Johnson v. Cranor

Decision Date04 September 1953
Docket NumberNo. 32542,32542
Citation43 Wn.2d 200,260 P.2d 873
PartiesJOHNSON, v. CRANOR, Superintendent of State Penitentiary.
CourtWashington Supreme Court

Claude L. Johnson, pro se.

Don Eastvold, Atty. Gen., Cyrus A. Dimmick, Olympia, for respondent.

FINLEY, Justice.

In his petition to this court for a writ of habeas corpus, Claude L. Johnson claims: That the attorney, employed to defend him, did not appear for the petitioner's trial in superior court; that petitioner's request for a continuance was refused; that he was offered the assistance of a young and inexperienced attorney by the court; that he reluctantly elected to defend himself, when the continuance was refused. Petitioner further asserts that he asked the court to subpoena several witnesses; that subpoenas were issued; that, after the state presented its case, the trial was continued from the morning of April 18, 1949, until 1:00 p. m. of the same day; that the witnesses were not present nor available when court reconvened at 1:00 p. m.; that petitioner objected to proceeding without his witnesses; that the court waited until 1:30 p. m., and then proceeded with the trial; that, thereupon, petitioner was convicted and sentenced without the benefit of testimony from the requested witnesses. Petitioner claims that the subpoenas, issued in his behalf, were defective in that they commanded the witnesses to appear at 10:00 a. m. on the following day, April 19, 1949, rather than at 1:00 p. m. on April 18, and that his constitutional right to compel the attendance of the witnesses at his trial was thereby violated. Lastly, petitioner claims that the prosecuting attorney, in summing up the state's case, told the jury that petitioner 'had a criminal record and was of a vicious nature;' that petitioner objected and asked for a mistrial ; that the court merely stated he would instruct the jury on the matter and, subsequently, gave an instruction to the jury as follows:

'Under the law of the State, the fact that a defendant has previously been convicted of a crime is not of itself any evidence of his guilt in this case. It is, however, a circumstance which may be weighed and considered by you in the determination of what weight or credibility should be allowed his testimony as a witness in this case.'

As to the latter aspect of the matter, petitioner claims he did not take the stand, that his credibility was not in issue, and that the court's instruction was ineffectual to remove from the minds of the jurors prejudice resulting from the prosecutor's misconduct.

The only contention that has merit and may properly be considered by us on habeas corpus is petitioner's claim respecting the defect in the subpoenas (allegedly depriving him of the constitutional right to obtain witnesses and their testimony in defense of the charges against him). This appears to us to be of considerable significance. The office of the attorney general, in preparing and submitting a brief for the hearing on this habeas corpus petition, attached a photostatic copy of a document which appears to be a copy of a subpoena issued on the 18th of April, 1949, in cause No. 25193, King county (State v. Claude L. Johnson), commanding certain witnesses for the defendant to be present in court at 10:00 a. m., on April 19, 1949. In the oral argument before us, assistant attorney general Cyrus Dimmick stated quite frankly that the subpoenas may have been defective, as claimed by petitioner. A photostatic copy of the allegedly defective subpoena is also submitted by petitioner along with his petition.

The record of this trial is not before us. It may be that the record or testimony of the prosecutor, or that of the trial judge, would provide an explanation of the matter relating to the subpoena which would be inconsistent with petitioner's present claims. In other words, the right to have process to compel the attendance of witnesses must be asserted and maintained. It can be, and might have been waived by the petitioner.

If the petitioner's claim respecting the subpoenas is wholly true, we think...

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6 cases
  • State v. Cook
    • United States
    • Washington Court of Appeals
    • 2 Julio 1973
    ...Indeed, it was on her motion. By such consent and motion, she waived her right to a claim of former jeopardy. In re Johnson v. Cranor, 43 Wash.2d 200, 260 P.2d 873 (1953), cert. denied, Johnson v. Delmore, 348 U.S. 902, 75 S.Ct. 226, 99 L.Ed. 709 (1954); Seattle v. Mathewson, Supra. Compare......
  • State v. Cook
    • United States
    • Washington Supreme Court
    • 29 Agosto 1974
    ...by her consent. By such consent and motion, we are satisfied that she waived her right to a claim of former jeopardy. Johnson v. Cranor, 43 Wash.2d 200, 260 P.2d 873 (1953), cert. denied, Johnson v. Delmore, 348 U.S. 902, 75 S.Ct. 226, 99 L.Ed. 709 (1954); Seattle v. Mathewson, 194 Wash. 35......
  • Giron v. Cranor
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Washington
    • 14 Octubre 1953
    ...56 S.Ct. 461, 465, 80 L. Ed. 682; see also Chambers v. State of Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 60 S.Ct. 472, 84 L.Ed. 716. 10 Johnson v. Cranor, Wash., 260 P.2d 873. 11 Malinski v. People of State of New York, 324 U.S. 401, 410-412, 65 S.Ct. 781, 89 L.Ed. 1029; see Stein v. People of State of New Y......
  • Tilghman v. Mayo
    • United States
    • Florida Supreme Court
    • 22 Julio 1955
    ...denied 339 U.S. 942, 70 S.Ct. 794, 94 L.Ed. 1358; State ex rel. Underwood v. Brown, 193 Tenn. 113, 244 S.W.2d 168; Johnson v. Cranor, 43 Wash.2d 200, 260 P.2d 873, certiorari denied Johnson v. Delmore, 348 U.S. 902, 75 S.Ct. We agree, however, and respondent admits, that petitioner is entit......
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