Johal v. Fedex Corp.

• Decision Date: 17 October 2022
• Docket Number: 1:22-cv-00716-JRS-MG
• Parties: GURINDER JOHAL personal representative of the Estate of Amarjeet Johal, DILJOT SEKHON personal representative of the Estate of Amarjit Sekhon, JASPREET SEKHON personal representative of the Estate of Jasvinder Kaur, MARY CAROL WEISERT, personal representative of the Estate of John Weisert, MATTHEW D. ALEXANDER personal representative of the Estate of Karlie Smith, Plaintiffs, v. FEDEX CORPORATION, FEDEX GROUND PACKAGE SYSTEM, INC., FEDERAL EXPRESS CORPORATION, FEDEX CORPORATE SERVICES, INC., SECURITAS SECURITY SERVICES, USA, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana

GURINDER JOHAL personal representative of the Estate of Amarjeet Johal, DILJOT SEKHON personal representative of the Estate of Amarjit Sekhon, JASPREET SEKHON personal representative of the Estate of Jasvinder Kaur, MARY CAROL WEISERT, personal representative of the Estate of John Weisert, MATTHEW D. ALEXANDER personal representative of the Estate of Karlie Smith, Plaintiffs, v. FEDEX CORPORATION, FEDEX GROUND PACKAGE SYSTEM, INC., FEDERAL EXPRESS CORPORATION, FEDEX CORPORATE SERVICES, INC., SECURITAS SECURITY SERVICES, USA, Defendants.

No. 1:22-cv-00716-JRS-MG

United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Indianapolis Division

October 17, 2022

ORDER ON MOTIONS TO DISMISS

JAMES R. SWEENEY II, JUDGE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

I. Introduction

This case concerns the April 15, 2021, mass shooting at an Indianapolis FedEx facility. Five victims killed in that attack-Amarjeet Johal, Amarjit Sekhon, Jasvinder Kaur, John Weisert, and Karlie Smith-here, through their estates' personal representatives, bring wrongful death claims against their employer FedEx and against FedEx's security provider, Securitas.

Now before the Court are two motions to dismiss, (ECF Nos. 23 38), both by FedEx, which assert, first, under Rule 12(b)(2) that this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over certain of FedEx's corporate guises and, second, under Rule 12(b)(6), that Indiana's Worker's Compensation Act provides Plaintiffs' only remedy, such that they have "failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2), 12(b)(6). The operative complaint is Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint. (ECF No. 16.)

II. Legal Standard

A. Rule 12(b)(2)

A Rule 12(b)(2) motion tests this Court's personal jurisdiction over the defendant. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(2). At this stage, the Court will "take the plaintiff's asserted facts as true and resolve any factual disputes in its favor." NBA Properties, Inc. v. HANWJH, No. 21-2909, 2022 WL 3367823, at *3 (7th Cir. Aug. 16, 2022) (quoting uBID, Inc. v. GoDaddy Grp., Inc., 623 F.3d 421, 423-24 (7th Cir. 2010)). However, "the plaintiff bears the burden of demonstrating the existence of jurisdiction." Id. (quoting Purdue Rsch. Found. v. Sanofi-Synthelabo, S.A., 338 F.3d 773, 782 (7th Cir. 2003)). The Court "may consider affidavits on the issue of personal jurisdiction; both parties' affidavits are accepted as true, and where they conflict, the plaintiff is entitled to resolution in its favor." Id. (citing Curry v. Revolution Lab'ys, LLC, 949 F.3d 385, 393 (7th Cir. 2020)).

B. Rule 12(b)(6)

"A Rule 12(b)(6) motion tests 'the legal sufficiency of a complaint,' as measured against the standards of Rule 8(a)." Gunn v. Cont'l Cas. Co., 968 F.3d 802, 806 (7th Cir. 2020) (citing Runnion v. Girl Scouts of Greater Chi. and Nw. Ind., 786 F.3d 510, 526 (7th Cir. 2015)). Rule 8(a) requires that the complaint contain a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). "To meet this standard, a plaintiff is not required to include 'detailed factual allegations,'" but the factual allegations must "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if it "pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). When considering a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, courts "take all the factual allegations in the complaint as true," Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor, Roberts v. City of Chicago, 817 F.3d 561, 564 (7th Cir. 2016). Courts need not, however, accept the truth of legal conclusions, and "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

That said, "the bar to survive a motion to dismiss is not high." Gociman v. Loyola Univ. of Chicago, 41 F.4th 873 (7th Cir. 2022) (citing Bonte v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 624 F.3d 461, 463 (7th Cir. 2010)). "[A] plaintiff 'receives the benefit of imagination, so long as the hypotheses are consistent with the complaint.'" Chapman v. Yellow Cab Coop., 875 F.3d 846, 848 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 563).

