Johnson v. Arteaga-Martinez
| Decision Date | 13 June 2022 |
| Docket Number | 19-896 |
| Citation | 142 S.Ct. 1827 |
| Parties | Tae D. JOHNSON, Acting Director of U. S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, et al., Petitioners v. Antonio ARTEAGA-MARTINEZ |
| Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
Austin Raynor for petitioners.
Pratik A. Shah, Washington, DC, for respondent.
Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Counsel of Record, Department of Justice, Washington, DC, Brian H. Fletcher, Acting Solicitor General, Counsel of Record, Brian M. Boynton, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Curtis E. Gannon, Deputy Solicitor General, Vivek Suri, Austin L. Raynor, Assistants to the Solicitor General, Matthew P. Seamon, Courtney E. Moran, Jessica W. D'arrigo, John J.W. Inkeles, Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Petitioners.
Marcia Binder Ibrahim, Brock L. Bevan, Law Office of Marcia Binder Ibrahim, LLC, Lansdale, PA, Pratik A. Shah, Counsel of Record, James E. Tysse, Jehanne C. McCullough, Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP, Washington, DC, Aileen M. McGrath, Michael Weisbuch, Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld LLP, San Francisco, CA, for Respondent.
Section 241(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a), authorizes the detention of noncitizens who have been ordered removed from the United States. See 110 Stat. 3009–598. In particular, § 1231(a)(6) provides that after a 90-day "removal period," a noncitizen "may be detained" or may be released under terms of supervision. This Court recently held that § 1231(a) applies to individuals who are removed and who then reenter without authorization and apply for withholding of removal based on a fear that they will be persecuted or tortured if returned to their countries of origin. See Johnson v. Guzman Chavez , 594 U. S. ––––, ––––, 141 S.Ct. 2271, 2280, 210 L.Ed.2d 656 (2021). The issue in this case is whether the text of § 1231(a)(6) requires the Government to offer detained noncitizens bond hearings after six months of detention in which the Government bears the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that a noncitizen poses a flight risk or a danger to the community. It does not.
Respondent Antonio Arteaga-Martinez is a citizen of Mexico. He admits that he has entered the United States without inspection four times. He first entered in March 2001 and was detained at the border and removed; he reentered in April of that year. Ten years later, in 2011, he left the country to care for his sick mother, reentering in July of the following year. The Government again detained him at the border, determined he was inadmissible, and removed him.
Arteaga-Martinez represents that, after returning to Mexico, he was beaten violently by members of a criminal street gang. Fearing that he would be persecuted or tortured again with the acquiescence of government officials, he reentered the United States in September 2012.
In May 2018, U. S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) issued a warrant for Arteaga-Martinez's arrest. By then, he had been living and working in the United States for nearly six years and was expecting the birth of his first child. He had no criminal record aside from minor traffic violations. ICE detained Arteaga-Martinez without any opportunity for bond and reinstated his earlier removal order.
Arteaga-Martinez applied for withholding of removal under § 1231(b)(3), as well as relief under regulations implementing the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100–20, 1465 U. N. T. S. 113. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) referred Arteaga-Martinez to an asylum officer, who found that Arteaga-Martinez's testimony was credible and that he had established a reasonable fear of persecution or torture. As a result, DHS referred Arteaga-Martinez's claims for adjudication by an immigration judge in what we have called "withholding-only proceedings." Guzman Chavez , 594 U. S., at ––––, 141 S.Ct., at 2283. Pending these proceedings, however, the Government continued to detain Arteaga-Martinez pursuant to § 1231(a)(6).1
In September 2018, after he had been detained for four months without a hearing, Arteaga-Martinez filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the U. S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania. His petition challenged his continued detention without a bond hearing on both statutory and constitutional grounds. Shortly thereafter, in a separate case, the Third Circuit held that a noncitizen facing prolonged detention under § 1231(a)(6) is entitled by statute to a bond hearing before an immigration judge and must be released from detention unless the Government establishes, by clear and convincing evidence, that the noncitizen poses a risk of flight or a danger to the community. See Guerrero-Sanchez v. Warden York County Prison , 905 F.3d 208, 224, and n. 12 (2018).
