Johns v. Suzuki Motor of Am., Inc.

• Decision Date: 19 October 2020
• Docket Number: S19G1478
• Citation: 310 Ga. 159,850 S.E.2d 59
• Parties: JOHNS et al. v. SUZUKI MOTOR OF AMERICA, INC. et al.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

310 Ga. 159

850 S.E.2d 59

JOHNS et al.

v.SUZUKI MOTOR OF AMERICA, INC. et al.

S19G1478

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Decided: October 19, 2020

Parks, Chesin & Walbert, David F. Walbert, Jennifer K. Coalson ; Cochran & Edwards, R. Randy Edwards, Paul A. Piland ; Sherrod & Bernard, John W. Sherrod, for appellants.

King & Spalding, Chilton D. Varner, Susan M. Clare, for appellees.

John D. Hadden ; Balch & Bingham, James D. Meadows, James L. Hollis, Malissa A. Kaufold- Wiggins, Patrick N. Silloway ; Chambless, Higdon, Richardson, Katz & Griggs, David N. Nelson ; Drew, Eckl & Farnham, Elissa B. Haynes ; Ellis Painter Ratterree & Adams, Philip M. Thompson, amici curiae.

Nahmias, Presiding Justice.

We granted this petition for certiorari to decide whether OCGA § 51-12-33 (a) applies to a strict products liability claim under OCGA § 51-1-11. The Court of Appeals held that strict products liability claims are subject to such apportionment. See Suzuki Motor of America v. Johns , 351 Ga. App. 186, 198, 830 S.E.2d 549 (2019). For the reasons discussed below, we agree, so we affirm.

1. The facts of this case are detailed throughout the Court of Appeals opinion, and

we will merely summarize them as pertinent here. Adrian Johns was seriously injured in August 2013 when the front brake on his Suzuki motorcycle failed suddenly. He sued the designer and manufacturer of the motorcycle, Suzuki Motor Corporation ("SMC"), and its wholly-owned subsidiary and American distributor, Suzuki Motor of America, Inc. ("SMAI") (collectively, "Suzuki"), asserting a claim of strict products liability based on a design defect and two negligence claims (breach of a continuing duty to warn and negligent recall). Adrian's wife, Gwen Johns, also sued Suzuki, alleging loss of consortium.

The case proceeded to trial, where the Johnses presented evidence showing that the brake failure of Adrian's motorcycle was caused by a defect in the design of the front master brake cylinder that created a corrosive condition, which resulted in a "leak path" that misdirected the flow of brake fluid and caused the total brake failure. About two months after Adrian's accident, Suzuki issued a recall notice warning about a safety defect in the front brake master cylinder. Suzuki had notice of the issue, including reports of similar accidents, for a significant amount of time before Adrian's accident. Adrian admitted, however, that contrary to the instructions in the owner's manual to replace the brake fluid every two years, he had not changed the fluid during the eight years he had owned the motorcycle.

The jury found in favor of the Johnses on all claims. It awarded $10.5 million in compensatory damages to Adrian and another $2 million to Gwen. The jury apportioned 49% of the fault to Adrian and 51% to the two defendants – 45% to SMC and 6% to SMAI. In light of these findings, the trial court reduced Adrian's award to $5,355,000 and Gwen's award to $1,020,000. Because the damages after apportionment were less than the Johnses’ pretrial demand of $10 million, the trial court rejected the Johnses’ request for pre-judgment interest under OCGA § 51-12-14 (a).

The Johnses cross-appealed,¹ arguing that because their claim was based on strict products liability, the trial court erred in reducing the damages awards based on OCGA § 51-12-33 (a), and therefore also erred in failing to award them pre-judgment interest. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's rulings. See Suzuki Motor , 351 Ga. App. at 198-199 & n.5, 830 S.E.2d 549. As explained below, the Court of Appeals did so correctly.²

2. The current version of OCGA § 51-12-33 was enacted in 2005. See Ga. L. 2005, p. 1, § 12. As particularly relevant to the issue

presented in this case, subsection (a) of § 51-12-33 says:

Where an action is brought against one or more persons for injury to person or property and the plaintiff is to some degree responsible for the injury or damages claimed, the trier of fact, in its determination of the total amount of damages to be awarded, if any, shall determine the percentage of fault of the plaintiff and the judge shall reduce the amount of damages otherwise awarded to the plaintiff in proportion to his or her percentage of fault.

Subsection (g) says:

Notwithstanding the provisions of this Code section or any other provisions of law which might be construed to the contrary, the plaintiff shall not be entitled to receive any damages if the plaintiff is 50 percent or more responsible for the injury or damages claimed.

