Johnson v. Ford Motor Co.

• Decision Date: 02 April 2002
• Docket Number: No. 95,873.,95,873.
• Citation: 45 P.3d 86,2002 OK 24
• Parties: Ricky JOHNSON, Plaintiff/Appellee, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, Defendant/Appellant.
• Court: Oklahoma Supreme Court

45 P.3d 86

2002 OK 24

Ricky JOHNSON, Plaintiff/Appellee, v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY, Defendant/Appellant.

No. 95,873.

Supreme Court of Oklahoma.

April 2, 2002.

James D. Sill, Mary A. Black, James C. Winterringer, Shawnee, OK, Richard L. Denney, Lydia J. Barrett, Norman, Oklahoma, Brent D. Berry, Oklahoma City, OK, for Plaintiff/Appellee.

A. Thomas Elder, Jr., Curtis L. Smith, Oklahoma City, OK, George E. Wolf, Paul A. Williams, Kansas City, MO, Craig A. Morgan, Austin, TX, for Appellant.

KAUGER, J.

¶ 1 This cause concerns manufacturers' products liability as it relates to automobile accidents in which the alleged defective product did not cause the accident to occur, but allegedly caused injuries after the initial impact. This theory of recovery is commonly known as the "second impact injury" or "second collision doctrine".¹ Three issues are addressed:² 1) whether the trial court's omission of a jury instruction regarding enhanced injuries resulting from the alleged defect is grounds for reversal; 2) whether the evidence was sufficient to support the jury verdict; and 3) whether the calculation of pre-judgment interest should have commenced from the date the amended petition was filed and the defendant was served or from the date the cause was filed. Under the facts presented, we hold that: 1) the omission of the manufacturer's requested instruction relating to enhanced injuries does not require reversal; 2) the plaintiff's evidence that the seat belt and restraint system caused his permanent brain injury was sufficient to support the jury verdict; and 3) pre-judgment interest commenced from the date the cause was filed.

FACTS

¶ 2 On June 16, 1997, the appellee, nineteen-year-old Ricky Johnson (Johnson) apparently lost control of his 1988 Ford Ranger pickup truck while driving on a country road near his home in Tecumseh, Oklahoma. The pickup went off of the right side of the road, swerved to the left side of the road, flew off the road and the edge of a creek bank, smashed into an embankment, and landed at the bottom of the creek bed on its passenger's side. Johnson has no recollection of the accident.

¶ 3 During the accident, Johnson's seat belt webbing tore apart at the latch plate and he landed against the passenger-side door. Johnson sustained a broken pelvis, broken left arm, broken bone in his spine, ruptured bladder and a severe head injury with bruising and hemorrhaging in the brain. As a result of the brain injury, Johnson has permanent physical impairment and a reduction in his mental functioning.

¶ 4 On August 6, 1998, Johnson's parents initiated a suit³ against the manufacturer of the pickup, Ford Motor Company (Ford).⁴ They sought to recover compensatory and punitive damages resulting from Johnson's injuries. They alleged that: 1) Johnson suffered severe and disabling injuries because his seat belt failed during the accident; 2) the pickup's seat belt system was defective and unreasonably dangerous; and 3) Ford wilfully disregarded public safety in its design and manufacture of the vehicle, and that it was grossly negligent in its testing and warnings to consumers.⁵

¶ 5 Ford defended, denying that the seat belt was defective, or that it was the cause of Johnson's injuries. A jury returned a verdict in favor of Johnson for $5,000,000.00. On October 6, 2000, the trial court entered a journal entry of judgment on the jury verdict and awarded pre-judgment interest.⁶ On October 16, 2000, Ford filed a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict/motion for new trial, arguing that: 1) the trial court improperly refused to allow its requested jury instructions regarding enhanced injuries allegedly caused by the defect; 2) Johnson's evidence was insufficient to support the jury verdict; and 3) the calculation of pre-judgment interest should not have begun until the amended petition was filed and Ford was served. The trial court overruled both of Ford's motions on January 12, 2001. Ford appealed on February 16, 2001, and filed a motion for oral argument and a motion to retain the cause in this Court. On September 21, 2001, we retained the cause and briefing was completed on October 22, 2001.

¶ 6 I.

UNDER THE FACTS PRESENTED, THE OMISSION OF THE MANUFACTURER'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION RELATING TO ENHANCED INJURIES DOES NOT REQUIRE REVERSAL.

