Johnson ex rel. Johnson v. DeProspo

• Decision Date: 03 September 2020
• Docket Number: 1:20-CV-2878 (LLS)
• Parties: JEREMIAH S. JOHNSON-EL Exrel JERRY L. JOHNSON, Plaintiff, v. WILLIAM L. DePROSPO d/b/a COUNTY COURT MAGISTRATE, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

JEREMIAH S. JOHNSON-EL Exrel JERRY L. JOHNSON, Plaintiff, v. WILLIAM L. DePROSPO d/b/a COUNTY COURT MAGISTRATE, Defendant.

1:20-CV-2878 (LLS)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

September 3, 2020

ORDER OF DISMISSAL

LOUIS L. STANTON, United States District Judge:

Plaintiff, who appears pro se, styles his pleading, which the Court will refer to as the complaint, as a "Legal Notice of Removal From Municipal Court to Federal Court." He names William L. DeProspo, a Judge of the County Court, Orange County, as the sole defendant. Plaintiff alleges that Judge DeProspo violated his federal constitutional rights. He seeks damages and the return of his pistol permit. He also asks the Court to enforce the "Divine Constitution and By-Laws of the Moorish Science Temple of America; The Moorish Nation of North America; Act VI; . . . [and] [t]he Treaty of Peace and Friendship of EIGHTEEN HUNDRED and THIRTY-SIX." (Id.) He further asks the Supreme Court of the United States to view him "as a Moorish American National (Natural Born Citizen of the Land) and not as a (brand) NEGRO, BLACKMAN (person), COLORED, AFRICAN-AMERICAN, or other SLAVE TITLE or 'nom de guerre' imposed on [him] for misrepresentation." (Id.) In addition, he asks the Supreme Court of the United States "to fulfill [its] obligation to preserve [his] rights . . . and carry out [its] Judicial Duty . . . by ordering [the defendant] to be brought before the Law to answer for [his] criminal and unjust actions." (Id.) And he asks the Court to dismiss and expunge "ALL UNCONSTITUTIONAL Citations - Summons / Ticket - Suit /(misrepresented) Bill of Exchange: Number Pistol Permit 592-C16, and any other 'Order' or 'Action' associated with it / them . . . or [that the present action] be brought before a legitimately - delegated, and competent 'Court of Law' of International jurisdiction /venue." (Id.) The Court construes Plaintiff's complaint as asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

By order dated August 27, 2020, the Court granted Plaintiff's request to proceed without prepayment of fees, that is, in forma pauperis ("IFP").¹ For the reasons discussed below, the Court dismisses the present action.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or portion thereof, that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a complaint when the Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the "strongest [claims] that they suggest," Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted, emphasis inoriginal). But the "special solicitude" in pro se cases, id. at 475 (citation omitted), has its limits - to state a claim, pro se pleadings still must comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.

The Supreme Court of the United States has held that under Rule 8, a complaint must include enough facts to state a claim for relief "that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible if the plaintiff pleads enough factual detail to allow the Court to draw the inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). In reviewing the complaint, the Court must accept all well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Id. But it does not have to accept as true "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action," which are essentially just legal conclusions. Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). After separating legal conclusions from well-pleaded factual allegations, the Court must determine whether those facts make it plausible - not merely possible - that the pleader is entitled to relief. Id. at 679.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff's complaint is difficult to comprehend; it is replete with unnecessary legal jargon and references to purported treaties between the United States of America and other nations and entities. But the Court understands the complaint as making the following allegations: Judge DeProspo relied on false statements and Plaintiff's previous illegal traffic stop by a member of the Town of Chester Police Department to unconstitutionally revoke Plaintiff's pistol permit.

