Johnson v. Missouri Dept. of Corrections
| Decision Date | 30 June 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. WD 64175.,WD 64175. |
| Citation | 166 S.W.3d 110 |
| Parties | Terril Lee JOHNSON, Respondent, v. MISSOURI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Appellant. |
| Court | Missouri Supreme Court |
Lisa J. Berry, Jefferson City, MO, for appellant.
Amy M. Bartholow, Columbia, MO, for respondent.
Before BRECKENRIDGE, P.J., LOWENSTEIN and HARDWICK, JJ.
The Department of Corrections appeals from a summary judgment declaring that the minimum prison term provisions of Section 558.0191 do not apply to Terril Johnson's fourteen-year sentence for armed criminal action. For reasons explained herein, we affirm the judgment.
On November 25, 2002, Johnson pled guilty to charges of first-degree robbery, Section 569.020, and armed criminal action, Section 571.015. The court sentenced him to consecutive terms of ten years for robbery and fourteen years for armed criminal action.
Based on Johnson's conviction for first-degree robbery as a "dangerous felony" under Section 558.019.3, the Department of Corrections determined that he must serve at least 85% of his ten-year sentence before becoming eligible for parole. The Department also determined that the minimum term requirements of Section 558.019.2(3) applied to Johnson's sentence for armed criminal action because he had at least three previous prison commitments for felony offenses unrelated to his current offense. The Department's ruling required Johnson to serve at least 80% of his fourteen-year sentence for armed criminal action before becoming eligible for parole.
Johnson sought a declaratory judgment in the Circuit Court of Cole County that the Department had erroneously applied the minimum prison term provisions to his sentence for armed criminal action. He later filed a summary judgment motion arguing that, under the plain language of the statute, the offense of armed criminal action was excluded from the requirements of Section 558.019. The circuit court agreed and granted summary judgment in Johnson's favor.
In its sole point on appeal, the Department contends the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment because the minimum prison term provisions of Section 558.019 can be applied to convictions for armed criminal action. Both parties agree that there are no factual issues in dispute. The appeal exclusively raises a question of law regarding the statutory interpretation of Section 558.019 and its relationship to Section 571.015, the armed criminal action statute.
Our review of the summary judgment is de novo, without deference to the circuit court's ruling. ITT Commercial Fin. Corp. v. Mid-America Marine Supply Corp., 854 S.W.2d 371, 376 (Mo. banc 1993). Summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine issues of material fact, and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Rule 74.04(c)(6).
In reviewing the statutes at issue, our role is to ascertain the legislative intent from the language used and to give effect to the words based on their plain and ordinary meaning. Nunn v. C.C. Midwest, 151 S.W.3d 388, 396 (Mo.App.2004). The legislature is presumed to have intended what the statute says; consequently when the legislative intent is apparent from the words used and no ambiguity exists, there is no room for statutory construction. Garcia-Huerta v. Garcia, 108 S.W.3d 684, 687 (Mo.App.2003). When interpreting a penal statute, however, we must construe any ambiguity "against the government or party seeking to exact statutory penalties and in favor of persons on whom such penalties are sought to be imposed." J.S. v. Beaird, 28 S.W.3d 875, 877 (Mo. banc 2000).
Section 558.019 sets forth the minimum prison terms that certain convicted felons may be required to serve before becoming eligible for parole, conditional release, or other early release by the Department. In subsection 1, the statute provides that it "shall not affect those provisions of ... section 571.015, RSMo, which set minimum terms of sentences[.]" § 558.019.1. In subsection 2, the statute further states that the minimum prison terms are "applicable to all classes of felonies except those ... otherwise excluded in subsection 1 of this section." § 558.019.2.
The offense of armed criminal action, as defined in Section 571.015, is specifically identified as an exception to the general minimum prison term requirements in Section 558.019. The armed criminal action statute includes its own minimum terms, requiring convicted persons to serve at least three years before reaching eligibility for parole or early release from prison. § 571.015.1. Any person convicted of a second offense of armed criminal action must serve a term of at least five years, and a third offense requires serving a minimum ten-year sentence. § 571.015.2-3.
The Department argues that the general minimum term provisions of Section 558.019 can be applied in this case because they do not conflict with or "affect" the minimum sentence requirements for armed criminal action under Section 571.015. Because Johnson was sentenced to serve fourteen years for armed criminal action, the armed criminal action statute requires him to serve at least three years of that sentence, while the general minimum term provisions of Section 558.019.2(3) would require him to serve 80% or 11.2 years of that sentence. The Department contends Section 558.019 only precludes a reduction of the minimum sentence for armed criminal action. Thus, it argues the armed criminal action statute is not "affected" when the general statute imposes a greater minimum sentence.
The Department's argument is based on the language in subsection 1 of Section 558.019, which states that the general minimum term provisions "shall not affect" the minimum terms set forth in the armed criminal action statute. The dictionary defines "affect" in at least two ways that may be applicable in this context: "1: to act upon[;] a: to produce an effect ... upon... b(1): to produce a material influence or alteration in ... b(2): to have a detrimental influence on[.]" Webster's New Third International Dictionary 35(1993).
The Department's interpretation of Section 558.019 invokes the narrowest part of this definition, which seems to indicate that the armed criminal action statute would only be detrimentally affected if its three-year minimum sentence was reduced by applying the general minimum terms. Alternatively, if the broader definition is considered, Section 558.019 could be interpreted to mean that the general minimum prison terms would "affect" the armed criminal action statute if it altered or had any material influence by either increasing...
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