¶ 7 This cause involves a single-car accident, and it is undisputed that the failure of the seat belt and restraint system were not the cause of the accident. Ford asserts that the trial court committed reversible error when it neglected to specifically instruct the jury that if it determined that the seat belt and restraint system were defective, then Johnson could only recover damages for the portions of his injury which were enhanced because the seat belt separated.⁷

¶ 8 Johnson argues that: 1) the evidence presented at trial showed that, regardless of why Johnson's vehicle left the road, Johnson would not have suffered any permanent disabling brain injury if the defective seat belt had not failed; 2) Ford's proposed jury instruction was unnecessary and it would have mislead the jury because Johnson's brain damage was not merely "enhanced" by the defect, it was caused by the defect; and 3) the jury instructions which were given properly reflected Oklahoma products liability law.⁸ Both parties rely upon Lee v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 1984 OK 48, 688 P.2d 1283 in support of their arguments.

¶ 9 In giving instructions, the trial court is not required to frame issues, but it must state the law correctly.⁹ Instructions are explanations of the law of a case which enable a jury to understand its duty and to arrive at a correct conclusion.¹⁰ The instructions need not be ideal, but they must reflect the Oklahoma law regarding the subject at issue.¹¹

¶ 10 Oklahoma adopted the theory of manufacturers' products liability in Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., 1974 OK 52, 521 P.2d 1353. Kirkland teaches that one who sells a product in a defective condition, which is unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer, is strictly liable for the physical harm to the person or property caused by the defect.¹² In Kirkland, we recognized that the burden of proof regarding causation was on the plaintiff and that a defense to a products liability action was that the defect did not cause the injury.

¶ 11 Ten years later, in Lee v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 1984 OK 48, 688 P.2d 1283, we determined that a manufacturer is liable for the damages caused by a defect even if the defect may not have caused the accident — if the defect caused an injury or increased the severity of the injury sustained as a result of the first impact. In Lee, the plaintiff's car collided with another vehicle. After the initial impact, the plaintiff was thrown from the car and sustained a cervical fracture which rendered him quadriplegic. Lee brought a negligence action against the driver of the other vehicle and a manufacturers' products liability action against Volkswagen. The application of products liability was based on the contention that a defective door latch caused the plaintiff's cervical fracture by allowing the door to come open, causing the plaintiff to be thrown from the car. The jury rendered a verdict in favor of the plaintiff and against both defendants. Volkswagen appealed, arguing that the plaintiff did not offer sufficient proof of causation to submit the cause to the jury.

¶ 12 On appeal we affirmed, recognizing that a manufacturer should be liable for damages if the plaintiff can prove that he or she suffered injuries as a result of the defect or "second impact" in addition to those suffered as a result of the latent defect. Regarding the plaintiff's burden to prove causation, we held that: 1) the plaintiff was required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the product was in a defective condition which was unreasonably dangerous as defined by ordinary expectations when it left control of the manufacturer; and 2) after the original, initial impact the defect caused an injury or enhanced injuries.

¶ 13 Rather than require the plaintiff to prove precisely and exactly those injuries which are attributable to the accident and those which are attributable to the alleged design defect, we determined that: 1) the plaintiff should be required to prove by a preponderance of the evidence the extent of the enhanced injuries resulting from the defect; and 2) the manufacturer is liable for damages only for injuries which resulted from the defect. We also noted that when injuries are sustained which are separate and divisible, the burden of proof remains on the plaintiff including the burden of proving "enhancement". In other words, the plaintiff must offer sufficient proof to prove which of the injuries are attributable to the manufacturer's defective product and the degree of "enhancement" occasioned by the product as distinguished from the injuries flowing from a third party's acts of negligence.

¶ 14 However, we also recognized that when the principal injury complained of is single and indivisible and therefore incapable of apportionment, there can be no "enhancement." Accordingly, under this theory, the plaintiff has the burden of presenting sufficient evidence to prove to the jury that each defendant's act was a contributing factor in producing the plaintiff's injuries. Once the plaintiff meets this burden, the burden of proving that the plaintiff's injury was either the result of a third party's negligence or only in part attributable to the manufacturer's defective product shifts to the manufacturer. Under these circumstances, the relationship of the manufacturer and the third party are concurrent tortfeasors in the sense that their independent acts combine to cause a single injury. Should the plaintiff's injuries be indivisible, the defendants are held jointly and severally liable as concurrent tortfeasors for plaintiff's total damage. If reasonable minds could...