Jewett City Savings v. Town of Franklin

• Decision Date: 10 October 2006
• Docket Number: No. 17499.,17499.
• Citation: 280 Conn. 274,907 A.2d 67
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: JEWETT CITY SAVINGS BANK v. TOWN OF FRANKLIN et. al.

Page 67

907 A.2d 67

280 Conn. 274

JEWETT CITY SAVINGS BANK v. TOWN OF FRANKLIN et. al.

No. 17499.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued April 10, 2006.

Decided October 10, 2006.

Ronald F. Ochsner, for the appellants (defendants).

John R. FitzGerald, for the appellee (plaintiff).

SULLIVAN, C.J., and BORDEN, KATZ, PALMER and ZARELLA, Js.^*

ZARELLA, J.

The defendants, the town of Franklin (town), the town planning and zoning commission (commission), and the town zoning board of appeals (board), appeal from the judgment of the trial court declaring § 3.5 B of the town's zoning regulations void and temporarily enjoining the board from proceeding with a zoning appeal filed by the plaintiff, Jewett City Savings Bank. On appeal, the defendants claim that the trial court incorrectly concluded that: (1) the commission's denial of the plaintiff's application for a special exception under the town's zoning regulations was not an enforcement action; and (2) § 3.5 B of the town's zoning regulations is void. We agree with the defendants and, therefore, reverse the judgment of the trial court.

The following facts and procedural history are relevant to our resolution of this appeal. On July 26, 2004, the plaintiff filed an application with the commission for a special exception to the town zoning regulations (regulations), seeking to use and develop approximately four acres of unimproved land in the town of Franklin.¹ On September 21, 2004, the commission conducted a public hearing on the plaintiff's application. The commission denied the application on October 19, 2004. The plaintiff appealed from the commission's decision to the Superior Court on November 5, 2004. Concurrently, the plaintiff appealed from the commission's decision to the board² pursuant to § 3.5 B of the regulations.³ In addition to the foregoing appeals, the plaintiff also filed the present action, seeking a declaratory judgment and a temporary injunction precluding the board from proceeding with the appeal on the ground that it was not authorized by General Statutes § 8-6(a)(1).⁴ The plaintiff claimed that the appeal to the board effectively would require two different town zoning authorities to give separate consideration to its application before it could appeal the matter to the Superior Court.⁵ This requirement, according to the plaintiff, was not authorized by law. The trial court rendered judgment for the plaintiff, declaring § 3.5 B of the regulations void and temporarily enjoining the board from proceeding with the plaintiff's appeal. Specifically, the court noted that § 3.5 B of the regulations was not authorized by § 8-6(a)(1) because "the commission's action on [the plaintiff's] application for the special exception . . . was not in fact an `enforcement' action." Consequently, the trial court rendered judgment declaring § 3.5 B void. The defendants appealed from the trial court's judgment to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199(c) and Practice Book § 65-1.

The defendants claim that the trial court incorrectly determined that the commission's denial of the plaintiff's application for a special exception was not an enforcement action. They contend that, insofar as the commission's denial of the plaintiff's application for a special exception was based on established standards contained in the regulations, such action constituted an enforcement of those regulations. The plaintiff responds that the denial of the application was not an enforcement action because the commission's decision required some exercise of discretion. We agree with the defendants.

We begin with the standard of review that governs the present appeal. Resolution of the issue presented requires us to review the applicable statutory provisions and the relevant town regulations. "Because the interpretation of . . . [statutes and] regulations presents a question of law, our review is plenary." Graff v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 277 Conn. 645, 652, 894 A.2d 285 (2006). "Additionally, zoning regulations are local legislative enactments . . . and, therefore, their interpretation is governed by the same principles that apply to the construction of statutes." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id.

