MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
A jury in the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis, Missouri convicted petitioner Antwane N. Johnson of crimes arising from an armed home invasion that Johnson committed with another person; the other person died during the crime. The jury convicted Johnson of one count of burglary in the first degree, three counts of robbery in the first degree, and four counts of armed criminal action, but acquitted him on a charge of felony murder and an associated charge of Armed Criminal Action. The court sentenced Johnson to four concurrent 25-year sentences on the burglary and robbery counts, to be followed consecutively by four concurrent 15-year sentences for the armed criminal action counts. The convictions and sentence were affirmed on appeal. State v. Johnson, 479 S.W.3d 736 (Mo. Ct. App. 2016) (unreported Memorandum at Resp. Exh. 8, ECF 8-8). Johnson filed a motion for post-conviction relief under Missouri Supreme Court Rule 29.15, which was denied after an evidentiary hearing. That denial was also affirmed on appeal. Johnson v. State, 552 S.W.3d 768 (Mo. Ct. App. 2018).
This matter is before me on Johnson's petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. For the reasons that follow I will deny Johnson's petition.
In affirming the denial of post-conviction relief, the Missouri Court of Appeals described the facts and procedural history as follows:
On May 16, 2012 Movant [Johnson], who was armed with a knife, and Jerome Burse (Burse), who was armed with a .38 caliber revolver, entered a home in the City of St. Louis that Hakeem Grant (Grant), his girlfriend Jasmine Hopkins, their seven month-old daughter Z.G., Kiana Miller (Miller), Lamonica Ruff (Ms. Ruff), and John Darryl Ruff all occupied. Grant testified that around 2:30 p.m. he heard his daughter and Miller screaming, and he saw a man armed with a gun holding Miller—who was carrying the baby—in a headlock. Movant gathered all the people in the home into the front room where he and Burse demanded money and jewelry at gunpoint, including the rings from Ms. Ruff's fingers, all of which Movant collected. Movant then held a knife to Ms. Ruff's throat and threatened to cut her throat if the people in the home did not give Movant more money. At this point, Grant drew a .40 caliber pistol from the couch and began shooting at Movant and Burse, striking them both. Grant and Burse continued to shoot at each other as Burse ran away; Burse died from these multiple gunshot injuries. The State charged Movant with: (1) second-degree felony murder for Burse's death, (2) ACA, (3) first-degree burglary, (4) ACA, (5) first-degree robbery, (6) ACA, (7) first-degree robbery, (8) ACA, (9) first-degree robbery, and (10) ACA. The jury convicted Movant of counts 3-10, but acquitted Movant of felony murder and the associated ACA charge.
At the sentencing hearing, the State argued that Johnson's crime was "a little bit more than ... what a normal robbery case would involve" specifically pointing out that Burse died during the course of the robbery. The State argued that even though the jury did not convict Movant of felony murder, Burse's death was an "aggravating factor" that the sentencing court should take into account in determining Movant's sentence. The State also argued that the sentencing court should consider Movant's failure to accept responsibility for the crimes in determining the proper sentence, as evidenced by the "three or four-day" trial. The State then noted Movant's four prior convictions and requested a sentence of twenty-five years, arguing, "[t]his was a violent home invasion, and I think a violent home invasion deserves an appropriate sentence."
Movant's trial counsel countered that Johnson had always accepted responsibility for the burglary and robbery but "went to trial specifically because there was no way to negotiate the murder charge out of the ten charges." Movant's counsel requested a sentence at the lower end of the sentencing range, noting that while Movant had prior convictions, they were for nonviolent offenses. Movant addressed the court, expressing his remorse both for the crime and for the pain that Burse's family experienced, and he stated he went to trial "to prove [his] innocence of murder."
In announcing its sentence, the sentencing court recognized that "certainly the jury found [Movant] not guilty of the murder" but noted the physical and psychological injuries that resulted from "going into someone's house and holding them up," including that Burse was killed. The sentencing court again noted that the jury did not find Movant guilty of felony murder, which the court "accept[ed]," but the court stated the jury found Movant guilty of the other charges and "judgment needs to be entered accordingly." The court then sentenced Movant as a prior and persistent offender to concurrent terms of twenty-five years on both the robbery and burglary charges, and to fifteen years each on all ACA charges, concurrent to each other, but consecutive to the robbery and burglary charges, for a total sentence of forty years in the Missouri Department of Corrections. This Missouri Court of Appealsaffirmed Movant's conviction and sentence on appeal. State v. Johnson, 479 S.W.3d 736 (Mo. App. E.D. 2016).
Movant filed a timely Rule 29.15 motion. In his amended motion, Movant asserted that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the State's statements at sentencing suggesting Movant's sentence be enhanced for exercising his right to go to trial and for the felony murder charge despite the acquittal, and for failing to object to the sentence itself; and that the sentencing court abused its discretion in enhancing Movant's sentence based on the acquitted felony murder and ACA charges.
After an evidentiary hearing on the motion, the motion court denied Movant's request for relief under Rule 29.15, finding the record did not show the sentencing court either punished Movant for having a trial or sentenced Movant for the acquitted charges. Rather, the motion court stated the sentencing court sentenced Movant based on the "egregious nature of the offenses and the jury's verdicts in this matter." The motion court further noted any objection by trial counsel on these grounds "would not have mattered in the sentencing hearing." Moreover, the motion court found the sentence was "a fair and just sentence based solely on the facts and circumstances as the jury found them in its guilty verdicts."
Johnson v. State, 552 S.W.3d 768, 770-72 (Mo. Ct. App. 2018) (footnote omitted).
In his petition for writ of habeas corpus, Johnson raises three1 grounds for relief:
1. Delays in bringing his case to trial violated the Interstate Agreement on Detainers as well as his rights guaranteed by the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth andFourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution.
2. Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the prosecutor's sentencing arguments that Johnson should be punished for the felony murder on which he was acquitted; and
3. The trial court's sentence violated his Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights because the court sentenced him to fifteen years above the prosecutor's recommendation and because the court considered the felony murder on which he was acquitted.
In order to obtain federal habeas review of a claim raised in a § 2254 petition, the petitioner must have first raised the federal constitutional dimensions of the claim in state court in accordance with state procedural rules. Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364 (1995) (per curiam); Beaulieu v. Minnesota, 583 F.3d 570, 573 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting Gilmore v. Armontrout, 861 F.2d 1061, 1065 (8th Cir. 1988)). When a prisoner has gone through all stages of direct appeal and post-conviction proceedings without presenting a claim to the state courts, that claim is procedurally defaulted. Sweet v. Delo, 125 F.3d 1144, 1149 (8th Cir. 1997). This means that a federal habeas court cannot hear the claim unless the prisoner demonstrates "cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged violation of federal law, or...that failure to consider the claim [ ] will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice." Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991). To demonstrate cause, he must show that "some objective factor externalto the defense" impeded his efforts to present the claim to the state courts. Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478, 488 (1986). To establish prejudice, the petitioner must demonstrate that the identified errors "worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting the entire trial with error of constitutional dimensions." United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 170 (1982).
Where a state court has adjudicated a claim on the merits, federal habeas relief can be granted on the claim only if the state court adjudication "resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States," 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); or "was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding," 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). The federal law must be clearly established at the time petitioner's state conviction became final, and the source of doctrine for such law is limited to the United States Supreme Court. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 380-83 (2000).
A federal court is "bound by the AEDPA [Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act] to exercise only limited and deferential review of underlying state court decisions." Lomholt v. Iowa, 327 F.3d 748, 751 (8th Cir. 2003). A habeas petitioner must show that the challenged state court ruling "rested on 'an...
