Johnson v. Presbyterian Homes of Synod of Fla., Inc.

• Decision Date: 16 September 1970
• Docket Number: 39197,Nos. 39196,s. 39196
• Citation: 239 So.2d 256
• Parties: Gilbert E. JOHNSON, as Tax Collector of Manatee County, Florida, et al., Appellants, v. PRESBYTERIAN HOMES OF the SYNOD OF FLORIDA, INC., a non-profit corporation of Florida, Appellee. CITY OF BRADENTON, a Florida municipal corporation, et al., Appellants, v. PRESBYTERIAN HOMES OF the SYNOD OF FLORIDA, INC., a non-profit corporation of Florida, Appellee.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 256

239 So.2d 256

Gilbert E. JOHNSON, as Tax Collector of Manatee County, Florida, et al., Appellants, v. PRESBYTERIAN HOMES OF the SYNOD OF FLORIDA, INC., a non-profit corporation of Florida, Appellee.

CITY OF BRADENTON, a Florida municipal corporation, et al., Appellants, v. PRESBYTERIAN HOMES OF the SYNOD OF FLORIDA, INC., a non-profit corporation of Florida, Appellee.

Nos. 39196, 39197.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Sept. 16, 1970.

Robert E. Knowles, Bradenton, for Hiram Strickland, Tax Assessor.

Robert J. Boylston, Bradenton, for Gilbert E. Johnson, Tax Collector and Fred O. Dickinson, Comptroller of the State of Florida.

Lloyd A. Lyday, Bradenton, for City of Bradenton.

Thomas T. Cobb, of Black, Cobb, Cole, Crotty & Sigerson, Daytona Beach, for appellee.

ADKINS, Justice.

This is a direct appeal from a final judgment of the Circuit Court in Manatee County, Florida, directly passing upon the validity of Fla.Stat. (1967) § 192.06(14), F.S.A. Fla.Const., art. V, § 4(2), F.S.A.

Confusingly, Fla.Stat. (1967) § 192.06(14), F.S.A., has been transferred in the official Florida Statutes and renumbered as Fla.Stat. (1969) § 196.191(14), F.S.A. The substantive provisions of the statutes were not changed.

The appellee, plaintiff in the trial court, filed two companion suits questioning the assessment of real property taxes for the year 1968 by Manatee County and the City of Bradenton, respectively. The suit filed against the County and the suit filed against the City were consolidated. For clarity, the appellee will be referred to as 'Plaintiff' and the appellants will be referred to as 'Defendants.'

Plaintiff contends that the assessments by the Defendants were unlawful for the reason that the property involved was exempt from taxation under the provision of Fla.Stat. (1967) § 192.06(14), F.S.A. Defendants contend that the statute is unconstitutional as applied to the facts of this case in that it attempts to grant tax exemptions to homes for the aged owned by religious organizations and operated primarily for religious purposes.

Fla.Stat. (1967) § 192.06(14), F.S.A., contains the following:

'(a) All property, real and personal, of any bona fide home for the aged, licensed by the state board of health, owned and operated by Florida corporations not for profit, which has been and is currently exempt from the payment of taxes to the United States for the income derived from the operation of such home for the aged and used by such home for the aged for the purposes for which it was organized, and limited to providing homes and services to elderly persons, housing for nurses and other personnel of such home, medical facilities, dining facilities, laundries, parking lots, auditoriums, administrative offices, and other uses essential to the operation of such home for the aged; provided that all income of such home for the aged remaining after payment of the usual and necessary expenses of operation including the payment of liens and encumbrances upon its property, shall be used exclusively for educational, charitable or scientific purposes, including the maintenance, improvement or expansion of its facilities.'

In an earlier case dealing with this same property, decided prior to the enactment of Subsection (14) of Fla.Stat. (1967) § 192.06, F.S.A., this Court held that the Plaintiff was not entitled to an exemption. Presbyterian Homes of Synod of Florida, Inc. v. City of Bradenton, 190 So.2d 771 (Fla.1966). The only change in the applicable law since the prior decision has been the enactment of Subsection (14) and the sole basis of the exemption claimed by the Plaintiff is under this new subsection.

Just as in the prior case, the parties have commendably entered into a stipulation of facts. There is no substantial difference in the facts of the case Sub judice and the facts of the prior litigation between the parties.

The directors of Plaintiff, a non-profit corporation, are annually elected by the Synod of Florida of the Presbyterian Church, the highest governing body of the Presbyterian Church in the State of Florida. The officers and directors of Plaintiff are under the control of the Synod and are answerable to it for the performance of their acts and duties.

