New Orleans & N.E.R. Co. v. Humphreys

• Decision Date: 22 June 1914
• Docket Number: 16386
• Citation: 65 So. 497,107 Miss. 396
• Parties: NEW ORLEANS & N.E. R. Co. v. CHRISTINE HUMPHREYS
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

65 So. 497

107 Miss. 396

NEW ORLEANS & N.E. R. Co. v. CHRISTINE HUMPHREYS

No. 16386

Supreme Court of Mississippi

June 22, 1914

APPEAL from the circuit court of Lamar county. HON. A. E WEATHERSBY, Judge.

Suit by Mrs. Chrstine Humphreys against the New Orleans &amp Northeastern Railroad Company. From a judgment for plaintiff defendant appeals.

The facts are fully stated in the opinion of the court.

Reversed and remanded.

R. H. &amp J. H. Thompson and A. S. Bozeman, for appellants.

The only duty owing by a railroad company to a trespasser is not to wantonly or wilfully injure him. Railroad Co. v. Burnsed, 70 Miss. 473; Railroad Co. v. McAfee, 71 Miss. 70, and many other Mississippi cases announcing this rule.

Where plaintiff was injured by being struck by an engine, without fault on the part of the railroad company, the latter was not liable by reason of the fact that its servants did not use their best judgment in affording plaintiff necessary assistance after the accident. Griswold v. B. & M. R. R. Co., 183 Mass. 434, 67 N.E. 354. A railroad company assuming charge of an injured trespasser, is charged with no higher degree of duty to him than that of ordinary humanity--common humanity. Dyche v. Railroad, 71 Miss. 361. See, also, for a like rule applied to a passenger injured by his own negligence, the case of Railroad Co. v. Byrd, 89. Miss. 308.

In furnishing medical or surgical aid for an injured person, the whole duty of the railroad company is performed when it employs a person of ordinary competence and skill in that profession; and having done so, it cannot be held liable for the carelessness or negligence of such surgeon in the performance of his duties as such. South Fla. R. Co. v. Price, 32 Fla. 46, 13 So. 638; Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Whitney, 56 So. 937; Dyche v. Railroad, 79 Miss. 361; 3 Elliot on Railroads, sec. 1388. It would be absurd to insist that not only the selection of a physician and surgeon should be prudent, but that the company should guarantee that the surgeon selected would make no mistake and be guilty of no negligence. The very fact that there was required of a surgeon, in the line of his duty, the possession of a superior degree of skill and of knowledge of medicine, precludes the possibility that the officers or employees of a railroad company should exercise a supervisory control and direction of the time when and the mode in which the necessary surgical operation should be performed. C. B. & Q. R. Co. v. Howard, 45 Neb. 570, 63 N.W. 872. The above doctrine is peculiarly applicable to cases where such attendance is furnished by the railroad company at its own expense, and without cost to the injured person. Pittsburg, etc., R. Co. v. Sullivan, 141 Ind. 83, 27 L. R. A. 840, 50 Am. St. Rep. 314.

Tally & Mayson, for appellee.

Counsel complains of the action of the court in its refusal to exclude the testimony offered by plaintiff and to direct the jury to return a verdict for the defendants. The action of the court was, as we think, eminently correct. This was a case peculiarly for the jury, as it was for it to say, under all the instructions in the case, whether or not the deceased received at the hands of these appellants, that treatment that common humanity dictates that the unfortunate and helpless should receive from the hands of parties having control over them after they are in a situation that they can render no assistance to themselves.

Counsel cites as supporting his contention of nonliability on the part of the defendants Griswold v. B., etc., R. R. Co., 183 Mass. 434, 67 N.E. 354, but the doctrine announced in this case is directly at war with that promulgated in the Dyche case, supra.

It is said in the monographic note to Union P. R. Co. v. Cappier, 69 L. R. A. 513, at pages 534 and 536 of the note that the court in Griswold v. Boston & M. R. Co., 183 Mass. 434, 67 N.E. 354, unsuccessfully attempts to distinguish Central R. R. Co. v. State, 96 Am. Dec. 545, from the Dyche case. The court refers to the case of Dyche v. Vicksburg S., etc., R. R. Co., 79 Miss. 361, 30 So. 711, supra, but repudiates its authority and attempts to distinguish Northern Central R. Co. v. State, 29 Md. 420, 96 Am. Dec. 545, supra, in a manner not warranted by the report of that case, as already pointed out. The attention of the court is specially invited to this exhaustive note beginning on page 534 and running through page 536 where all the authorities on the subject appear to have been collated with great care. While it is true, as demonstrated by the author of the above note, that in some courts, a different rule prevails, yet it is asserted that the true rule is to be found in the case reported in 96 Am. Dec. and in the Dyche case, supra. We, therefore, confidently submit that in order for appellants to secure a reversal, the Dyche case must be overruled.

The two propositions relied upon by the appellee in this cause to sustain the judgment rendered in her favor by the lower court are as follows: First, although the railroad company was not in fault in inflicting the original injuries upon Leslie Humphreys, whom it is conceded was a trespasser, still the railroad company, after he had been injured, was under legal duty, as well as moral obligation, to give him proper care and treatment which was proper and necessary under the circumstances of the case; second, even conceding that the railroad company was under no original legal duty, or obligation, to render proper and necessary care and attention to Leslie Humphreys after he was injured, it is unquestionably correct, as a legal proposition, in view of all the authorities, that having undertaken the care of the wounded man, it was then the legal duty and obligation of the railroad to discharge this duty and responsibility with proper care and attention under the circumstances of the case.

First, I will present to the court the proposition above stated, that the railroad company was under, not only a moral obligation resting on the commonest principles of humanity, but under a distinct legal obligation to give this unfortunate man proper attention after it was found that he had been injured and disabled in this railroad accident; and this proposition assumes that the railroad company is not liable for the original injury inflicted upon him.

The idea that the railroad company is under no duty, as a legal obligation, to a trespasser under any circumstances, is a total misconception of the legal doctrine and principles applicable to this class of cases. On the contrary, the best considered cases, and the great weight of authority, and the whole body of the reasoning on the subject a priori is, that a railroad company is under a large measure of duty and obligation of a legal character to trespassers who are ejected from their trains and who have been injured by railroad accidents without the fault of the railroad company. The universal doctrine is, that while the railroad company has a right to eject a trespasser from its train, it is under legal obligation and positive duty to remove him or eject him in such prudent and reasonable manner as not to inflict any injuries upon him. It is also, I respectfully submit to the court, not only in accordance with the a priori principle of justice involved as well as the ordinary consideration of common humanity, but it is established by the very best considered decision on this subject, that a railroad company is under this measure of legal obligation and duty to render proper care and assistance to a trespasser who has been injured without the fault of the railroad company.

This court has placed itself in line with the best considered cases and doctrine on this subject in a case which, in legal principle, is identically in point with the case now under consideration, the case of Dyche v. V. S. & P. R. R Co., 79 Miss. 361; Railroad v. Byrd, 89 Miss. 308; Railroad Company v. State, 29 Md. 439 and 442, and the Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Company v. State, 41 Md. 288; Weightman v....