John Doe v. Roe

• Decision Date: 24 June 2021
• Docket Number: No. M2020-01277-COA-R3-CV,M2020-01277-COA-R3-CV
• Citation: 638 S.W.3d 614
• Parties: John DOE v. Jane ROE
• Court: Tennessee Court of Appeals

638 S.W.3d 614

John DOE

v.Jane ROE

No. M2020-01277-COA-R3-CV

Court of Appeals of Tennessee, AT NASHVILLE.

May 5, 2021 Session

FILED June 24, 2021

John J. Griffin, Jr., Michael A. Johnson, and Kelley Strange, Nashville, Tennessee, and David T. Hooper, Brentwood, Tennessee, for the appellant, Jane Roe.

Michelle Owens, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellee, John Doe.

David L. Hudson, Jr., Nashville, Tennessee, for amicus curiae, First Amendment Scholar.

Arnold B. Goldin, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which W. Neal McBrayer and Kenny Armstrong, JJ., joined.

OPINION

Arnold B. Goldin, J.

This appeal involves review of a trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's lawsuit pursuant to the Tennessee Public Participation Act. The trial court determined that the Tennessee Public Participation Act was not applicable and denied the motion, finding that the defendant's activity was not protected. The defendant now appeals, contending that the underlying matter involves the exercise of her right to free speech and her right to petition. We agree and find that the defendant engaged in protected activity in the filing of a Title IX complaint. Because we find that the defendant's appeal is limited to that part of the trial court's judgment relating to the allegations in plaintiff's lawsuit concerning defendant's Title IX complaint, we reverse in part the trial court's cited basis for denial and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion and the Tennessee Public Participation Act.

BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The facts giving rise to this appeal are largely in dispute and are a matter of great contention between the parties. The plaintiff and defendant, identified as John Doe and Jane Roe respectively in this litigation, were acquaintances prior to the events giving rise to this appeal. At the time of the alleged incident, both parties were students at Middle Tennessee State University ("MTSU") in Murfreesboro, Tennessee. On November 30, 2018, Roe met up with Doe. Roe alleges that Doe sexually assaulted her later that night, which Doe disputes. At varying times after the incident, Roe informed friends and family of the assault, including a professor at MTSU. On December 5, 2019, Roe filed a complaint with MTSU's Title IX office. The Title IX office later completed its investigation, finding that there was a lack of evidence to proceed further, specifically noting that "the proof does not show that it was more likely than not" that a Title IX violation occurred.

Doe ultimately filed a complaint in the Davidson County Circuit Court ("the trial court") against Roe for defamation, false light invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Specifically, Doe based his claims on Roe's Title IX complaint as well as her purported communications regarding the incident with friends and family and on social media. In response to Doe's complaint, Roe filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that her activity was protected under the Tennessee Public Participation Act ("TPPA"), codified at Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-17-101 et seq.¹ Roe's motion was specifically filed pursuant to the authority in Tennessee Code Annotated section 20-17-104(a), which provides that "[i]f a legal action is filed in response to a party's exercise of the right of free speech, right to petition, or right of association, that party may petition the court to dismiss the legal action." Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-17-104(a). Following a hearing, the trial court denied Roe's motion, finding that the matter was not one of public concern such as to warrant the application of the TPPA. Roe thereafter filed this interlocutory appeal as permitted by the statute.²

ISSUE PRESENTED

Roe raises a single issue³ for our review on appeal:

1. Whether the trial court erred in holding that the Tennessee Public Participation Act, Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-17-101, et seq. , does not apply to the report of an alleged crime to a government entity.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

At the outset, we note that the TPPA is a relatively new creature of the legislature, having only been codified in 2019. In fact, the first Tennessee appellate opinion providing guidance on interpretation of the TPPA was only recently decided. See Nandigam Neurology, PLC v. Beavers , M2020-00553-COA-R3-CV, 2021 WL 2494935 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 18, 2021).