We have said that these two subsections together "codify the doctrine of comparative negligence." Zaldivar v. Prickett , 297 Ga. 589, 594, 774 S.E.2d 688 (2015).³

As the Court of Appeals recognized, "by its plain terms, the statute governs actions ‘for injury to person,’ without in any way distinguishing between the theories upon which those claims are premised." Suzuki Motor , 351 Ga. App. at 198, 830 S.E.2d 549. The Johnses’ strict products liability claim is "an action ... brought against one or more persons [SMC and SMAI] for injury to person [Adrian]." OCGA § 51-12-33 (a). Thus, the strict products liability claim falls comfortably within the statute's textual ambit. See Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Loudermilk , 305 Ga. 558, 562, 826 S.E.2d 116 (2019) (explaining that "a statute draws its meaning ... from its text," and "we must read the statutory text in its most natural and reasonable way, as an ordinary speaker of the English language would" (citations and punctuation omitted)).

The Johnses argue that OCGA § 51-12-33 (a) does not apply because neither that provision nor the preamble to the 2005 act of which it was a part expressly mentions strict products liability. But it is not necessary for the statute (much less its preamble) to recite "strict products liability" to encompass strict products liability claims like Adrian's within its broad, and by all appearances applicable, language. See Couch v. Red Roof Inns , 291 Ga. 359, 361-363, 729 S.E.2d 378 (2012) (applying OCGA § 51-12-33 to intentional tortfeasors not because the statute mentions them but because "the ordinary meaning of ‘fault’ ... includes intentional conduct," explaining that "a thing need not be defined into a class that already includes it").

3. The Johnses further argue that even if the language of OCGA § 51-12-33 (a) would otherwise apply to their claim, we should read into the statute an exception for strict products liability claims, based on a line of Georgia precedent holding that principles of comparative negligence do not apply to such claims. That precedent, however, was supplanted by OCGA § 51-12-33 (a) and (g).

Georgia's strict products liability statute, OCGA § 51-1-11, was originally enacted in 1968. See Ga. L. 1968, p. 1166. OCGA § 51-1-11 (b) (1) says:

The manufacturer of any personal property sold as new property directly or through a dealer or any other person shall be liable in tort, irrespective of privity, to any natural person who may use, consume, or reasonably be affected by the property and who suffers injury to his person or property because the property when sold by the manufacturer was not merchantable and reasonably suited to the use intended, and its condition when sold is the proximate cause of the injury sustained.

"The paramount purpose of strict liability is the protection of otherwise defenseless victims of manufacturing defects and the spreading throughout society of the cost of compensating them." Farmex Inc. v. Wainwright , 269 Ga. 548, 550, 501 S.E.2d 802 (1998) (citation and punctuation omitted). To advance these goals, strict products liability "imposes liability irrespective of negligence." Ford Motor Co. v. Carter , 239 Ga. 657, 660, 238 S.E.2d 361 (1977) (plurality opinion). See also Alexander v. General Motors Corp. , 267 Ga. 339, 340, 478 S.E.2d 123 (1996) ("[A] strict liability claim in Georgia ... eliminates questions of negligence and the usual defenses to negligence."); Ellis v. Rich's, Inc. , 233 Ga. 573, 576, 212 S.E.2d 373 (1975) ("Essentially the doctrine of strict liability eliminates questions of negligence in tort actions.").⁴

A number of cases from this Court and the Court of Appeals have held that a plaintiff's negligence generally is not a defense to a claim of strict products liability. See Deere & Co. v. Brooks , 250 Ga. 517, 518, 299 S.E.2d 704 (1983) (" ‘[T]he case law generally is in accord with the Restatement of Torts in holding that contributory negligence is not a defense to a claim of strict liability for product-caused harm.’ " (citation omitted) (referring to Restatement (Second) of Torts § 402A (1965) ); Ford Motor Co. , 239 Ga. at 661 n.3, 238 S.E.2d 361 (plurality opinion) ("Contributory negligence on the part of the injured party is generally not available as a defense in strict liability actions."); Ray v. Ford Motor Co. , 237 Ga. App. 316, 319-320, 514 S.E.2d 227 (1999) ; Barger v. Garden Way, Inc. , 231 Ga. App. 723, 727, 499 S.E.2d 737 (1998) ; Continental Research Corp. v. Reeves , 204 Ga. App. 120, 128, 419 S.E.2d 48 (1992) (physical precedent only); Parzini v. Center Chem. Co. , 136 Ga. App. 396, 399, 221 S.E.2d 475 (1975).⁵

Although the Johnses would like to rely on the precedent established by these cases, all of the cases were decided before the 2005 enactment of OCGA § 51-12-33 (a) and (g).⁶ There is no question that statutes can displace decisional law. See Couch , 291 Ga. at 364, 729 S.E.2d 378 ("[A]s long as legislation does not violate the Constitution, when the Legislature says something clearly – or even just implies it – statutes trump cases."). In fact, we have held that the very statute at issue here supplanted the common law prohibiting apportionment to intentional tortfeasors. See id. at 364-365, 729 S.E.2d 378. Given the clear and broad language of OCGA § 51-12-33, we conclude, as the Court of Appeals did, that the statute supplanted the nocomparative-negligence holdings of the pre-2005 cases on...