Johnson Stewart Min. Co., Inc. v. Industrial Com'n of Arizona, 1
| Decision Date | 24 August 1982 |
| Docket Number | No. 1,CA-IC,1 |
| Citation | 652 P.2d 163,133 Ariz. 424 |
| Parties | JOHNSON STEWART MINING CO., INC., Petitioner Employer, Transamerica Insurance Company/Premier Insurance, Petitioner Carrier, v. The INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF ARIZONA, Respondent, David W. Butler, Respondent Employee. JOHNSON STEWART MINING CO., INC., Petitioner Employer, Transamerica Insurance Company/Premier Insurance, Petitioner Carrier, v. The INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF ARIZONA, Respondent, George A. Webb, Respondent Employee. 2625. |
| Court | Arizona Court of Appeals |
The issue presented in this special action review of an Industrial Commission award for compensable claim and temporary disability is whether there is reasonable evidence to support the finding by the administrative law judge that respondents were injured by accident occurring in the course of their employment. We find sufficient evidence and affirm the award.
Respondent employees George A. Webb and David W. Butler (respondents) worked as diesel mechanics for petitioner employer Johnson Stewart Mining Company, Inc. (petitioner employer). Three or four days prior to July 15, 1980, respondents were requested by their foreman, Lewis Crockett, to attend an educational seminar, after working hours, sponsored by the manufacturer of equipment used by the petitioner employer. Respondents, along with Mr. Crockett, went together in a car driven by Gary Kirkpatrick. They were picked up from their homes in Chandler and Mesa and driven to the Rodeway Inn in Phoenix, the site of the seminar. On their way home, after the seminar, the car collided with another car and both respondents suffered serious injuries.
Respondents filed Workmen's Compensation claims, which were denied by separate notices of claim status and respondents filed timely requests for a hearing. A consolidated hearing for both claims was held on March 11, 1981. Following the hearing, the administrative law judge issued his award finding compensable claims and awarding temporary benefits to both respondents. The award was based, primarily, upon the testimony of Respondent Webb 1 and Mr. Crockett. The administrative law judge affirmed his decision upon administrative review, and special action review to this court followed.
Petitioners' argument on review is that the educational seminar was primarily for the benefit of the respondents rather than for the employer, and thus the injuries sustained while returning from the seminar were not compensable. Petitioners further argue that the employer's authorization or permission to attend the seminar is not sufficient to make the injuries compensable. They contend that the employer must have required, or at least specifically urged, the employee's attendance at the seminar.
For an industrial injury to be compensable, it must arise out of, and occur in the course of, the applicant's employment. Royall v. Industrial Commission, 106 Ariz. 346, 476 P.2d 156 (1970). The term "arising out of" is said to refer to the origin or the cause of the injury, while "in the course of" refers to the time, place and circumstances of the accident in relation to the employment. Peter Kiewit Sons' Company v. Industrial Commission, 88 Ariz. 164, 354 P.2d 28 (1960). Although not clearly stated by petitioners, we understand petitioners' argument to be that the injury did not occur "in the course of" respondents' employment.
Petitioners correctly assert that the appellate courts of Arizona have never had occasion to directly address the issue of compensability where an employee has been injured after normal working hours while engaging in educational pursuits arranged by the employer. Petitioners assert the principle of law that an employee who undertakes educational or training programs which incidentally enhance his proficiency in his work, generally does so primarily to benefit himself, and injuries sustained in the course of such activities are not compensable. In support of this proposition, petitioners quote from 1A Larson's Workmen's Compensation Law, § 27.31(a), at 5-281 to 5-282:
[S]elf-improvement is primarily the employee's own concern; obviously the ambitious clerk who is burning the midnight oil studying to become an accountant cannot expect workmen's compensation if his lamp blows up.
Petitioners, however, overlook the next sentence which states:
In some situations, however, it may be found that, either by the contemplation of the contract or by custom, the educational activity is part of the employment. Id. at 5-282.
In addition, Professor Larson's treatise subsequently states:
Employment connection may be supplied by varying degrees of employer encouragement or direction.... Connection with the employment may also be bolstered by the showing of a specific employer benefit, as distinguished from a vague and general benefit, as when the attendance of an automobile mechanic at an examination given by the manufacturer permitted the dealer to advertise "factory-trained mechanic." Id. § 27.31(c), at 5-293 to 5-296.
The two factors listed by Larson, i.e., employer involvement and employer benefit, are among the factors listed in the course of employment test set forth by this court in Truck Insurance Exchange v. Industrial Commission, 22 Ariz.App. 158, 524 P.2d 1331 (1974). In that case, we stated the relevant factors as being: Id., 22 Ariz.App. at 160, 524 P.2d at 1333.
The administrative law judge explicitly recognized the above tests in his findings and then applied them in finding of fact number 6 as follows:
Whether or not mandatory language was used, it is clear that the symposium was for the primary benefit of the employer by increasing the employees' skills; that the attendance in Phoenix made the trip necessary; and that the attendance was authorized and permitted by the employer. These facts constitute sufficient work connection to bring the auto accident and injuries sustained within the course and scope of the applicants' employment with the defendant employer.
Thus, the administrative law judge found that the first two tests were met and, inferentially, that the last test was also met. He then based his decision upon those findings.
The thrust of petitioners' argument on review is that educational activities, as a class, are primarily for the benefit of the employee, rather than for the employer. We do not, however, think such a broad generalization can be drawn from such activities and that each case must be determined on its own facts.
In the case at bar, we find sufficient evidence that the seminar training was reasonably, substantially, and indeed primarily, for the benefit of the employer. The direct and specific benefit to the company clearly appears from the testimony of Mr. Crockett:
[By Mr. McLaws]
Q. All right. The purpose of the seminar was to educate mechanics in ways to do their job better?
A. [Mr. Crockett] Yes, sir.
Q. There were people that would lecture, that would have illustrations or movies or any number of educational helps there--
A. Yes, sir.
Q. --to help the employees. is that true?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Would an employee that would attend the seminar, would he be rated in your organization in any manner for having attended such a seminar over an employee that didn't attend such a seminar?
A. Well, when you got new types of equipment out, especially on the mixers, I took a lot of them to them. They were new styles and I didn't have anybody there myself to work on them, so I took George Webb and I think Dave Butler at the time, so I had somebody else to rely on to do some repair work on them when I didn't have the time.
Q. So Johnson-Stewart had equipment that needed special care and attention, and would these employees that were skilled in taking care of this certain type of equipment that the seminar would certainly help with; is that true?
A. I feel it benefits the company--
Q. All right.
A. --in sending these men to it, on new equipment.
* * *
* * *
Q. so it was a direct benefit to Johnson-Stewart if the mechanics attended the seminar; is that true?
A. Yes, sir.
There was absolutely no testimony that the seminar would benefit the respondents in seeking other employment or in obtaining a better job within the company. We conclude therefore, that respondents' ability to repair the machinery used by their...
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