Jim Halsey Co., Inc. v. Bonar
| Decision Date | 15 April 1985 |
| Docket Number | No. 84-180,84-180 |
| Citation | 688 S.W.2d 275,284 Ark. 461 |
| Parties | , 11 Media L. Rep. 1863 JIM HALSEY CO., INC., Appellant, v. Chet BONAR, Appellee. |
| Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
No brief, for appellant.
No brief, for appellee.
[284 Ark. 473-A] SUPPLEMENTAL OPINION ON DENIAL OF REHEARING.
The trial court committed error by permitting broadcasting of a certain portion of the trial proceedings in violation of Canon 3, Code of Judicial Conduct. When an objection was made at the beginning of trial, the judge ruled that he would allow the cameras in, but he stated, "if it becomes distracting to anyone, they should raise an objection at that time and I'll take care of it at that time". Subsequently there were [284 Ark. 473-B] no objections. We unanimously held that the appellant acquiesced in the trial court's ruling by failing to make further objections during the course of the trial and that in this instance, the error was rendered harmless. We further advised the bench and bar that they should be on notice that this court will closely scrutinize any further violations of this rule. 284 Ark. 461, 683 S.W.2d 898.
On rehearing some of our members have changed their minds and now think that violation of this rule mandates reversible error, without exception.
The majority is deeply concerned over the trial court's obvious violation of Canon 3 which reads in pertinent part: "(b) an objection timely made by a party or attorney shall preclude broadcasting ... of the proceedings; and an objection timely made by a witness who has been informed of the right to refuse such exposure, shall preclude broadcasting."
Although the rule also vests in the trial judge the right to make the final decision as to "whether it would be fitting and proper to permit photographing and recording of the trial proceedings", Re: Petition of Arkansas Bar Association, 271 Ark. 358, 361, 609 S.W.2d 28, the trial court is without discretion when timely objection is made. In this instance, the appellant made timely objection.
It is the opinion of the majority that the warning contained in Ford v. State, 276 Ark. 98, 633 S.W.2d 3 (1982), where we said:
[a] willful disobedience of this Canon would, no doubt, be dealt with in an appropriate manner which could go so far as to cause a retrial of the case or result in other action by this court
does not mandate automatic reversal. Had the record in this case hinted of any prejudice to the appellant by the presence of cameras within the courtroom, reversal would be in order. Absent any prejudice, to reverse and remand as punishment to the trial court would not justify the time and expense for all parties and the court system to relitigate this matter.
[284 Ark. 473-C] We have repeatedly said that a mistrial is a drastic remedy, only to be granted when no other remedy exists. L.L. Cole & Son, Inc. v. Hickman, 282 Ark. 6, 665 S.W.2d 278 (1984). That is a fair standard to apply to our decision. No longer is error presumed to be prejudicial. A litigant is entitled to a fair trial--not a perfect one. Berna v. State, 282 Ark. 563, 670 S.W.2d 434 (1984). Here, justice has been done.
In our initial opinion we placed the bench and bar on notice that we would closely scrutinize further violations of this rule. In light of the present attitude of the court, we think it is safe to say this supplemental opinion shall constitute notice that further violation of this rule will not be tolerated to any degree, and that reversal may well be automatic, rather than a matter of scrutiny for possible prejudice.
Rehearing denied.
Before we take a hard line on the enforcement of the rule pertaining to cameras in the courtroom, we ought to examine the rule itself, now in its fifth year, to see if some relaxation is in order. A rule that requires the approval of opposing litigants is almost no rule at all, as experience teaches that adversaries in a lawsuit rarely agree on anything.
An overwhelming number of states have sensibly left the decision regarding cameras where it should be, subject to the discretion of the trial judge. (See Journal of the National Center for State Courts, Volume 9, No. 1, p. 5, for a list of some forty states permitting media coverage and the six states requiring the approval of both parties). We ought to consider joining the majority, at least with respect to civil trials.
[284 Ark. 473-D] NEWBERN, Justice, dissenting.
Rehearing should be granted. I was uncomfortable from the outset with the approach taken by our decision on the point of courtroom television. The essence of our opinion was that it was not reversible error to allow television photography in the courtroom after a timely objection but that it should never again be allowed. While I can appreciate an opinion which warns we may someday change a rule, I cannot appreciate an opinion saying we may someday enforce a rule.
The petition for rehearing made me wish I had dissented to the opinion. The petition correctly points out that a lawyer ought not be required to object more than once to a clear prospective violation of a rule, especially when the rule says a timely objection is all that is required. I am troubled by the fact that the colloquy between counsel and the court which was the entire basis of the appellant's argument on this point was not abstracted. However, as the objection and the court's ruling are recounted in the arguments in both parties' briefs, as well as in our opinion, I will not be dissuaded by that lapse from expressing my concern.
According to the briefs of both parties, counsel for the appellant objected on the morning the trial began to having the trial televised. Rather than keep the trial from being televised, the judge invited counsel to object again if the cameras became distracting.
The original modification of Canon 3(A)(7) of the Code of Judicial Conduct permitted broadcasting and photographing certain court proceedings upon written consent of all participating attorneys, parties and witnesses. Re: Petition of Arkansas Bar Association, 271 Ark. 358, 609 S.W.2d 28 (1980). The Canon was modified again to permit these activities unless there is "an objection timely made by a party or attorney...." The sole reason given for this modification was that it was "too...
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