Wright v. City of Miami Gardens

• Decision Date: 15 September 2016
• Docket Number: No. SC16–1518.,SC16–1518.
• Citation: 200 So.3d 765
• Parties: James Barry WRIGHT, Petitioner, v. CITY OF MIAMI GARDENS, etc., et al., Respondents.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

200 So.3d 765

James Barry WRIGHT, Petitioner,
v.
CITY OF MIAMI GARDENS, etc., et al., Respondents.

No. SC16–1518.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Sept. 15, 2016.

200 So.3d 766

Simone Marstiller of The Marstiller Firm, P.A., Tampa, FL; Jason Monroe Murray and Rashad M. Collins of Murray Law, P.A., Miami, FL; and Sorraya M. Solages–Jones of SMS Jones Law, PLLC, Wellington, FL, for Petitioner.

Abigail Price–Williams, Miami–Dade County Attorney, and Oren Rosenthal and Michael Benny Valdes, Miami–Dade Assistant County Attorneys, Miami, FL, for Respondent Christina White.

Juan–Carlos Planas of KYMP, LLP, Miami, FL; and Sonja Knighton Dickens, Miami Gardens, FL, for Respondents City of Miami Gardens and Ronetta Taylor.

LEWIS, J.

This case is before the Court on a certified question of great public importance for review of the decision of the Third District Court of Appeal in Wright v. City of Miami Gardens, 199 So.3d 381 (Fla. 3d DCA 2016).

200 So.3d 767

In February 2016, James Barry Wright properly opened a campaign account with Wells Fargo Bank to run in the August 30, 2016, election for the office of Mayor in the City of Miami Gardens (the City). The qualifying period for this particular election commenced at 9 a.m. on May 26, 2016, and terminated at 4 p.m. on June 2, 2016.

On June 1, 2016, one day before the qualifying period ended, Wright tendered to Ronetta Taylor, the City Clerk of the City of Miami Gardens, a check issued on the Wells Fargo Bank campaign account in the amount of $620.00, which was the specifically required qualifying fee amount. The City Clerk accepted the check and issued Wright a receipt. It is undisputed that Wright's properly opened and properly maintained campaign account had ample funds to pay the qualification fee at all relevant times. Although the check was one of the first checks written by Wright after the opening of his campaign account, and therefore might be considered a starter check or “temporary” check, it bore his name, his campaign name, his campaign mailing address, and his campaign account number. Further, it is also undisputed that Wells Fargo had properly and successfully previously processed and honored six similarly formatted “temporary” checks in connection with Wright's other campaign expenses. Finally, it is undisputed that Wright met all other requirements to qualify as a candidate for the office of the Mayor of the City.

However, on June 16, 2016—more than two weeks later—the City Clerk was notified by the City's Finance Department that Wright's check had been returned to the City by its bank “because the account number on the check could not be located.”¹ Indeed, the check that was returned was stamped with the following: “UN LOCATE ACCT.” Beneath that reflected “Do Not Re-deposit.” To the left of the check was the following: “6/8/2016 ... This is a LEGAL COPY of your check. You can use it the same way you would use the original check. RETURN REASON—UNABLE TO LOCATE ACCOUNT.”

Wright was not informed of the situation until four days later, on June 20, 2016. While the City Clerk initially informed Wright that he could still pay the filing fee (and the $45.00 returned check fee that Wells Fargo had charged the City) with a cashier's check to remain qualified, Wright later received an e-mail informing him that he had been totally disqualified. Nevertheless, Wright attempted, without success, to rectify the problem by actually tendering a cashier's check for the filing fee, as well as a separate check to pay the returned check fee.

When Wright requested an explanation as to why he could not rectify the situation which he had not created, the City Clerk referred Wright to section 99.061(7)(a) 1. of the Florida Statutes which provides:

(7)(a) In order for a candidate to be qualified, the following items must be received by the filing officer by the end of the qualifying period:

1. A properly executed check drawn upon the candidate's campaign account payable to the person or entity as prescribed by the filing officer in an amount not less than the fee required by s. 99.092, unless the candidate obtained the required number of signatures on petitions pursuant to s. 99.095. The filing fee for a special district candidate is not required to be drawn upon the candidate's

200 So.3d 768

campaign account. If a candidate's check is returned by the bank for any reason, the filing officer shall immediately notify the candidate and the candidate shall have until the end of qualifying to pay the fee with a cashier's check purchased from funds of the campaign account. Failure to pay the fee as provided in this subparagraph shall disqualify the candidate.