DISCUSSION

A. Claims arising from the traffic stop

Plaintiff asserts claims for damages against those "who initiated this false incident regarding a traffic stop which did not involve any firearms." (ECF 1, at 11.) These claims areduplicative of claims Plaintiff has raised in a previously filed action, Johnson El v. Bird, No. 7:19-CV-5102 - an action that was pending before Judge Cathy Seibel of this Court when Plaintiff filed the present action.² The Court therefore dismisses these claims without prejudice as duplicative of Plaintiff's claims in Johnson El, No. 7:19-CV-5102. See Sacerdote v. Cammack Larhette Advisors, LLC, 939 F.3d 498, 505 (2d Cir. 2019) ("The vital difference between the rule against duplicative litigation and the doctrine of claim preclusion . . . is that the former can only be raised to bar one of two suits that are both still pending; the latter is generally raised, after a prior suit is resolved on the merits, to preclude a party (or its privy) from relitigating claims in a subsequent suit that were or could have been raised in the prior action.) (footnotes omitted); Curtis v. Citibank, N.A., 226 F.3d 133, 138-39 (2d Cir. 2000) (For a duplicative second action, "simple dismissal of the second suit is [a] common disposition because plaintiffs have no right to maintain two actions on the same subject in the same court, against the same defendant at the same time.").

B. Claims against Judge DeProspo

In another of Plaintiff's actions, Johnson El v. DeProspo, 1:19-CV-8426, Plaintiff asserted claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Judge DeProspo arising from Judge DeProspo's May 16, 2019 decision to revoke Plaintiff's pistol permit. On November 22, 2019, Chief Judge McMahon dismissed that action - she dismissed Plaintiff's claims under § 1983 against Judge DeProspo under the doctrine of absolute judicial immunity and as frivolous. Johnson El v. DeProspo, No. 1:19-CV-8426, 2019 WL 6311882, *2-3 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 22, 2019) ("Johnson El I"). Plaintiff did not appeal.

On April 6, 2020, Plaintiff filed the complaint commencing the present action, again asserting claims under § 1983 against Judge DeProspo arising from Judge DeProspo's decision to revoke Plaintiff's pistol permit. For the reasons discussed below, the Court dismisses Plaintiff's claims under § 1983 against Judge DeProspo under the doctrines of issue preclusion and judicial immunity.

1. Issue preclusion

The doctrine of issue preclusion, also known as collateral estoppel, bars the relitigation of a legal or factual issue decided in a previous action if "(1) the issues in both proceedings are identical, (2) the issue in the prior proceeding was actually litigated and actually decided, (3) there was [a] full and fair opportunity to litigate in the prior proceeding, and (4) the issue previously litigated was necessary to support a valid and final judgment on the merits." Grieve v. Tamerin, 269 F.3d 149, 153 (2d Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted, alteration in original); see Tracy v. Freshwater, 623 F.3d 90, 99 (2d Cir. 2010) ("Collateral estoppel precludes a party from relitigating in a subsequent action or proceeding an issue clearly raised in a prior action or proceeding and decided against that party.") (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). "The doctrine of issue preclusion . . . 'bars successive litigation of an issue of fact or law actually litigated and resolved in a valid court determination essential to the prior judgment, even if the issue recurs in the context of a different claim.'" Marcel Fashions Grp., Inc. v. Lucky Brand Dungarees, Inc., 779 F.3d 102, 108 (2d Cir. 2015) (citation omitted, emphasis in original).

Although issue preclusion is an affirmative defense that must be pleaded in a defendant's answer, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(c)(1), the Court may raise it on its own initiative, see Curry v. City of Syracuse, 316 F.3d 324, 331 (2d Cir. 2003) ("[W]e have previously upheld a district court'sdismissal of a case on collateral estoppel grounds even where collateral estoppel was not raised as an affirmative defense in the answer, but was raised by the district court sua sponte, without permitting the party against which it was asserted an opportunity to argue the issue.").

The present action presents one of the same issues that Chief Judge McMahon decided in Johnson El I - whether Judge DeProspo is immune from suit for any claims under § 1983 arising from Judge DeProspo's revocation of Plaintiff's pistol permit. All of the requirements for the application of issue preclusion are present. First, the relevant issue in the present action is identical to the relevant issue in Johnson El 1 - whether Judge DeProspo is immune from suit for any claims under § 1983 arising from the revocation of Plaintiff's pistol permit. Second, that issue has been litigated and decided. See Johnson El, 2019 WL 6311882, at *2-3. Third, Plaintiff had a full and fair opportunity to litigate that issue in Johnson EI I, but he never appealed. The fourth element, as it is often formulated, requires that "the issue previously litigated was necessary to support a valid and final judgment on the merits." Grieve, 269 F.3d at 153 (2d Cir. 2001) (...