Joe Horisk's Salvage Pool Sys. of Ohio v. Strongsville

• Decision Date: 12 October 1993
• Docket Number: No. 63578,63578
• Citation: 631 N.E.2d 1097,91 Ohio App.3d 121
• Parties: JOE HORISK'S SALVAGE POOL SYSTEMS OF OHIO, Appellant, v. CITY OF STRONGSVILLE, Appellee. *
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

Page 121

91 Ohio App.3d 121

631 N.E.2d 1097

JOE HORISK'S SALVAGE POOL SYSTEMS OF OHIO, Appellant, v. CITY OF STRONGSVILLE, Appellee. ^*

No. 63578.

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Eighth District, Cuyahoga County.

Decided Oct. 12, 1993.

Edward Kancler, Cleveland, for appellant.

John D. Ryan, Cleveland, for appellee.

NUGENT, Judge.

This is an appeal from the decision of the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas which granted the motion for summary judgment filed by defendant-appellee, the city of Strongsville, Ohio (hereinafter "the city"), against plaintiff-appellant, Joe Horisk's Salvage Pool Systems of Ohio (hereinafter "appellant"), on appellant's complaint for declaratory judgment.

Count one ¹ of appellant's complaint sought a declaration from the court ruling, in effect, that R.C. Chapter 4738, regulating operations of salvage motor vehicle pools and salvage motor vehicle auctions, preempts the city's local zoning regulations, in particular Section 1262.03(a), notwithstanding any prior administrative or court decisions to the contrary. Appellee, the city of Strongsville, duly answered, asserting as an affirmative defense the doctrine of res judicata and/or collateral estoppel.

Following a pretrial held on November 11, 1991, both parties were granted leave to file motions for summary judgment. On January 21, 1992, appellant filed its motion for summary judgment on count one of its complaint. Appellee filed a brief in opposition as well as a motion for summary judgment of its own on March 6, 1992. Evidentiary materials attached in support of and in opposition to each party's motion for summary judgment reveal the following.

Appellant is the owner of two parcels of land, together consisting of approximately twenty-two acres, located in a general industrial zoning district in the city of Strongsville at the southeast corner of Route 82 and Marks Road. The first parcel, fronting on Route 82, consists of approximately seventeen acres and has been operated as a salvage motor vehicle pool operation and a salvage motor vehicle auction since 1972. The current operation has been in existence for some time prior to the adoption of the city's zoning code now in question. The second parcel, fronting on Marks Road (hereinafter referred to as the "Marks Road property"), consists of 4.387 acres, which remain vacant due to the existing zoning code, which prohibits the use of open land for general services, sales and storage establishments.

Appellant acquired both parcels of the property in question by way of warranty deed from James F. Ficociello in 1988. Ficociello had operated the Route 82 property as a motor vehicle salvage pool since 1972. The remaining smaller parcel, the Marks Road property, however, was vacant. The Marks Road property was purchased in 1978 by Ficociello.

Ficociello planned on devoting the smaller Marks Road property as part of his motor vehicle salvage pool and began construction of site improvements. After Ficociello was served with notice by the city to cease and desist, the city commenced an action for injunctive relief against Ficociello under case No. 012,491 in the Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas, praying for a temporary restraining order and a permanent injunction against Ficociello to bar the use of the Marks Road property in contravention of the city's zoning code.

Ficociello duly answered the city's complaint and filed a counterclaim seeking a declaratory judgment. The pertinent allegations of the counterclaim are as follows:

"4. Defendant says that he has conducted such operation continuously and without obligation since the time of its inception and that he has done so under a license issued by the State of Ohio.

"5. Defendant says that his operations in land use are well within the perameters [sic] of the zoning ordinances of the City of Strongsville and that the City's denial of his use of the adjoining, abutting, contiguous property is unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious and has been so done in derogation of his Constitutional Rights.

"6. Defendant further asserts that such conduct with regard to his property and his intended use is confiscatory in nature and a denial of due process of law as guaranteed by the Constitution[s] of the State of Ohio and of the United States."

Ficociello's prayer for relief was as follows:

"WHEREAS, the Defendant prays that he be granted a Declaratory Judgment authorizing him to use the premises known as Permanent Parcel No. 393-1-11 for the same purposes that he is using the adjacent and abutting premises; [and] that the ordinances of the City of Strongsville in their application with respect to the property of the Defendant be declared unconstitutional * * *."

