiff was the one who should be transferred and calling Plaintiff a "bald-faced liar." Plaintiff claims that soon after this confrontation, Williams told Burns that she was "taking [Plaintiff] to the superintendent" and that she was going to "get her fired." Williams then met with McNeel.
On or about 2 June 2003, Plaintiff was reassigned to Caldwell County Schools as a teacher for the 2003-2004 school year. No reason was given for the demotion. Plaintiff contends that Superintendent McNeel was openly hostile and unprofessional when she met with him to discuss her demotion. As a result of the meeting, Plaintiff believed she had three options: she could retire, return to teaching, or be terminated for insubordination. After meeting with McNeel, Plaintiff submitted an application for retirement effective 1 July 2003. On 25 June 2003, Plaintiff sentMcNeel a letter requesting that he reinstate her as an assistant principal at the high school. This request was denied.
Based on the foregoing allegations, Plaintiff's complaint asserted causes of action for (1) breach of contract (as to Defendant CCBE), (2) tortious interference with contract (as to Defendants McNeel, Burns, Reimer, and Williams in their individual capacities), (3) defamation of character (as to Defendants Burns and Williams), (4) civil conspiracy (as to Defendants McNeel, Burns, Reimer, and Williams), (5) intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress (as to all Defendants), and (6) "tortious intrusion of privacy." She sought compensatory and punitive damages.
By order entered 7 September 2004, the Honorable Robert C. Ervin dismissed with prejudice the claims of tortious interference with contract, civil conspiracy, and "tortious intrusion of privacy."1 On 24 January 2005, Defendants McNeel, Burns, Reimer, and Williams filed motions for summary judgment on all claims remaining against them. On 1 April 2005, Judge Boner granted the motion of each Defendant, ruling that Defendants McNeel, Burns, and Reimer were protected against suits brought against them in their "'individual capacity' on the grounds of public official immunity because there is no genuine issue of material fact that [each] is a public official whose conduct . . . was neither corrupt, malicious, nor outside the scope" of their duties. Judge Boner also ruled that Defendants McNeel, Burns, Reimer, and Williams were protected from claims against them in their "'official' capacity on the grounds of governmental immunity in that the Board's insurance policy specifically excludes claims for slander, emotional distress, claims of one insured against another, and punitive damages[.]" Finally, Judge Boner entered summary judgment "for the additional reason that plaintiff's forecast of the evidence failed to show any justiciable issue of fact or law for her claims against [McNeel, Burns, Reimer, or Williams] in any capacity."
On 8 April 2005, Plaintiff filed notice of appeal to this Court from Judge Boner's 1 April 2005 order. Defendants then moved the trial court to dismiss the appeal as arising from an interlocutory order not affecting a substantial right. By order dated 25 July 2005, Judge Boner ruled that his 1 April 2005 order "was based in part on governmental and public official immunities barring plaintiff's tort claims against the individual defendants, and is therefore immediately appealable to the Court of Appeals[.]"2 Thereafter, by motion filed 8 February 2006, Defendants moved this Court to dismiss Plaintiff's appeal for various appellate rule violations. For the reasons which follow, we affirm Judge Boner's order granting summary judgment in favor of Defendants.
As a threshold matter, we address Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's appeal. In support of this motion, Defendantsargue that Plaintiff failed to preserve issues for appellate review through proper assignments of error, and thus, violated Rule 10 of the North Carolina Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Rule 10 provides in pertinent part that "the scope of review on appeal is confined to a consideration of those assignments of error set out in the record on appeal[.]" N.C. R. App. P. 10(a). This rule further provides that
[e]ach assignment of error shall, so far as practicable, be confined to a single issue of law; and shall state plainly, concisely and without argumentation the legal basis upon which error is assigned. An assignment of error is sufficient if it directs the attention of the appellate court to the particular error about which the question is made, with clear and specific record or transcript references.
N.C. R. App. P. 10(c)(1). Rule 10 is intended to "identify for the appellee's benefit all the errors possibly to be urged on appeal . . . so that the appellee may properly assess the sufficiency of the proposed record on appeal to protect his position." Rogers v. Colpitts, 129 N.C. App. 421, 422, 499 S.E.2d 789, 790 (1998) (citation omitted). Additionally, Rule 10 is intended to relieve some of the burden on the judiciary by allowing appellate courts to determine the legal questions involved in the case "fairly and expeditiously[,]" without having to make a "voyage of discovery" through the record. Id. In reviewing a trial court's grant of summary judgment, however, the purpose of the Rule 10 requirements is no longer present. Addressing this point, our Supreme Court has held: On appeal, review of summary judgment is necessarily limited to whether the trial court's conclusions as to these questions of law were correct ones. It would appear, then, that notice of appeal adequately apprises the opposing party and the appellate court of the limited issues to be reviewed. Exceptions and assignments of error add nothing.
Ellis v. Williams, 319 N.C. 413, 415, 355 S.E.2d 479, 481 (1987) (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added); see also Nelson v. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., 177 N.C. App. 595, 603, 630 S.E.2d 221, 227 (2006) ( ); but see Shook v. County of Buncombe, 125 N.C. App. 284, 285, 480 S.E.2d 706, 707 (1997) (). We conclude that because Plaintiff is appealing from a summary judgment order, her appeal is not subject to dismissal, under Ellis and Nelson, on grounds that her assignments of error did not comport with the requirements of Rule 10. Accordingly, Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's appeal is denied.
Summary judgment is proper "where there...
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