Johnson v. Division of Employment
| Decision Date | 01 June 1976 |
| Docket Number | No. 27021,27021 |
| Parties | Pauline J. JOHNSON, Petitioner, v. DIVISION OF EMPLOYMENT, State of Colorado, and Industrial Commission of Colorado, (Ex-officio Unemployment Compensation Commission of Colorado), Respondents. |
| Court | Colorado Supreme Court |
Robert L. Harris, Denver, for petitioner.
J. D. MacFarlane, Atty. Gen., Jean E. Dubofsky, Deputy Atty. Gen., Edward G. Donovan, Sol. Gen., John Kezer, Louis L. Kelley, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for respondent Industrial Commission of the State of Colorado (Ex-officio Unemployment Compensation Commission of Colorado).
This is an appeal from a decision of the Industrial Commission of Colorado (the commission) denying the application of claimant Johnson (claimant) for unemployment compensation benefits by reason of leaving state employment. The denial was based on a finding that the unemployment benefits to which she might have been entitled when reduced by the amount of her retirement pay left her with zero unemployment benefits. She challenges the commission's power to make the deduction. We affirm.
The facts of this case are not in dispute. Claimant was employed in state service for 28 years. She was compelled to retire at the age of 57 because her husband's health required a move to a warmer climate. She elected to receive retirement benefits on a reduced annuity basis pursuant to section 24--51--109(4), C.R.S.1973. 1 These were paid to her in monthly installments of $460.
The commission denied claimant's claim on the basis of section 8--73--110(3) (a)(I), C.R.S.1973, which deals with unemployment benefits and provides:
'(3) (a) Individuals who receive or are entitled to receive the following types of remuneration shall be entitled to receive for such week, if otherwise eligible, benefits Reduced by the amount of such remuneration, and any such amounts which have been deducted from the benefit payment by reason of the provisions of this subsection (3) shall not be available for future benefits:
'(1) Retirement payments in the form of an annuity, pension, or other retirement pay from an employer or from any trust or Fund contributed to by an employer; except that there shall be no denial or reduction of award if in the individual's base period there are no wages which were paid by the employer paying or contributing to such remuneration; . . .' (Emphasis added.)
I.
Claimant argues that the commission misinterpreted the above-cited statute. She asserts that the pension payments she is receiving currently constitute solely her own funds contributed during her years of state employment to the Public Employees' Retirement Association (PERA). This allegation stated another way is that the payments to her are from the approximate $10,000 she paid to PERA, that such monies are hers, and that she is not receiving payments from a 'fund contributed to by an employer.' The argument is contrary to the statutes creating the PERA fund.
The pension to which claimant is entitled is provided for by a number of statutory provisions. The amounts contributed to the PERA fund by employees and the state are outlined, respectively, in sections 24--51--104 and 105, C.R.S.1973. Then follows section 24--51--106(1), C.R.S.1973, which states:
(Emphasis added.)
The commission thus correctly applied section 8--73--110(3)(a)(I).
Claimant argues that the commission's interpretation effects an unconstitutional denial of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It is argued she could have taken a lump sum refund of her PERA contributions and thus would not be receiving retirement 'pay' or 'payments' within the meaning of the statute and would have been entitled to unemployment compensation. She contends that this distinction in mode of payment effects an invidious discrimination against her and bears no rational relationship to any legitimate state interest.
It is axiomatic that the constitutionality of legislative enactments is presumed. Mosgrove v. Town of Federal Heights, Colo., 543 P.2d 715 (1975); Gates Rubber Co. v. South Suburban Metropolitan Recreation and Park District, 183 Colo. 222, 516 P.2d 436 (1973); Harding v. Industrial Commission, 183 Colo. 52, 515 P.2d 95 (1973). Claimant, as assailant of the statute, bears the burden of proving...
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