Joe R., In re

Citation27 Cal.3d 496,165 Cal.Rptr. 837,612 P.2d 927
Decision Date03 July 1980
Docket NumberCr. 20339
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court (California)
Parties, 612 P.2d 927 In re JOE R., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law. Kenneth F. FARE, as Acting Chief Probation Officer, etc., Plaintiff and Respondent, v. JOE R., Defendant and Appellant.

Page 837

165 Cal.Rptr. 837
27 Cal.3d 496, 612 P.2d 927
In re JOE R., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law.
Kenneth F. FARE, as Acting Chief Probation Officer, etc., Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
JOE R., Defendant and Appellant.
Cr. 20339.
Supreme Court of California, In Bank.
July 3, 1980.

[27 Cal.3d 500]

Page 840

[612 P.2d 929] William T. Harter, Sherman Oaks, under appointment by the Supreme Court, and Roger S. Hanson, Santa Ana, for defendant and appellant.

[612 P.2d 930] Evelle J. Younger and George Deukmejian, Attys. Gen., Jack R. Winkler and Robert H. Philibosian, Chief Asst. Attys. Gen., S. Clark Moore, Asst. Atty. Gen., Edward T. Fogel, Jr., William R. Weisman, Gary R. Hahn and Carol Slater Frederick, Deputy Attys. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.

Cecil Hicks, Dist. Atty., Orange, Michael R. Capizzi, Asst. Dist. Atty., Oretta D. Sears, Deputy Dist. Atty., D. Lowell Jensen, Dist. Atty., Alameda, John J. Meehan, Asst. Dist. Atty., and William M. Baldwin, Deputy Dist. Atty., as amici curiae on behalf of plaintiff and respondent.

NEWMAN, Justice.

A juvenile court petition filed against Joe R., a minor, charged him with two robberies (Pen.Code, § 211) and a murder (Pen.Code, § 187). (See Welf. & Inst.Code, § 602.) After hearing, the court [27 Cal.3d 501] found all charges true, declared him a ward of the court, and committed him to the California Youth Authority.

He appeals, contending that (1) the murder allegation is not supported by the evidence, and (2) the court wrongly denied his motion to suppress (a) certain physical evidence as the fruit of two illegal searches, and (b) a confession as tainted by those searches, coerced by threats, and obtained in violation of his Miranda rights. 1

On June 1, 1976, Renard Murray was working as night manager of the Taco Bell food stand at 60th and Crenshaw in Los Angeles. About 20 minutes after midnight the minor and another young male, Michael Ryles, approached the service window. As they approached, Murray saw each was pointing a pistol at him. Ryles ordered him to take money from the cash register and put it in a Taco Bell bag. The pair took approximately $140 in various denominations, including a large number of one dollar bills, and about $50 in change wrapped in rolls. Murray also was forced to surrender cash on his person.

The robbers fled in the car of the minor's mother parked nearby. While driving they saw Wayne Anderson sitting on a bus bench at the corner of Century and Vermont, and they decided to rob him. They parked the car and approached him at about 45 minutes past midnight. Ryles asked Anderson questions and then, pointing his gun at Anderson's head, announced it was a robbery.

Ryles ordered Anderson to walk behind nearby buildings a gas station and a weight-control center. As they walked, Ryles repeatedly asked for money; and Anderson said he had no money. Both robbers made threats on his life. On direct examination he testified that the minor said, "If you don't do what he says I'll kill you" and "If you don't do what he says he'll kill you." On cross-examination, however, Anderson agreed that the minor never said he (the minor) would do anything to Anderson. Anderson never saw the minor display a gun.

The group stopped behind the buildings, and Ryles ordered Anderson to give his coat and watch to the minor. Anderson complied and repeated[27 Cal.3d 502] he had no money. Ryles gestured with his gun toward an alley and said, "Let's go back there." At that moment Anderson grabbed for the gun, and the two struggled for about 10 seconds.

During the struggle Anderson was hit on the back of the head with a fist. The blow caused his glasses to be shaken loose. He did not see who hit him but knew that it was not Ryles and that the only other person present was the minor, who was in back of Anderson.

Anderson got possession of Ryles' gun and, as he did so, saw the minor running

Page 841

away. Ryles yelled, "Shoot him man; he's got my gun." Anderson then shot Ryles twice, within five seconds after being hit in the back of the head. Ryles died from the wounds.

[612 P.2d 931] The minor ran to 101st Street. There, outside a house less than half a block from the scene of the shooting, he met three individuals he knew and told each that Ryles had been shot. He also told one, Demetrius Hayes, that he had a gun in his mother's car and did not want to drive the car with the gun in it. He asked Demetrius to hide the gun for him. 2 The other individuals, Johnie Stigall and Enos Hayes, were questioned by police shortly after their conversation with the minor. They repeated what he had told them.

