Johnson v. Jensen, C0-88-1456
| Decision Date | 27 December 1988 |
| Docket Number | No. C0-88-1456,C0-88-1456 |
| Citation | 433 N.W.2d 472 |
| Parties | Dean E. JOHNSON, et al., Respondents, v. Verne JENSEN, et al., Appellants. |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
Syllabus by the Court
1. The trial court did not err by denying appellants' motion for JNOV where the evidence reasonably sustains the jury's verdict that appellants' trespass demonstrated willful indifference to the rights of respondents.
2. The trial court did not err by denying appellants' motion for a new trial. The trial court properly allowed the jury to consider the imposition of both treble damages, pursuant to Minn.Stat. Secs. 548.05 and 561.04 (1986), and punitive damages, pursuant to Minn.Stat. Sec. 549.20, subd. 1 (1986).
3. The trial court did not err by denying respondents' motion for costs, disbursements, witness fees, and reasonable attorney fees based on an actual good faith dispute as to the amount of damages.
Steven J. Running, Duluth, for respondents.
William Starr, Minneapolis, for appellants.
Heard, considered and decided by RANDALL, P.J., and FOLEY and SCHUMACHER, JJ.
Appellants appeal from the denial of their motion for JNOV and for a new trial. They allege error in the jury instructions which allowed the imposition of both statutory treble compensatory damages and punitive damages. Respondents seek review from the denial of their motion for costs, disbursements, witness fees, and reasonable attorney fees.
We affirm.
Respondents, Dean E. and Nancy A. Johnson, own a parcel of property located just northwest of the intersection of Interstate 35 and Highway 23 in Pine County, Minnesota. Respondents owned the property since April 20, 1981. There is a private asphalt road just inside the western border of respondents' property, providing them access to Highway 23.
In the fall of 1986, appellants, Verne and Kathleen Jensen, purchased a parcel of property adjacent to the western boundary of respondents' property. Appellants are both licensed real estate agents and their intention was to locate a real estate office building on the property.
Shortly after appellants purchased their property they requested an easement across respondents' private asphalt surfaced road. Because of concerns about increased traffic and potential liability exposure, respondents refused.
Appellants used the private road despite respondents' explicit instructions not to. Appellants also began constructing a driveway from respondents' road onto their own property. Brush and trees were cleared, and dirt was removed from respondents' property. When respondents discovered the driveway construction, they placed a fence along what they believed to be the boundary line of their property. Two days later they found the fence had been removed and additional excavation had been done on their land. A culvert had also been installed, part of which was on respondents' land, and deep ruts were left on respondents' land from a truck operated by appellants' contractor.
Respondents commenced a trespass action against appellants and obtained a temporary restraining order prohibiting any further acts of trespass. In their complaint, respondents sought compensatory damages for damage to their property. With consent of the trial court, respondents' complaint was subsequently amended to include a claim for punitive damages pursuant to Minn.Stat. Sec. 549.20 (1986). In their trial brief, appellants admit that a trespass did in fact occur. They contend, however, that the trespass was inadvertent and the damage caused was minimal.
The matter was tried to a jury. The trial court granted both parties opportunity to submit and object to proposed jury instructions. Both parties submitted proposed instructions. Instructions were given regarding the elements necessary for both treble and punitive damages. At no time did appellants' counsel object to the damage instructions. Nor did appellants object to respondents' proposed special verdict form.
In response to the special verdict interrogatories, the jury returned the following special verdict:
1. Appellants did trespass on real estate owned by respondents.
2. In trespassing upon respondents' property, appellants caused $1,800.00 in damage, of which $1,500.00 was found to relate specifically to appellants' destruction of trees, shrubs or bushes.
3. The $1,500.00 in damages referred to above were trebled by the jury to the sum of $4,500.00.
4. Appellants failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that their trespass was casual or involuntary or that they had probable cause to believe the trees, shrubs or bushes destroyed were theirs, and not respondents.
5. Respondents established by clear and convincing evidence that the acts of appellants in trespassing upon their property showed a willful indifference to respondents' rights.