We first review the relevant statutory provisions. General Statutes § 8-5(a) provides that any municipality with a zoning commission must have a zoning board of appeals.⁶ A zoning board of appeals is charged with, inter alia,⁷ "hear[ing] and decid[ing] appeals where it is alleged that there is an error in any order, requirement or decision made by the official charged with the enforcement of . . . any . . . [local zoning] regulation. . . ." General Statutes § 8-6(a)(1). In other words, decisions purporting to enforce local zoning regulations may be appealed to a zoning board of appeals. See General Statutes § 8-6(a)(1); Conto v. Zoning Commission, 186 Conn. 106, 114, 439 A.2d 441 (1982). The power to enforce zoning regulations may be delegated to an enforcement officer by the local zoning commission or vested in the commission itself. See General Statutes § 8-3(e) ("[t]he zoning commission shall provide for the manner in which the zoning regulations shall be enforced"); see also Conto v. Zoning Commission, supra, at 114, 439 A.2d 441 (holding that § 8-6 "authorizes zoning boards of appeals to review the actions of any local officer, board or commission that has been designated by local regulations to be the official charged with the enforcement of local zoning regulations" [internal quotation marks omitted]). If local regulations vest the zoning commission with enforcement authority, it becomes "a protean body with the capacity to act either legislatively or administratively." Conto v. Zoning Commission, supra, at 109, 439 A.2d 441.

The statutory scheme grants zoning commissions the authority to establish and change zoning regulations. See generally General Statutes § 8-3. Furthermore, we have made it clear in our decisions that municipalities generally are free to establish their own appellate procedures. See, e.g., Conto v. Zoning Commission, supra, 186 Conn. at 117, 439 A.2d 441 ("[i]t is clear that [General Statutes] § 8-10 does not intend to prohibit local arrangements by which a commission decision may be appealed to a board of appeals, [as] long as review by the Superior Court is ultimately available").

This court long has held that when "a statute has established a procedure to redress a particular wrong, a person must follow the specified remedy and may not institute a proceeding that might have been permissible in the absence of such a statutory procedure." Norwich v. Lebanon, 200 Conn. 697, 708, 513 A.2d 77 (1986); see also LaCroix v. Board of Education, 199 Conn. 70, 78, 505 A.2d 1233 (1986) (when "a statutory right of appeal from an administrative decision exists, an aggrieved party may not bypass the statutory procedure and instead bring an independent action to test the very issue which the appeal was designed to test" [internal quotation marks omitted]); Carpenter v. Planning & Zoning Commission, 176 Conn. 581, 598, 409 A.2d 1029 (1979) (same).

The General Statutes have established a procedural framework that allows a zoning board of appeals to hear appeals of enforcement proceedings. A zoning board of appeals may "hear and decide appeals where it is alleged that there is an error in any order, requirement or decision made by the official charged with the enforcement of this chapter or any bylaw, ordinance or regulation adopted under the provisions of this chapter. . . ." General Statutes § 8-6(a)(1). Section 3.5 of the regulations provides that "[a]ny person who alleges that there is an error in any order, requirement, or decision made by the [c]ommission or its agent in . . . enforcement of these regulations, or . . . [an] action on a special exception application" may appeal to the board. Thus, § 8-6 permits enforcement decisions to be appealed to a zoning board of appeals, and § 3.5 of the regulations implements this authority by allowing enforcement decisions and determinations regarding special exceptions to be appealed to the board. The plaintiff concedes that if the commission's denial of the plaintiff's application for a special exception was an enforcement of the regulations, then the defendants must prevail in this appeal.

In order for the decision of a zoning commission to constitute an enforcement action, that decision must be administrative rather than legislative in nature. See Conto v. Zoning Commission, supra, 186 Conn. at 111, 439 A.2d 441 ("we should review the commission's enforcement action as an aspect of its exercise of its administrative capacity"). A zoning commission's legislative decision is a policy decision that involves the exercise of broad discretion. See Malafronte v. Planning & Zoning Board, 155 Conn. 205, 209, 230 A.2d 606 (1967) ("[t]he discretion of a legislative body, because of its constituted role as a formulator of public policy, is much broader than that of an administrative board, which serves a quasi-judicial function"). Conversely, a zoning commission acts in an administrative capacity when its function is "to determine whether [a] proposed use is one which satisfies the standards set forth in the [zoning] regulations and the statutes." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Conto v. Zoning Commission, supra, at 111, 439 A.2d 441; accord Goldberg v. Zoning Commission, 173 Conn. 23, 29, 376 A.2d 385 (1977); see also Housatonic Terminal Corp. v. Planning & Zoning Board, 168 Conn. 304, 307, 362 A.2d 1375 (1975) ("[a]cting in [an] administrative capacity, the board's function is to determine whether the . . . proposed use is expressly permitted under the [zoning] regulations, and whether the standards set forth in the regulations and the statute are satisfied" [internal quotation marks omitted]).

In Conto v. Zoning Commission, supra, 186 Conn. at 106, 439...