Garland v. Aleman Gonzalez

• Decision Date: 13 June 2022
• Docket Number: 20-322
• Parties: Merrick B. GARLAND, Attorney General, et al., Petitioners v. Esteban ALEMAN GONZALEZ, et al. Merrick B. Garland, Attorney General, et al., Petitioners v. Edwin Omar Flores Tejada, et al.
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

142 S.Ct. 2057

213 L.Ed.2d 102

Merrick B. GARLAND, Attorney General, et al., Petitioners

v.Esteban ALEMAN GONZALEZ, et al.

Merrick B. Garland, Attorney General, et al., Petitioners

v.Edwin Omar Flores Tejada, et al.

No. 20-322

Supreme Court of the United States.

Argued January 11, 2022

Decided June 13, 2022^*

Curtis E. Gannon, Deputy Solicitor General, for the petitioners.

Matthew H. Adams, Seattle, WA, for the respondents.

Elizabeth B. Prelogar, Solicitor General, Counsel of Record, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for the petitioners.

Michael Kaufman, ACLU Foundation of Southern California, Ahilan Arulanantham, UCLA School of Law, Los Angeles, California, Matt Adams, Counsel of Record, Leila Kang, Aaron Korthuis, Margot Adams, Northwest Immigrant Rights Project, Seattle, Washington, Judah Lakin, Amalia Wille, Lakin & Wille LLP, Jesse Newmark, Centro Legal De La Raza, Alison Pennington, Claudia Valenzuela, Immigrant Legal Defense, Oakland, California, Bardis Vakili, American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of San Diego and Imperial Counties, San Diego, California, Cecillia D. Wang, Michael K.T. Tan, American Civil Liberties Foundation, New York, New York, Marc Van Der Hout, Johnny Sinodis, Van Der Hout LLP, Vasudha Talla, American Civil Liberties Union Foundation of Northern California, San Francisco, California, David D. Cole, Carmen Iguina Gonzalez, American Civil Liberties Foundation, Washington, D.C., for the respondents.

Brian H. Fletcher, Acting Solicitor General, Counsel of Record, Brian M. Boynton, Acting Assistant Attorney, General, Curtis E. Gannon, Deputy Solicitor General, Vivek Suri, Austin L. Raynor, Assistants to the Solicitor, General, Matthew P. Seamon, Courtney E. Moran, Jessica W. D'arrigo, Cara E. Alsterberg, Mary L. Larakers, Gladys Steffens Guzmán, Attorneys, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for the petitioners.

Justice ALITO delivered the opinion of the Court.

Respondents in these two cases are aliens who were detained by the Federal Government pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) pending removal from this country. Respondents sued in two Federal District Courts, alleging that § 1231(a)(6) requires the Government to provide bond hearings in cases like theirs. Both District Courts certified classes, agreed with respondents’ claims on the merits, and entered class-wide injunctive relief. The Ninth Circuit affirmed both judgments in relevant part.

We granted certiorari and instructed the parties to address whether another provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 66 Stat. 208, as amended, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(f)(1), deprived the District Courts of jurisdiction to entertain respondents’ requests for class-wide injunctive relief. We hold that the statute has that effect, and we therefore reverse.

I

The two cases before us arise out of respondents’ detention pursuant to § 1231(a)(6), which gives the Federal Government discretionary authority in specified circumstances to detain aliens who have been " ‘ordered removed’ " from the United States. See Johnson v. Arteaga-Martinez , 596 U. S. ––––, –––– – ––––, 142 S.Ct. 1827, 1831 – 1832, ––– L.Ed.2d (2022).

Respondents Esteban Aleman Gonzalez and Jose Eduardo Gutierrez Sanchez—the named plaintiffs in the case that bears Aleman Gonzalez's name—are natives and citizens of Mexico. They each reentered the United States illegally after being removed, and after they were apprehended, their prior orders of removal were "reinstated" as authorized by § 1231(a)(5). They sought withholding of removal on the ground that they would be subject to torture or persecution if they were returned to Mexico. While they awaited proceedings before an immigration judge, they were detained under § 1231(a)(6), and they then filed a putative class action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, alleging that aliens detained under § 1231(a)(6) are entitled to bond hearings after six months’ detention. The District Court certified a class of similarly situated plaintiffs and "enjoined [the Government] from detaining [respondents] and the class members pursuant to section 1231(a)(6) for more than 180 days without providing each a bond hearing." Gonzalez v. Sessions , 325 F.R.D. 616, 629 (2018). A divided panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed. Compare Aleman Gonzalez v. Barr , 955 F.3d 762, 766 (2020), with id., at 790 (Fernandez, J., dissenting).