The Government conceded that under Guerrero-Sanchez , Arteaga-Martinez would be entitled to a bond hearing pursuant to § 1231(a)(6) as of November 4, 2018, six months after the start of his detention. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 4a. Once Arteaga-Martinez's time in detention had reached nearly six months, a Magistrate Judge recommended that the District Court grant a writ of habeas corpus on Arteaga-Martinez's statutory claim and order the Government to provide him an individualized bond hearing before an immigration judge. Id. , at 4a–5a. The District Court adopted the report and recommendation and ordered a bond hearing. Id. , at 3a.
The Government appealed. The Court of Appeals summarily affirmed, citing its earlier decision in Guerrero-Sanchez . See App. to Pet. for Cert. 1a–2a. Arteaga-Martinez received a bond hearing at which an Immigration Judge, considering Arteaga-Martinez's flight risk and dangerousness, authorized his release on bond. Arteaga-Martinez posted bond and was released pending a final determination on his application for withholding of removal, which, as of today, the Immigration Judge has yet to make. Pet. for Cert. 6; Brief for Respondent 10–11.
This Court granted certiorari. 594 U. S. ––––, 142 S.Ct. 920, 210 L.Ed.2d 1009 (2021).2
The INA establishes procedures for the Government to use when removing certain noncitizens from the United States and, in some cases, detaining them. The section at issue here, 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a), governs the detention, release, and removal of individuals "ordered removed." This Court has held that § 1231(a) applies to individuals with pending withholding-only proceedings. See Guzman Chavez , 594 U. S., at –––– – ––––, 141 S.Ct., at 2283–2284.
After the entry of a final order of removal against a noncitizen, the Government generally must secure the noncitizen's removal during a 90-day " ‘removal period.’ " § 1231(a)(1)(A). The statute provides that the Government "shall" detain noncitizens during the statutory removal period. § 1231(a)(2). After the removal period expires, the Government "may" detain only four categories of people: (1) those who are "inadmissible" on certain specified grounds; (2) those who are "removable" on certain specified grounds; (3) those it determines "to be a risk to the community"; and (4) those it determines to be "unlikely to comply with the order of removal." § 1231(a)(6). Individuals released after the removal period remain subject to terms of supervision. Ibid.
Section 1231(a)(6) does not expressly specify how long detention past the 90-day removal period may continue for those who fall within the four designated statutory categories. In Zadvydas v. Davis , 533 U.S. 678, 121 S.Ct. 2491, 150 L.Ed.2d 653 (2001), the Court observed that the statute's use of the term "may" introduces some ambiguity and "does not necessarily suggest unlimited discretion." Id. , at 697, 121 S.Ct. 2491. The Court explained that "[a] statute permitting indefinite detention of an alien would raise a serious constitutional problem," noting that it had upheld noncriminal detention as consistent with the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment only under certain narrow circumstances. Id. , at 690, 121 S.Ct. 2491. Accordingly, the Court applied the canon of constitutional avoidance and determined that "read in light of the Constitution's demands," § 1231(a)(6) "does not permit indefinite detention" but instead "limits an alien's post-removal-period detention to a period reasonably necessary to bring about that alien's removal from the United States." Id. , at 689, 121 S.Ct. 2491.
Subsequently, in Jennings v. Rodriguez , 583 U. S. ––––, 138 S.Ct. 830, 200 L.Ed.2d 122 (2018), this Court considered the text of other provisions of the INA that authorize detention. One such provision was § 1226(a), which governs the detention of certain noncitizens present in the country who were inadmissible at the time of entry or who have been convicted of certain criminal offenses since they were admitted. Id. , at ––––, 138 S.Ct, at 837–838. Section 1226(a) provides that the attorney general "may" detain these noncitizens pending their removal proceedings and "may release" such individuals on "bond ... or conditional parole." 8 U.S.C. §§ 1226(a)(1), (2). Noncitizens detained under § 1226(a) receive bond hearings after the Government initially detains them. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(d)(1), 1236.1(d)(1) (2021). Relying on Zadvydas , the Ninth Circuit had interpreted § 1226(a) to require additional, periodic bond hearings every six months, with the burden on the Government to prove by clear and convincing evidence that further detention was justified. Jennings , 583 U. S., at –––– – ––––, 138 S.Ct., at 847–848. The Court in Jennings disagreed. It held that "the meaning of the relevant statutory provisio[n] is clear" and that it did not support a periodic bond hearing requirement. Id. , at ––––, 138 S.Ct., at 848.
The Jennings Court also rejected the lower court's application of the canon of constitutional avoidance. Earlier in...
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