§ 99.061(7)(a) 1., Fla. Stat. (2016) (emphasis added). The City Clerk further referred Wright to the decision of the First District Court of Appeal in Levey v. Detzner which had held that the clear and unambiguous language of section 99.061(7)(a) 1. required disqualification under very similar circumstances:

The statute at issue is clear and unambiguous. Although we agree with the trial court that this result is harsh, it is mandated by the clear language of the statute. If a candidate's qualifying check is returned for any reason, the candidate must pay the qualifying fee by cashier's check before the end of the qualifying period. Levey's check was returned, the reason for that occurring is immaterial, and she failed to cure the deficiency within the time allotted by the statute. This circumstance “shall disqualify the candidate.” Courts are not at liberty to extend, modify, or limit the express and unambiguous terms of a statute. See Hill v. Davis, 70 So.3d 572, 575 (Fla.2011) ; see also State v. Chubbuck, 141 So.3d 1163 (Fla.2014).

The result in this case is buttressed by the fact that under an earlier version of section 99.061, if a candidate's qualifying check was returned, the candidate was allowed 48 hours after being notified of that fact by the filing officer to pay the fee by cashier's check, “the end of qualifying notwithstanding.” See § 99.061(7)(a) 1., Fla. Stat. (2010). The operative language of the current statute, which eliminated the possibility of a post-qualifying cure period for candidates for federal, state, county, and district offices, was adopted by the Legislature in a 2011 amendment. See Ch. [20]11–40, § 14, at 22, Laws of Fla. It is not within a court's power to rewrite the statute or ignore this amendment, and any remedy Levey or others aggrieved by the amendment may have lies with the Legislature, not the courts.

AFFIRMED.

146 So.3d 1224, 1226 (Fla. 1st DCA 2014), rehearing en banc denied, Sept. 22, 2014, review denied, 153 So.3d 906 (Fla.2014) (footnote omitted).

On June 30, 2016, Wright sought judicial redress by filing the instant action. Wright sought declaratory and mandamus relief against the City, the City Clerk, and the Miami–Dade County Supervisor of Elections.² On July 27, 2016, the trial court conducted a hearing on Wright's amended motion for temporary injunction and emergency writ of mandamus. In both counts, Wright sought to require the defendants to recognize Wright as a properly and validly qualified candidate for the office of Mayor in the August 30 election. In the alternative, Wright sought to require the defendants to reschedule the pertinent election to the general election taking place on November 9, 2016.

During the hearing on Wright's motion, the Supervisor of Elections announced that it had no objections to moving the election to the November general election if Wright were entitled to relief on the merits.

200 So.3d 769

On the other hand, the City of Miami Gardens objected to consideration of this relief on the basis that it would add unnecessary expenses, create a hardship, potentially result in a separate December run-off election with low voter turnout, and affect its ability to ensure a fair election. Specifically, the City noted that Wright would be able to raise funds that other candidates would not be able to because he had not been a candidate.

Ultimately, the trial court denied both of Wright's motions on the merits. The trial court concluded that Wright was not entitled to any relief because section 99.061(7)(a) 1., Florida Statutes, explicitly required the City Clerk to disqualify Wright. The trial court further explained that it was bound by the decision of the First District Court of Appeal in Levey, 146 So.3d 1224, which it considered to be directly on point, absent any relevant precedent from the Third District Court of Appeal.

Wright sought review of the trial court's order in the Third District Court of Appeal. Relying on largely the same reasoning as the trial court and the First District in Levey, the Third District affirmed:

Appellees argue, and we agree, that the plain and unambiguous provisions of the controlling statute require affirmance. When a candidate's qualification fee has been returned by the bank for any reason, the statute rather plainly provides a mechanism for a candidate to pay the qualifying fee only within the qualifying period. We recognize the statute produces a harsh result in this case. When an unambiguous statute plainly requires a particular result, though, courts are powerless to fashion a different result

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