John Doe v. John Doe (In re John Doe)
| Decision Date | 26 November 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. 37486.,37486. |
| Citation | 150 Idaho 46,244 P.3d 190 |
| Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
| Parties | In the Matter of John Doe, a Minor Child Under Eighteen Years of Age. John DOE I and Jane Doe, Petitioners–Respondents, v. John DOE II, Respondent–Appellant. |
May, Rammell & Thompson, Chtd., Pocatello, for appellant. Aaron N. Thompson argued.
M. Brent Morgan, Chtd., Pocatello, for respondent. M. Brent Morgan argued.
John Doe II appeals the magistrate court's judgment terminating his parental rights to his child. We reverse.
Appellant John Doe II (Father) and Respondent Jane Doe (Mother) married in April of 2002. At the time of the marriage, Father was enlisted in the U.S. Army and the couple lived in Italy, where Father was stationed. Mother became pregnant later that year and gave birth to a son (Son) in 2003.1 Father was later honorably discharged from the Army, and the family moved to Klamath Falls, Oregon, where they lived with Mother's parents. While living in Oregon, Father, who had also previously served in the U.S. Marine Corp., decided to re-enlist with the Marines and was temporarily assigned to a position in Klamath Falls pending deployment for training. As a result of continuing marital problems, Mother moved to Pocatello, Idaho, with Son to attend college. Father then filed for a divorce in Oregon in May of 2005. Around this same time, Father received orders from the Marine Corp. and was ultimately stationed in North Carolina. He was also required to attend training in California prior to being permanently stationed in North Carolina.
While the divorce proceedings were pending, Father filed a motion in Oregon court seeking immediate parenting time with Son. The Oregon court entered a temporary parenting time schedule allowing visitation with Son for eight hours during a weekend in July of 2005, as well as eight hours during a weekend in September of 2005. Pursuant to the parenting time schedule, the visitation was to take place in Klamath Falls, and Mother was to be responsible for transporting Son to Oregon. Father exercised his visitation rights in July, but did not exercise his visitation in September because Mother, due to her school schedule, was unable to transport Son to Oregon. The visit in July of 2005 is the last physical contact Father had with Son.
In 2006, Father and Mother stipulated to the terms of a judgment dissolving their marriage and fixing custody of Son. Pursuant to the judgment, Mother and Father were awarded joint legal custody of Son. Mother was designated as the primary residential parent and Father was granted unsupervised visitation rights. Father was responsible for paying the costs associated with traveling to Pocatello for the visits, and was also ordered to pay child support in the amount of $350 per month. In December of 2006, Mother contacted Father's commanding officer and arranged for the monthly child support payment to be automatically withheld from Father's military pay, which remained in effect up through the conclusion of the termination proceedings.
In July of 2007, Mother filed a petition for termination of Father's parental rights alleging that Father had abandoned Son. The termination proceedings were stayed because Father was deployed to Iraq from August 2007 until March 2008. In May of 2008, Mother married John Doe I (Stepfather). Stepfather and Mother had been dating since Son was three years old and Stepfather had developed a good relationship with Son. At some point during the course of Son's relationship with Stepfather, Son began to call him "Dad" or "Daddy."
Once Father returned from Iraq, Mother and Stepfather filed a second petition for termination of parental rights, again alleging abandonment.2 In April of 2009, following Father's request to visit Son, Mother filed a motion asking the court to suspend Father's court-ordered visitation. In support of her motion, Mother argued that Father had not had any contact with Son for the previous four years and she felt a visit would cause Son to suffer psychological trauma. The court granted Mother's motion and prohibited Father from having contact with Son for the duration of the termination proceedings. Finally, Mother and Stepfather filed an amended petition for termination of parental rights, this time alleging abuse in addition to abandonment. Specifically, the petition alleged that Father had not had any contact with Son since July of 2005 and that he had previously physically and mentally abused Son. Additionally, Stepfather sought to adopt Son in the amended petition.