Prior to trial on the parties' claims and counterclaims, the parties stipulated that Ficociello was licensed to engage in the business of operating a salvage motor vehicle pool pursuant to R.C. Chapter 4738. On April 21, 1983, case No. 012,491 was fully tried on the issues raised by the city's complaint and the defendant's answer and counterclaim. On August 22, 1983, the trial court executed its journal entry and opinion finding in favor of the city on its complaint. The trial court issued the following order:

"IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED as follows:

"That the Court finds that the Strongsville zoning ordinance is constitutional; that the application of this ordinance to the Marks Road property is also not unconstitutional, confiscatory or a denial of defendant's constitutional rights, nor is it unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious.

"That a declaratory judgment is issued permitting Permanent Parcel No. 393-1-11 for use as a salvage pool, provided all building and zoning ordinances are complied with, namely, that the business and operations of the pool be conducted within an enclosed building or buildings, and that the items which are the subject of the business of a salvage pool, namely, wrecked, scrapped, ruined, or dismantled motor vehicles or vehicles worn out or unfit for operation as a motor vehicle, be processed and stored only within enclosed buildings; that the exceptions as to off-street parking are not applicable to such vehicles; [and] that drainage and setback, etc. requirements, etc., must be complied with.

"IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendant be enjoined from constructing or using said parcel for a salvage pool or facility without an occupancy permit or building permit in accordance with this order and the ordinances of the City of Strongsville."

In the present case, appellant's motion for summary judgment argued that the earlier judgment did not operate as a bar to the present action under the doctrine of res judicata and/or collateral estoppel because the earlier action was decided prior to 1988 when the state adopted regulations governing the operation of salvage motor vehicle pools and salvage motor vehicle auctions. The regulations, as found in Ohio Adm.Code 4501:1-4-04, it was contended, preempted local zoning ordinances that were in conflict therewith. However, appellant abandoned this argument when it learned that Ohio Adm.Code 4501:1-4-04 was actually adopted in 1980. Based on the foregoing, the trial court granted the city's motion for summary judgment and denied appellant's motion for summary judgment. Appellant timely appeals, raising the following sole assignment of error for our review:

"The trial court committed prejudicial error in granting defendant/appellee's motion for summary judgment and denying plaintiff/appellant's motion for summary judgment because the decision as a matter of law fails to recognize and hold that the local zoning laws of the city of Strongsville as applied to plaintiff/appellant's property are preempted by the operation of Chapter 4738 of the Ohio Revised Code and valid regulations adopted thereunder."

Appellant contends the trial court erred in granting the city's motion for summary judgment. The city's primary contention in its motion for summary judgment is that appellant's complaint is barred by the doctrine of res judicata and/or collateral estoppel. We agree with the city.

The doctrine of res judicata "is that 'a final judgment or decree rendered upon the merits, without fraud or collusion, by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of rights, questions and facts in issue as to the parties and their privies, and is a complete bar to any subsequent action on the same claim or cause of action between the parties or those in privity with them.' " Johnson's Island v. Danbury Twp. Bd. of Trustees (1982), 69 Ohio St.2d 241, 243, 23 O.O.3d 243, 244-245, 431 N.E.2d 672, 674, quoting Norwood v. McDonald (1943), 142 Ohio St. 299, 27 O.O. 240, 52 N.E.2d 67, paragraph one of the syllabus. As the Ohio Supreme Court recently explained:

"It has long been the law of Ohio that 'an existing final judgment or decree between the parties to litigation is conclusive as to all claims which were or might have been litigated in a first lawsuit.' (Emphasis added.) Rogers v. Whitehall (1986), 25 Ohio St.3d 67, 69, 25 OBR 89, 90, 494 N.E.2d 1387, 1388. '[W]here a party is called upon to make good his cause of action * * *, he must do so by all the proper means within his control, and if he fails in that respect * * *, he will not afterward be permitted to deny the correctness of the determination, nor to re-litigate the same matters between the same parties.' Covington & Cincinnati Bridge Co. v. Sargent (1875), 27 Ohio St. 233, paragraph one of the syllabus. The doctrine of res judicata 'encourages reliance on judicial decisions, bars vexatious litigation, and frees the court to resolve other disputes.' Brown v. Felsen (1979), 442 U.S. 127, 131 [99 S.Ct. 2205, 2209, 60 L.Ed.2d 767, 771]. 'Its enforcement is essential to the maintenance of social order; for, the aid of judicial tribunals would not be invoked for the vindication of rights of person and property, if * * * conclusiveness did not...