Johnson v. Astrue
| Citation | 816 F.Supp.2d 752 |
| Decision Date | 13 September 2011 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 10–0516–CV–SJ–REL–SSA. |
| Parties | Daniel T. JOHNSON, Plaintiff, v. Michael J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Missouri |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Daniel T. Johnson, pro se.
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiff, Daniel T. Johnson, seeks review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security denying Plaintiff's application for disability benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act (Act), 42 U.S.C. §§ 401, et seq. (Tr. 53–58). Plaintiff raises these specific issues:
1. Whether the ALJ's determination regarding Plaintiff's credibility is supported by substantial evidence;
2. Whether the ALJ properly determined that Plaintiff did not meet the requirements for listing § 3.02, chronic pulmonary insufficiency;
3. Whether the ALJ properly assessed Plaintiff's residual functional capacity (RFC); and
4. Whether the ALJ's hypothetical question to the vocational expert constituted substantial evidence in support of the ALJ's determination at step five of the sequential evaluation process.
I find that the ALJ did not err. Therefore, Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment will be denied and the decision of the Commissioner will be affirmed.
This suit involves an application for disability benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act (Act), 42 U.S.C. §§ 401, et seq. (Tr. 53–58). Section 205(g) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), provides for judicial review of a “final decision” of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration under Title II.
Plaintiff's application was denied initially (Tr. 40–44). On October 1, 2008, following a hearing, an ALJ issued a decision in which he found that Plaintiff was not under a “disability” as defined in the Social Security Act at any time when he met the earnings requirements of the law (Tr. 5–15). On March 19, 2010, the Appeals Council of the Social Security Administration denied Plaintiff's request for review (Tr. 1–4). Therefore, the decision of the ALJ stands as the final decision of the Commissioner.
Section 205(g) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), provides for judicial review of a “final decision” of the Commissioner under Title II. The standard for judicial review by the federal district court is whether the decision of the Commissioner was supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971); Johnson v. Chater, 108 F.3d 178, 179 (8th Cir.1997); Andler v. Chater, 100 F.3d 1389, 1392 (8th Cir.1996). The determination of whether the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence requires review of the entire record, considering the evidence in support of and in opposition to the Commissioner's decision. Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 488, 71 S.Ct. 456, 95 L.Ed. 456 (1951); Thomas v. Sullivan, 876 F.2d 666, 669 (8th Cir.1989). “The Court must also take into consideration the weight of the evidence in the record and apply a balancing test to evidence which is contradictory.” Gavin v. Heckler, 811 F.2d 1195, 1199 (8th Cir.1987) (citing Steadman v. Securities & Exchange Commission, 450 U.S. 91, 99, 101 S.Ct. 999, 67 L.Ed.2d 69 (1981)).
Substantial evidence means Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. at 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420; Jernigan v. Sullivan, 948 F.2d 1070, 1073 n. 5 (8th Cir.1991). However, the substantial evidence standard presupposes a zone of choice within which the decision makers can go either way, without interference by the courts. “[A]n administrative decision is not subject to reversal merely because substantial evidence would have supported an opposite decision.” Id.; Clarke v. Bowen, 843 F.2d 271, 272–73 (8th Cir.1988).
An individual claiming disability benefits has the burden of proving he is unable to return to past relevant work by reason of a medically-determinable physical or mental impairment which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). If the plaintiff establishes that he is unable to return to past relevant work because of the disability, the burden of persuasion shifts to the Commissioner to establish that there is some other type of substantial gainful activity in the national economy that the plaintiff can perform. Griffon v. Bowen, 856 F.2d 1150, 1153–54 (8th Cir.1988); McMillian v. Schweiker, 697 F.2d 215, 220–21 (8th Cir.1983).
The Social Security Administration has promulgated detailed regulations setting out a sequential evaluation process to determine whether a claimant is disabled. These regulations are codified at 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1501, et seq. The five-step sequential evaluation process used by the Commissioner is outlined in 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 and is summarized as follows:
1. Is the claimant performing substantial gainful activity?
Yes = not disabled.
No = go to next step.
2. Does the claimant have a severe impairment or a combination of impairments which significantly limits his ability to do basic work activities?
No = not disabled.
Yes = go to next step.
3. Does the impairment meet or equal a listed impairment in Appendix 1?
Yes = disabled.
No = go to next step.
4. Does the impairment prevent the claimant from doing past relevant work?
No = not disabled.
Yes = go to next step where burden shifts to Commissioner.
5. Does the impairment prevent the claimant from doing any other work?
Yes = disabled.
No = not disabled.
The record consists of the testimony of Plaintiff and vocational expert Janice Hastert, in addition to documentary evidence admitted at the hearing.
The record contains the following administrative reports:
1. Earnings Record
Plaintiff's earnings record (Tr. 60) shows the following income for the years indicated:
2. Job Objective Evaluation/Vocational Evaluation Report
Between February 6, 2006, and February 21, 2006, Plaintiff was seen at the Rehabilitation Institute of Kansas City, in St. Joseph, Missouri, for developing a vocational plan leading to employment (Tr. 75–79). During this evaluation, Plaintiff indicated that he had an appointment to discuss his eligibility for Social Security benefits (Tr. 77). The Institute stated: “Should he be unable to qualify, Mr. Johnson will require assistance in identifying resources to sustain his self-sufficiency” (Tr. 77).
Plaintiff requested assistance from the Institute for physical disabilities and educational limitations that have limited his job choices (Tr. 75). Although Plaintiff reported physical ailments and limitations, the Institute did not do any independent testing to confirm these complaints (Tr. 75).
The Institute's evaluations focused on Plaintiff's academic achievement and aptitude as well as his reasoning and mechanical abilities (Tr. 77–78). The Institute reported that Plaintiff reads and comprehends at a post high-school level but he has low number operation skills (Tr. 77). Plaintiff scored above average in vocabulary and reading comprehension; average in language and problem solving; low average in spelling and total language; and below average in number operations and total mathematics (Tr. 78).
After undergoing the job evaluation, the Institute recommended that the Plaintiff pursue the vocational goal of cook. Plaintiff reportedly planned to secure part-time work due to his emphysema and asthma, which he represented as significantly reducing his stamina (Tr. 79).
3. Consultative Examination
On May 23, 2006, Dr. Sreenadha Davuluri, a neurologist, performed a consultative evaluation at the request of the agency (Tr. 225–30).
Plaintiff reported he suffered from chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (“COPD”) and emphysema,1 and he had a stroke in 2002, leaving him with weakness in his left arm (Tr. 225). Plaintiff indicated he was smoking one and a half packs of cigarettes a day. Plaintiff weighed 279 pounds (Tr. 227).
On physical exam, Plaintiff's range of motion of the cervical spine was limited and painful. Range of motion of the lumbar spine was limited. Dr. Davuluri noted Plaintiff had an abnormal gait and walked with a slow gait and was unable to walk on his heels and toes. Sensation to pin prick was decreased in the left C5 and C6 regions and left lower extremity below the knee (Tr. 229).
Dr. Davuluri diagnosed cervical disc disorder with myelopathy 2 and cerebral thrombosis [blood clot] with cerebral infarction. 3 On examination, the doctor noted Plaintiff had hyperreflexia 4 and minimal weakness of his left upper extremity. The doctor suspected Plaint...
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