6. The jury awarded the sum of $9,000.00 in punitive damages.
After trial, respondents moved for an order awarding them costs, disbursements and reasonable attorney and witness fees, pursuant to Minn.Stat. Sec. 549.21, subd. 2 (1986).
Appellants subsequently moved the trial court for an order directing judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV), or to reduce the amount of the judgment to $4800 plus interest, costs and disbursements. Appellants asserted, for the first time, that it was improper for the trial court to allow the imposition of both treble compensatory damages and punitive damages. In the alternative, appellants moved for a new trial.
The trial court denied all motions. Appellants' motion for JNOV and a new trial was denied because the trial court found that appellants waived any objections they may have had by failing to object to the proposed jury instructions prior to their submission to the jury, and by failing to assert their objections at trial. In addition, the trial court specifically found that treble and punitive damages may be awarded in cases such as this, that the jury's verdict was justified by the evidence, and that it was not contrary to law. Respondents' motion for attorney fees was denied because the trial court found there was an actual good faith dispute as to the amount of damages appellants' actions caused respondents to suffer.
Appellants appeal from the order denying the motion for JNOV or a new trial. Respondents seek review from that part of the order denying their motion for Sec. 549.21 costs, disbursements and reasonable attorney and witness fees.
1. Did the trial court err by denying appellants' motion for JNOV?
2. Did the trial court err by denying appellants' motion for a new trial?
3. Did the trial court err by denying respondents' motion for costs, disbursements and reasonable attorney and witness fees?
On appeal from an order denying a motion for JNOV, the trial court's order should stand if there is competent evidence reasonably tending to sustain the verdict. Bisher v. Homart Development Co., 328 N.W.2d 731, 733 (Minn.1983). Unless the evidence is practically conclusive against the verdict, or that reasonable minds could reach but one conclusion against the verdict, the verdict should not be set aside. The evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict. Id.
Based on the record, the jury's finding that the trespass showed a willful indifference to respondents' rights is supported by competent evidence. Appellants instructed respondents not to use their road and actually placed a fence along the boundary line of their property. Despite these instructions, appellants continued to use the road and went so far as removing respondents' fence to continue excavation on respondents' property. These facts are competent evidence sustaining the jury's verdict that the trespass demonstrated willful indifference to respondents' rights. The trial court's order denying appellants' motion for JNOV was proper.
Motion for a new trial
This court's standard of review of a trial court's denial of a motion for a new trial is narrow. The granting of a new trial rests in the discretion of the trial court, and the trial court's decision will be reversed only for a clear abuse of discretion. Heroff v. Metropolitan Transit Commission, 373 N.W.2d 355, 356 (Minn.Ct.App.1985), pet. for rev. denied (Nov. 18, 1985).
The right to a new trial because of errors of law occurring during trial is governed by Minn.R.Civ.P. 59.01(6). That rule states, in pertinent part:
A new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on all or part of the issues for any of the following causes: * * * (6) Errors of law occurring at the trial, and objected to at the time or, if no objection need have been made under Rules 46 and 51, plainly assigned in the notice of motion.
Id. Therefore, as a general rule, a new trial may be granted on the basis of errors of law only where those alleged errors were objected to at the time of trial.
There are, however, exceptions to this general rule. Minn.R.Civ.P. 51 is one such exception. This rule states, in pertinent part:
An error in the instructions with respect to fundamental law or controlling principle may be assigned in a motion for a new trial though it was not otherwise called to the attention of the court.
Id. Taken together, the rules permit a party to move the trial court for a new trial based upon erroneous jury instructions, even though no objection was made before the jury retired. Donald v. Moses, 254 Minn. 186, 194, 94 N.W.2d 255, 261 (1959).
Appellants first raised their objection to the jury instructions in their motion for new trial. Therefore, appellate review of the jury instructions is limited to errors in fundamental law or controlling principle. Minn.R.Civ.P. 51; Palatine Natl. Bank of Palatine v. Olson, 366 N.W.2d 726, 731 (Minn.Ct.App.1985). Unless this court finds the alleged error (instructions allowing imposition of both treble compensatory damages and punitive damages) was one of...
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