III. Discussion

A. Personal Jurisdiction

FedEx argues that not all its divisions are subject to this Court's personal jurisdiction. (FedEx Br. Supp. 9, ECF No. 31.) As the caption of this case indicates, the FedEx business is divided into various separate corporations: Fedex Corporation (the parent company), FedEx Ground Package System, Inc. (the ground transport division), Federal Express Corporation (the express mail division), and Fedex Corporate Services, Inc. (a centralized administrative service for the other divisions). FedEx thus argues that FedEx does no business in Indiana; FedEx has never heard of Indiana; only Ground does business in Indiana; what Ground does in Indiana is its own affair. That argument is, of course, preposterous-but it might be valid as a point of corporate law. Because corporations are treated as separate legal entities, "as a general rule, the jurisdictional contacts of a subsidiary corporation are not imputed to the parent." Purdue Rsch. Found. v. Sanofi-Synthelabo, S.A., 338 F.3d 773, 788 n.17 (7th Cir. 2003) (citing Central States, S.E. & S.W. Areas Pension Fund v. Reimer Express World Corp., 230 F.3d 934, 943-44 (7th Cir. 2000); Consolidated Dev. Corp. v. Sherritt, Inc., 216 F.3d 1286, 1293 (11th Cir. 2000); Dickson Marine Inc. v. Panalpina, Inc., 179 F.3d 331, 338 (5th Cir. 1999); Szakacs v. Anheuser-Busch Cos., Inc., 644 F.Supp. 1121, 1125 (N.D. Ind.1986); Anthem Ins. Cos., Inc. v. Tenet Healthcare Corp., 730 N.E.2d 1227, 1240 n. 17 (Ind. 2000)). It is therefore quite possible that FedEx cannot ultimately be held to account for its subsidiaries' actions in Indiana.

Here, though, the Court rules on a 12(b)(2) motion, where, as described above, Plaintiffs get the benefit of the doubt.^[1] NBA Properties, 2022 WL 3367823 at *3. In some cases, where subsidiaries are mere agents of the parent corporation's business, personal jurisdiction is appropriate against the out-of-forum parent. See IDS Life Ins. Co. v. SunAmerica Life Ins. Co., 136 F.3d 537, 541 (7th Cir. 1998) ("[A] corporation should not be able to insulate itself from the jurisdiction of the states in which it does business by the simple expedient of separately incorporating its sales force and other operations in each state."); § 1069.4 Application of Modern Jurisdictional Principles-Contacts by Related Entities, 4A Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. §1069.4 (4th ed.) (restating the law, collecting cases, and concluding "[t]he very nature of these often difficult issues makes their resolution extremely fact dependent."). The Court, then, heeds FedEx's affidavits on its corporate structure and its business operations in Indiana but holds that those affidavits are not dispositive on the issue of personal jurisdiction. Plaintiffs have alleged an entanglement between the various branches of FedEx sufficient to overcome the presumption of corporate separateness. Plaintiffs allege that FedEx's subsidiaries are "operating units" of the parent corporation, (Compl. ¶ 13, ECF No. 16), that FedEx devised and implemented the security plan at the Indianapolis Ground facility, (id. ¶ 15-16), that FedEx has a registered agent in Indiana for service of process, (id. ¶ 18), that FedEx Services provides "legal, finance, tax, treasury, accounting and investor services" to Ground, (id. ¶ 38), and that Services contracted for security at the Indianapolis Ground facility, (id. ¶ 41). Taken together, those allegations suffice to carry Plaintiffs' initial burden of demonstrating personal jurisdiction over FedEx, either directly by in-state contacts or indirectly by imputing Ground's Indiana contacts to FedEx's various divisions.

B. Sufficiency of Claim

The Indiana Worker's Compensation Act provides the exclusive remedy, under Indiana law, for employees injured by accidents at work. Ind. Code § 22-3-2-6. Cases within the scope of the Act are to be decided by the Indiana worker's compensation board. Id. § 22-3-1-2. Indiana state courts of general jurisdiction may not hear them. Sims v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 782 N.E.2d 345, 349-50 (Ind. 2003). If a case brought in state court is found to be within the scope of the Act, the state court dismisses for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Goetzke v. Ferro Corp., 280 F.3d 766, 778 (7th Cir. 2002). One might think, then, that if such a case is brought in federal court sitting in diversity, then the federal court should also dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. It is not so. The Seventh Circuit, applying the axiom that state legislatures have no power to modify Congress' statutory grant of federal jurisdiction,^[2] instructs that the federal court in such a case must instead dismiss for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted.^[3] Id. at 779 (citing Beach v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 728 F.2d 407, 409 (7th Cir. 1984)). The parties' dispute here, then, is addressed under Rule 12(b)(6).

FedEx argues that Plaintiffs have by their own allegations pled a worker's compensation case. Cf. Summers v. Crossroads Galvanizing, LLC, No. 4:21-CV-074-PPS-JEM, 2022 WL 3595014, at *3 (N.D. Ind. Aug. 22, 2022) (quoting Perry v. Stizer Buick GMC, Inc., 637 N.E.2d 1282, 1286 (Ind. 1994) ("Where, as here, 'a plaintiff's own complaint recites facts demonstrating the employment relationship and its role in the injuries alleged,' the plaintiff carries the burden 'to demonstrate some grounds for taking the...