The atmosphere of the home is religious, as religious services, under the supervision of an ordained minister, are conducted in the chapel daily except on Sunday. Various religious faiths are represented by residents in the home and, on Sunday, the residents are taken to the churches of their choice. Unquestionably, a Christian atmosphere is maintained. The spiritual needs of the residents are provided for and the residents are given 'Christian care' with Bible instruction and study. The general nature of Plaintiff's business is the establishment and maintenance of homes for the aged, 'primarily those affiliated with the Presbyterian Church.'

Defendants rely upon Fla.Const. (1885), Declaration of Rights, § 6, F.S.A., which was in effect on January 1, 1968. This section provides as follows:

'No preference shall be given by law to any church, sect or mode of worship and no money shall ever be taken from the public treasury directly or indirectly in aid of any church, sect or religious denomination or in aid of any sectarian institution.' (1967 Index)

The parties stipulated that any ruling with respect to the 1968 taxes on the property shall likewise apply to the 1969 taxes. Fla.Const. (1968) did not take effect until after January 1, 1969, the date upon which the tax assessment is determined. However, there was no substantial change made by the Fla.Const. (1968), art. I, § 3, F.S.A., of which provides:

'There shall be no law respecting the establishment of religion or prohibiting or penalizing the free exercise thereof. Religious freedom shall not justify practices inconsistent with public morals, peace or safety. No revenue of the state or any political subdivision or agency thereof shall ever be taken from the public treasury directly or indirectly in aid of any church, sect, or religious denomination or in aid of any sectarian institution.'

Defendants also urged that Fla.Stat. (1967) § 192.06(14), F.S.A., as applied in this case, violates the clause prohibiting the establishment of religion as contained in the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, the provisions of which are applicable to the states under the due process provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 60 S.Ct. 900, 84 L.Ed. 1213 (1940).

Defendants rely upon School District of Abington Township, Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 83 S.Ct. 1560, 10 L.Ed.2d 844 (1963), in which the Court considered the constitutionality of a statute and administrative rule requiring daily readings from the Bible and the recitation of the Lord's Prayer in public schools. Recognizing that the case cited is factually distinguishable from the question in the case Sub judice, defendants urge that the reasoning of the Court is applicable. In declaring the statute and rule unconstitutional the Supreme Court reasoned that the State could not pass laws which aid one religion or prefer one religion over another; that legislation must have a secular purpose that neither advances nor inhibits religion; and that government must maintain strict neutrality, neither aiding nor opposing religion.

In Walz v. Tax Commission of City of New York, 397 U.S. 664, 90 S.Ct. 1409, 25 L.Ed.2d 697 (1970), Walz sought an injunction in the New York courts to prevent the Tax Commission from granting property tax exemptions to religious organizations for religious properties used solely for religious worship. A summary judgment was granted in favor of the Tax Commission. The summary judgment was affirmed by the New York Court of Appeals and by the Supreme Court of the United States. The latter Court in its opinion said:

'The Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment are not the most precisely drawn portions of the Constitution. The sweep of the absolute prohibitions in the Religion Clauses may have been calculated; but the purpose was to state an objective, not to write a statute. In attempting to articulate the scope of the two Religious Clauses, the Court's opinions reflect the limitations inherent in formulating general principles on a case-by-case basis. The considerable internal inconsistency in the opinions of the Court derives from what, in retrospect, may have been too sweeping utterances on aspects of these clauses that seemed clear in relation to the particular cases but have limited meaning as general principles.' (90 S.Ct. 1411)

The Court then notes the struggle to find a mutual course between the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses, saying:

'The course of constitutional neutrality in this area cannot be an absolutely straight line; rigidity could well defeat the basic purpose of these provisions, which is to insure that no religion be sponsored or favored, none commanded, and none inhibited. The general principle deducible from the First Amendment and all that has been said by the Court is this: that we will not tolerate either governmentally established religion or governmental interference with religion. Short of those expressly proscribed governmental acts there is room for play in the joints productive of a benevolent neutrality which will permit religious exercise to exist without sponsorship and without interference.

'Each value judgment under the Religion Clauses must therefore turn on whether particular acts in question are intended to establish or interfere with religious beliefs and practices or have the effect of doing so. Adherence to the policy of neutrality that derives from an accommodation of the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses has prevented the kind of involvement that would tip the balance toward government control of churches or governmental restraint on religious...