After conducting a trial on the petition, the magistrate court issued an order terminating Father's parental rights. The court found that while Father had substantially complied with his child support obligations, he had willfully failed to maintain a normal parental relationship with Son by not maintaining regular personal contact with him for a period of at least three years.3 The court further found there was no just cause for Father's failure to maintain a normal parental relationship with the child. Additionally, the court found it was in Son's best interests to terminate Father's parental rights because Son was doing well in the custody of Mother and Stepfather, and termination and adoption were necessary to provide him with permanency and stability. The court rejected the allegations of abuse and based its decision solely on the ground of abandonment.4
I. Whether there is substantial, competent evidence in the record to support the magistrate court's decision to terminate Father's parental rights.
Grounds for termination of parental rights must be shown by clear and convincing evidence because each parent has a fundamental liberty interest in maintaining a relationship with his or her child. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 1403, 71 L.Ed.2d 599, 616 (1982) ; In re Aragon, 120 Idaho 606, 608, 609, 818 P.2d 310, 312, 313 (1991). "Clear and convincing evidence is generally understood to be ‘[e]vidence indicating that the thing to be proved is highly probable or reasonably certain.’ " In re Adoption of Doe, 143 Idaho 188, 191, 141 P.3d 1057, 1060 (2006) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 577 (7th ed. 1999)). On appeal, this Court will not disturb the magistrate court's decision to terminate parental rights if there is substantial, competent evidence in the record to support the decision. State v. Doe, 143 Idaho 343, 345, 144 P.3d 597, 599 (2006). "Substantial, competent evidence is ‘such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’ " Id. at 345–46, 144 P.3d at 599–600 (quoting Folks v. Moscow Sch. Dist. No. 281, 129 Idaho 833, 836, 933 P.2d 642, 645 (1997) ). This Court is required to conduct an independent review of the magistrate court record, but must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the magistrate court's judgment, as the magistrate court has the opportunity to "observe witnesses' demeanor, to assess their credibility, to detect prejudice or motive and to judge the character of the parties." In re Aragon, 120 Idaho at 608, 818 P.2d at 312.
In this case, the magistrate court terminated Father's parental rights on the grounds of abandonment and on a finding it was in the best interests of the child to terminate those rights. Statutory grounds for termination of parental rights under Idaho Code section 16–2005 include: (a) abandonment; (b) neglect or abuse; (c) lack of a biological relationship between the child and a presumptive parent; (d) inability to discharge parental responsibilities for a prolonged period, which will be injurious to the health, morals, or well-being of the child; or (e) incarceration for a substantial period of time during the child's minority. I.C. § 16–2005. Upon finding a statutory ground for termination, the court must also find that it is in the best interests of the child to terminate the parent-child relationship. I.C. § 16–2005(1). Both findings must be established by clear and convincing evidence.
On appeal, Father argues that he did not willfully fail to maintain a normal parental relationship with Son because he did not have the ability to maintain significant contact with him. Specifically, Father asserts that because he was stationed in North Carolina, some 2,500 miles away from Pocatello, he did not have the financial ability to travel to Pocatello to exercise his visitation rights. Father also argues that during the time he was stationed in North Carolina, he was preparing for deployment in Iraq and his active military status "hampered if not eliminated his ability to reasonably maintain a normal parental relationship." He further contends that any contact he did have with Mother was acrimonious, which contributed to his inability to maintain a normal parental relationship with Son. In the alternative, Father argues that even if he willfully failed to maintain regular personal contact with Son, there was just cause for his failure to do so.
Pursuant to Idaho Code section 16–2002(5), abandonment occurs when "the parent has willfully failed to maintain a normal parental relationship including, but not limited to, reasonable support or regular personal contact." I.C. § 16–2002(5). When a parent fails to maintain a normal parental relationship without just cause for a period of one year, prima facie evidence of abandonment exists. Id. There is no universal standard for what constitutes a normal parental relationship, and whether such a relationship exists depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. In re Adoption of Doe, 143 Idaho at 191, 141 P.3d at 1060. The burden of persuasion is on the petitioner to demonstrate that the defendant lacks a normal parental relationship with the child and that there is no just cause for the failure to maintain such...
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Doe v. Doe, 37486.
...244 P.3d 190150 Idaho 46In the Matter of John Doe, a Minor Child Under Eighteen Years of Age.John DOE I and Jane Doe, Petitioners-Respondents,v.John DOE II, Respondent-Appellant.No. 37486.Supreme Court of Idaho,Boise, September 2010 Term.Nov. 26, 2010.Rehearing Denied Jan. 5, 2011.244 P.3d ......