Respondent Edwin Flores Tejada—the named plaintiff in the case that bears his name—is a native and citizen of El Salvador. He likewise was previously ordered removed, reentered the country illegally, had his prior removal order reinstated, applied for withholding of removal, and was detained under § 1231(a)(6). He filed suit in the Western District of Washington, likewise alleging (as relevant here) that § 1231(a)(6) entitled him to a bond hearing. The District Court certified a class, granted partial summary judgment against the Government, and entered class-wide injunctive relief. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 110a; Report and Recommendation in Martinez Baños v. Asher , No. 2:16–cv–01454 (WD Wash., Jan. 23, 2018) (ECF), Doc. 77–1, p. 2. A divided panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed in relevant part. Compare Flores Tejada v. Godfrey , 954 F.3d 1245, 1247 (2020), with id., at 1251 (Fernandez, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

The Government petitioned for certiorari and asked us to decide whether an alien detained under § 1231(a)(6) is entitled to a bond hearing. We granted that petition and instructed the parties to address the threshold question whether the District Courts had jurisdiction to entertain respondents’ requests for class-wide injunctive relief. 594 U. S. ––––, 142 S.Ct. 919, 210 L.Ed.2d 1009 (2021).

II

We hold that the District Courts exceeded their jurisdiction in awarding such relief.

A

We begin with the text of § 1252(f)(1), which provides:

"Regardless of the nature of the action or claim or of the identity of the party or parties bringing the action, no court (other than the Supreme Court) shall have jurisdiction or authority to enjoin or restrain the operation of the provisions of part IV of this subchapter, as amended by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, other than with respect to the application of such provisions to an individual alien against whom proceedings under such part have been initiated." (Emphasis added.)

With one exception that we will discuss momentarily, the critical language in this provision strips lower courts of "jurisdiction or authority" to "enjoin or restrain the operation of " the relevant statutory provisions. The ordinary meaning of these terms bars the class-wide relief awarded by the two District Courts.

The term "to enjoin" ordinarily means to "require," "command," or "positively direct" an action or to "require a person to perform, ... or to abstain or desist from, some act." Black's Law Dictionary 529 (6th ed. 1990); see also Webster's Third New International Dictionary 754 (1993) (defining "enjoin" to mean "to direct, prescribe, or impose by order"). When a court "enjoins" conduct, it issues an "injunction," which is a judicial order that "tells someone what to do or not to do." Nken v. Holder , 556 U.S. 418, 428, 129 S.Ct. 1749, 173 L.Ed.2d 550 (2009) ; see also Black's Law Dictionary, at 784 (defining an "injunction" as a "court order prohibiting someone from doing some specified act or commanding someone to undo some wrong or injury"); 2 J. Story, Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence § 861, p. 178 (13th ed. 1886) (similar).

The term "to restrain" means to "check, hold back, or prevent (a person or thing) from some course of action." 5 Oxford English Dictionary 756 (2d ed. 1989) (emphasis deleted); Webster's Third New International Dictionary, at 1936 ("to hold (as a person) back from some action, procedure, or course: prevent from doing something"). We have suggested in another context that "restrain" sometimes has a "broad meaning" that refers to judicial orders that "inhibit" particular actions, and at other times it has a "narrower meaning" that includes "orders that stop (or perhaps compel)" such acts. Direct Marketing Assn. v. Brohl , 575 U.S. 1, 12–13, 135 S.Ct. 1124, 191 L.Ed.2d 97 (2015) (emphasis deleted).

The object of the verbs "enjoin or restrain" is the "operation of " certain provisions of federal immigration law. See §§ 1221–1232. The "operation of " (a thing) means the functioning of or working of (that thing). Random House Dictionary of the English Language 1357 (2d ed. 1987) ("an act or instance, process, or manner of functioning or operating"); Webster's Third New International Dictionary, at 1581 ("method or manner of functioning"). The way in which laws ordinarily "work" or "function" is through the actions of officials or other persons who implement them. This is certainly true of the statutes to which § 1252(f)(1) refers—i.e ., the provisions of part IV of subchapter II of the Immigration and Nationality Act. Those provisions charge the Federal Government with the implementation and enforcement of the immigration laws governing the inspection, apprehension, examination, and removal of aliens. See §§ 1221–1232. Accordingly, the "operation of " the relevant statutes is best understood to refer to the Government's efforts to enforce or implement them. As the Government put it at oral argument, the "operation of the provisions" is a reference "not just to the statute itself but to the way that [it is] being carried out." Tr. of Oral Arg. 11.

Putting these terms together, § 1252(f)(1) generally prohibits lower courts from entering injunctions that order federal officials to take or to refrain from taking actions to enforce, implement, or otherwise carry out the specified statutory provisions.

Section 1252(f)(1) includes one exception to this general prohibition: The lower courts retain the authority to "enjoin or restrain the operation of " the relevant statutory provisions ...