Statutory construction is a question of law which we review de novo with no presumption of correctness. Tenn. R. App. P. 13(d) ; Spears v. Weatherall , 385 S.W.3d 547, 549 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2012). As we are interpreting a statute, the rules of statutory construction shall apply. Our goal in statutory construction is to "carry out legislative intent without broadening or restricting the statute beyond its intended scope." In re Estate of Tanner , 295 S.W.3d 610, 613 (Tenn. 2009) (citing Houghton v. Aramark Educ. Res., Inc., 90 S.W.3d 676, 678 (Tenn. 2002) ). As such, we presume that every word contained in a statute has both meaning and purpose and should therefore be given its full effect if the General Assembly's obvious intention is not violated in doing so. Id. at 613–14 (citing In re C.K.G. , 173 S.W.3d 714, 722 (Tenn. 2005) ). Thus, when the language of a statute is unambiguous, we apply its plain meaning. State v. Wilson , 132 S.W.3d 340, 341 (Tenn. 2004) (citing Carson Creek Vacation Resorts v. Dep't of Revenue , 865 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Tenn. 1993) ). Essentially, "[o]ur obligation is simply to enforce the written language." In re Estate of Tanner , 295 S.W.3d at 614 (citing Abels ex rel. Hunt v. Genie Indus., Inc. , 202 S.W.3d 99, 102 (Tenn. 2006) ).

DISCUSSION

Anti-SLAPP Statutes and The Tennessee Public Participation Act

The underlying matter involves the application of Tennessee's Anti-SLAPP law, the TPPA, to a lawsuit filed by Doe against Roe for defamation, false light invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. SLAPP⁴ suits are lawsuits used "as a powerful instrument of coercion or retaliation" against a defendant, George W. Pring & Penelope Canan, "Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation" ("SLAPPS"): An Introduction for Bench, Bar and Bystanders , 12 BRIDGEPORT L. REV. 937, 942 (1992) (quoting Bill Johnson's Rests., Inc. v. NLRB , 461 U.S. 731, 740–41, 103 S.Ct. 2161, 76 L.Ed.2d 277 (1983) ), and anti-SLAPP legislation such as the TPPA is designed to counteract such lawsuits and prevent "meritless suits aimed at silencing a plaintiff's opponents, or at least diverting their resources." John C. Barker, Common-Law and Statutory Solutions to the Problem of SLAPPs , 26 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 395, 396 (1993).

Enacted in 2019, the TPPA is designed to "encourage and safeguard the constitutional rights of persons to petition, to speak freely, to associate freely, and to participate in government to the fullest extent permitted by law and, at the same time, protect the rights of persons to file meritorious lawsuits for demonstrable injury." Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-17-102. As with the typical design of anti-SLAPP statutes, the TPPA works to "discourage[ ] and sanction[ ] frivolous lawsuits and permits the early disposition of those cases before parties are forced to incur substantial litigation expenses." Todd Hambridge et al., Speak Up. , 55 Tenn. B.J. 14, 15 (2019). Although it has been noted that Tennessee had a limited anti-SLAPP statute before the TPPA, the TPPA "broadens anti-SLAPP protection." Id.

The TPPA provides relief for parties who partake in protected activity constituting either the exercise of the right of association, the exercise of the right of free speech, or the exercise of the right to petition. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 20-17-104(a), 20-17-105. Specifically, if the petitioning party makes a prima facie case that they have participated in protected activity under the TPPA, the court may then dismiss the action against them, "unless the responding party establishes a prima facie case for each essential element of the claim in the legal action." Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-17-105(a)(b). The TPPA also provides definitions as to what constitutes these forms of protected activity. For example, an "exercise of the right of association" is an "exercise of the constitutional right to join together to take collective action on a matter of public concern that falls within the protection of the United States Constitution or the Tennessee Constitution." Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-17-103(2). An "exercise of the right of free speech" means "a communication made in connection with a matter of public concern or religious expression that falls within the protection of the United States Constitution or the Tennessee Constitution." Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-17-103(3). Finally, an "exercise of the right to petition" means "a communication that falls within the protection of the United States Constitution or the Tennessee Constitution and: (A) Is intended to encourage consideration or review of any issue by a federal, state, or local legislative, executive, judicial, or other governmental body; or (B) Is intended to enlist public participation in an effort to effect consideration of an issue by a federal, state, or local legislative, executive, judicial, or other governmental body[.]" Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-17-103(4).

Notably, the definitions above reveal that both the "exercise of the right of association" and the "exercise of the right of free speech" require that the activity be connected with a "matter of public concern." Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-17-103(2–3). As defined by the statute, a "matter of public concern" includes issues relating to: "(A) Health or safety; (B) Environmental, economic, or community well-being; (C) The government; (D) A public official or public figure; (E) A good, product, or service in the marketplace; (F) A literary, musical, artistic, political, theatrical, or audiovisual work; or (G) Any other matter deemed by a court to involve a matter of public concern." Tenn. Code Ann. § 20-17-103(6)...