Johnson v. Melton Truck Lines, Inc.
| Decision Date | 30 September 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 14 C 07858,14 C 07858 |
| Parties | DAVID M. JOHNSON, Plaintiff, v. MELTON TRUCK LINES, INC., ROBERT A. PETERSON, MICHAEL DARGEL, RAMONA WILLIAMS, MELTON TRUCK LINES, INC. OCCUPATIONAL INJURY BENEFIT PLAN, ROBERT ROGAN, GREAT WEST CASUALTY COMPANY, TANYA JENSEN, BLANE J. BRUMMOND, and UNKNOWN DEFENDANTS, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
The plaintiff, David M. Johnson, has filed suit against his former employer, Melton Truck Lines, Inc. ("Melton"), a number of individuals associated with Melton—Robert Peterson, Michael Dargel, Ramona Williams, and Robert Ragan,1 Melton Truck Lines, Inc. Occupational Injury Benefit Plan ("the Plan") (collectively with Melton and the individual defendants, the "Melton defendants"), Melton's insurer Great West Casualty Company ("Great West"), and individuals associated with Great West—Tanya Jensen and Blane Brummond (collectively, the "Great West defendants"). Johnson asserts a variety of federal and state claims, including violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), the Lanham Act, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"), the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), invasion of privacy, breach of contract, wrongful termination, and retaliation, among others. See Sec. Am.Compl. ("SAC"), ECF No. 103. Pending before the Court are the Great West defendants' motion to dismiss, ECF No. 117, and motion for sanctions against Johnson, ECF No. 132, the Melton defendants' motion to dismiss, ECF No. 156, and Johnson's motion for sanctions against Great West, ECF No. 137. For the following reasons, the motions to dismiss are granted in part and denied in part and the sanctions motions are denied.
Johnson's Second Amended Complaint is no less prolix than his original complaint; in fact, Johnson has expanded his allegations in the SAC, which runs to 48 pages and 265 paragraphs. As in his original complaint, the SAC is replete with misused legal jargon and omits many facts necessary to the formation of a coherent narrative. The Opinion granting Great West's motion to dismiss the original Complaint explains some of the background between the parties. See Johnson v. Great W. Cas. Co., No. 14 C 7858, 2015 WL 4751128, at *1-2 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 11, 2015).3 To briefly summarize, Johnson claims that he injured his hand on May 3, 2013 while driving for his employer, Melton Truck Lines, in Alabama. Melton subsequentlyterminated Johnson's employment on or about June 12, 2013. Thereafter, Johnson filed a workers' compensation claim in Ohio with Great West, Melton's workers' compensation insurer, which was disallowed for lack of jurisdiction. See Pet. Conf. Arb. Award Ex. A, ECF No. 62 (). Johnson also filed a workers' compensation claim in Illinois, which was eventually dismissed for failure to appear.4 See GW Mot. Dismiss 4, ECF No. 117; see also Pet. Conf. Arb. Award Ex. B.
The Opinion dismissing the original Complaint advised Johnson that claims premised upon the defendants' opposition to his workers' compensation claim "are the province of the [Illinois Workers Compensation Commission], not a federal court." Johnson, 2015 WL 4751128, at *2 (). Nonetheless, a number of Johnson's new allegations continue to assert liability based on the defendants' opposition to his workers compensation claims. See SAC (Counts V-VI, IX-XI, XIV). To these claims against the Great Western defendants, Johnson now asserts claims against the Melton defendants based on his recruitment to, employment with, and termination from, Melton. The defendants have filed motions to dismiss,arguing that Johnson has not stated a claim entitling him to any relief from this Court.5 Both Johnson and the Great West defendants have filed motions for sanctions pursuant to Rule 11.
The individual Melton defendants move to dismiss the SAC under Rule 12(b)(2), arguing that Johnson has failed to establish that this Court has personal jurisdiction over them. Melton Mem. in Supp. 2; Melton Reply 2-5, ECF No. 179. A federal court in Illinois may exercise personal jurisdiction over a defendant if the Illinois long-arm statute would allow it. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(1)(A); uBID, Inc. v. GoDaddy Grp., Inc., 623 F.3d 421, 425 (7th Cir. 2010). Because Illinois' statute contains a catch-all provision that permits personal jurisdiction if it would be authorized by either the Illinois Constitution or the United States Constitution, the state statutory and federal constitutional requirements merge. Id.; see 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/2-209(c).