The minor stayed at Demetrius' house until about 5 o'clock in the morning. Demetrius hid the gun in his own car at about 6:30.

After the shooting, Anderson recounted the incident to the police and described one robber as wearing a dark beanie. Based on information obtained from Stigall and Enos Hayes, a mug-photo lineup was prepared; and Anderson was able to identify both the minor and Ryles.

At about 8 a. m. five officers went to the minor's home. They did not have an arrest warrant and had reason to believe he would be armed and dangerous. They searched the house and then asked his mother if they could search further. She said, "Go ahead, you'll do it anyway." After an officer explained that she could refuse to consent to the search she signed a consent form. The beanie was found on a closet shelf in the minor's bedroom. Inside it was a Taco Bell bag containing loose change and rolls of coins.

[27 Cal.3d 503] At about 10 a. m. police arrested the minor at his high school. They recovered $115 from his pants pocket and $58 (in dollar bills) from his shirt pocket. At the station he waived Miranda rights and responded to questions with exculpatory statements and denials. The interrogating officer loudly accused him of lying and produced evidence against him including the beanie, bag, and coins. He then confessed to participation in the two robberies, but not the homicide, and said his gun was in Demetrius' car. He now claims that, before confessing, he asked that the interrogation be terminated. (The unclear record on that issue is discussed below.)

That afternoon police went to Demetrius' house to search for the gun. Demetrius, 16 years old, was at school. The police asked his mother for permission to search his car. She consented but could not find the keys. His brother then broke a car window, entered, and removed the back seats. Police entered and discovered the gun.

After the arrest the Taco Bell manager, Murray, was shown a lineup of 12 mug photos from which he identified the minor and Ryles as the robbers. He thought his identification was made on the day following the arrest.

MURDER?

The murder allegation (Paragraph III) was based on the premise that the minor is liable for the death of his accomplice, Ryles, at the hands of the robbery victim, Anderson, under the doctrine pronounced in People v. Washington (1965) 62 Cal.2d 777, 44 Cal.Rptr. 442, 402 P.2d 130 and People v. Gilbert (1965) 63 Cal.2d 690, 47 Cal.Rptr. 909, 408 P.2d 365. The minor argues that the evidence is insufficient to sustain a Washington-Gilbert murder finding, since it shows no life-threatening acts on his part other than those implicit in the crime of armed robbery. We agree.

Washington held that the felony-murder rule, which makes one guilty of first-degree murder when he kills while committing or attempting a felony, is confined to homicide actually perpetrated by the felon or his accomplice. (62 Cal.2d at p. 783, 44 Cal.Rptr. 442, 402 P.2d 130.) This court therefore reversed a murder conviction arising from a gas station robbery in which defendant's

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accomplice was killed by the station owner. The killing occurred when the accomplice entered the owner's office brandishing a pistol. The owner fired his own weapon immediately, mortally wounding [612 P.2d 932] the accomplice. [27 Cal.3d 504] Defendant, who had remained outside the office, was shot and wounded while escaping on foot with the robbery receipts.

Washington rejected felony-murder in such situations on grounds that, since the killing did not occur in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of a felony, necessary malice could not be ascribed on that basis to the surviving felon. (Id., at p. 781, 44 Cal.Rptr. 442, 445, 402 P.2d 130, 133.) The court concluded that the rule's purpose of deterring negligent or accidental deaths caused by felons would not be served by extending the rule to killings committed by their victims. Since any robbery victim may resist, extension of the felony-murder rule to such situations, the court reasoned, would punish arbitrarily those robbers whose victims by chance had responded lethally. 3

Washington cautioned, however, that one may be a murderer when, with conscious disregard for life, he or his accomplice does an intentional act likely to cause death, even when the actual killing is accomplished by another. (Id., at p. 782, 44 Cal.Rptr. 442, 402 P.2d 130.) Thus, the court observed, defendants who initiate gun battles may be murderers of anyone killed in the crossfire. Yet by reversing defendant's conviction Washington implicitly concluded that mere participation in an armed robbery is not sufficient to invoke murder liability, direct or vicarious, when the victim resists and kills. 4

That view subsequently was confirmed in Gilbert, supra, 63 Cal.2d 690, 47 Cal.Rptr. 909, 408 P.2d 365. There, while defendant and his accomplice were escaping from the attempted robbery of a savings and loan office, defendant shot and killed Police Officer Davis. As the two fled, a second officer fired and mortally wounded the accomplice. At defendant's trial for the accomplice's murder the jury was instructed that defendant could be found guilty if the accomplice's death was a proximate result of the armed robbery. This court reversed, holding that the instruction had withdrawn...

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