Johnson v. C., R.I. & P.R. Co.

• Decision Date: 24 April 1882
• Citation: 58 Iowa 348,12 N.W. 329
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court
• Parties: JOHNSON v. C., R. I. & P. R. CO.

58 Iowa 348

12 N.W. 329

JOHNSON

v.C., R. I. & P. R. CO.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Filed April 24, 1882.

Appeal from Wappello circuit court.

Action for a personal injury which, it is alleged, the plaintiff received by being forcibly ejected from the station-house of the defendant at Eldon, by the agent in charge of the station. There was a trial by jury, which resulted in a verdict for plaintiff for $4,000. Upon a motion for a new trial, based upon several grounds, the court required the plaintiff to remit $1,500 of the verdict, and thereupon overruled the motion. Defendant appeals.Stiles & Lathrop, for appellant.

W. H. C. Jaques and Wm. McNett, for appellee.

ROTHROCK, J.

1. This is the second appeal in this case. There was a verdict for $2,000 at the first trial, which was reversed for errors in the rulings of the court pertaining to the evidence, and for an erroneous instruction as to exemplary damages. See 51 Iowa, 25.

The plaintiff was removed from the waiting-room of the station by the agent of the defendant. That his shoulder was dislocated, either from a fall from the door out of which the agent pushed him, or by a fall after he landed on the platform, is not disputed. It also appears, without any conflict or question, that the plaintiff was not in the waiting-room awaiting an outgoing train upon which to take passage, nor for any other purpose for which a waiting-room at a station is kept open to the public. He was there for the purpose of waiting to take passage on a train on another railroad. The facts as to his right to remain in the waiting-room are more fully set out in the opinion on the former appeal, which are in substance the same as are shown by this record. Without repeating the facts in detail, it is sufficient to say that there was no warrant from the evidence, conceding anything it tended to prove, which would justify any jury in finding that the plaintiff had any right to remain in the waiting-room after being requested by the agent to leave it. That he was so requested and refused, before any violence was used towards him, is not disputed.

The only question, then, for the jury to determine was, did the agent use more force than was reasonably necessary in removing the plaintiff from the room, and was he injured by reason of the excessive force? Upon this question we are asked to reverse the judgment, because the verdict finds no support in the evidence. In removing the plaintiff from the room no blows were struck by any one. The plaintiff resisted the force employed by the agent, and another employe of the defendant who assisted him in ejecting plaintiff, by holding to a seat and by holding to the door-case as he was pushed out. There is a very decided preponderance of the evidence to the effect that the plaintiff and one Shinblom, who was his comrade on the occasion, were drunk and disorderly, and that they both deserved to be removed from the room for their conduct, and we also think that the great weight of the evidence is that there was no excessive force used to effect the removal. But the plaintiff and Shinblom hoth testified that they were sober and well-behaved, and that the agent used such force as to throw plaintiff out of the door; as Shinblom expressed it, “One of the men shoved Johnson to the door, and took hold of him and threw him square out.” Now we do not believe this testimony, simply because several witnesses testify in direct contradiction to it. But we cannot usurp the functions of the jury and the court below. Here are two concurringverdicts, upon substantially the same facts, and two nisi prius judges have given their approval and indorsement of them by overruling motions for new trials grounded upon the insufficiency of the evidence. It appears to us this is a proper occasion to repeat what was said by this court more then 10 years ago, that “those courts ought to independently exercise their power to grant new trials; and, with entire freedom from the rule which controls appellate tribunals, they ought to grant new trials whenever their superior and more comprehensive judgment teaches them that the verdict of the jury fails to administer substantial justice to the parties in the case.” Dewey v. C. & N. W. R. R. 31 Iowa, 373. It is scarcely necessary to say that where there is a conflict in the evidence upon any fact this court must accept the finding of the jury as conclusive.

2. It...