Personal jurisdiction may be "general" or "specific." Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 754 (2014); Int'l Shoe Co. v. State of Wash., Office of Unemployment Comp. & Placement, 326 U.S. 310, 318 (1945). General personal jurisdiction exists where the defendant's continuous operations within the forum state are "so substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit against it on causes of action arising from dealings entirely distinct from those activities." Daimler AG, 134 S. Ct. at 754 (quoting Int'l Shoe Co, 326 U.S. at 318). "For an individual, the paradigm forum for the exercise of general jurisdiction is the individual's domicile." Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2853 (2011).
Specific personal jurisdiction exists when the plaintiff's claims against the defendant arise out of the defendant's constitutionally sufficient contacts with the forum state. uBID, Inc., 623 F.3d at 425; Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.8 (1984). "The key question is therefore whether the defendant [has] sufficient 'minimum contacts' with Illinois such that the maintenance of the suit 'does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.'" Tamburo v. Dworkin, 601 F.3d 693, 700-701 (7th Cir. 2010), citing Int'l Shoe Co., 326 U.S. at 316. Specific jurisdiction requires that (1) the defendant has purposely directed his activities at the forum state or purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting business in the state, and (2) the alleged injury arises out of the defendant's forum-related activities. Id. at 702, citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985).
Given that the defendants have moved to dismiss the SAC for a lack of personal jurisdiction, the burden shifts to Johnson to show that such jurisdiction exists. Purdue Research Found. v. Sanofi-Synthelabo, S.A, 338 F.3d 773, 782 (7th Cir. 2003). Johnson alleges that because defendants Peterson, Williams, and Dargel interacted with him by both phone and email on matters related to Johnson's employment with Melton, both specific and general personal jurisdiction exists. See, e.g., SAC ¶¶ 27, 33, 55, 112-13, 248, 250, 256, 262. As to defendant Ragan, Johnson alleges no facts indicating that Ragan had any contacts with Illinois; instead, the complaint merely describes Ragan as the administrator of Melton's Injury Benefit Plan. See SAC ¶¶ 141, 152, 156.
Here, it is apparent that Johnson's allegations have failed to demonstrate that this Court has personal jurisdiction over any of the individual Melton defendants. In order for a court to exercise general jurisdiction over an individual defendant, that defendant must be a citizen of theforum state or have contacts that are so "continuous and systematic" with the forum state that, for all intents and purposes, they are at home in that state. See, e.g., Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 416 (1984). For the purposes of general jurisdiction, individual defendants are considered citizens of the state in which they reside with the intent to remain indefinitely. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 923 (2011) (). The complaint makes plain that none of the individual Melton defendants are domiciled in Illinois; all three of these defendants reside in Tulsa, Oklahoma and, although residence does not necessarily equate to domicile, no facts are alleged to suggest that with respect to these defendants their residence and domicile are not one and the same. See SAC ¶¶ 8-10, 12. Nor does the complaint does not allege any facts indicating that the defendants have "systematic and continuous" contacts with Illinois to the extent required for the exercise of general jurisdiction over a non-citizen defendant. See Goodyear, 564 U.S. at 930. Here, the individual Melton defendants' alleged contacts with Illinois are limited to a few phone calls and emails. See SAC ¶¶ 18, 33, 112-13. Such limited, infrequent conduct does not warrant a finding of general personal jurisdiction over any of the individual Melton defendants.
Nor do the few phone calls or business solicitation emails establish specific jurisdiction. To establish specific jurisdiction, a plaintiff must show that (1) the defendant purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting business in the forum state; (2) the alleged injury must have arisen from the defendant's activities within the forum; and (3) the exercise of jurisdiction comports with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. Felland v. Clifton, 682 F.3d 665, 673 (7th Cir. 2012). Here, it is apparent the individual defendants did not purposely avail themselves to the benefits of Illinois; their alleged contacts with Illinois arelimited to Peterson's emails to Johnson advertising Melton, Williams' phone calls to Johnson regarding his scheduling, and...
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