Johnson v. Starbucks Corp.

• Decision Date: 30 July 2020
• Docket Number: Case No. 2:20-cv-02189-ODW (SKx)
• Citation: 475 F.Supp.3d 1080
• Parties: Dexter JOHNSON, an individual, Plaintiff, v. STARBUCKS CORPORATION, dba "Starbucks"; et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Central District of California

475 F.Supp.3d 1080

Dexter JOHNSON, an individual, Plaintiff,

v.STARBUCKS CORPORATION, dba "Starbucks"; et al., Defendants.

Case No. 2:20-cv-02189-ODW (SKx)

United States District Court, C.D. California.

Signed July 30, 2020

Jay S. Rothman, Timothy E. Kearns, Jay Rothman and Associates, Woodland Hills, CA, for Plaintiff.

Meri Dichigrikian, Rachael Sarah Lavi, Littler Mendelson PC, Los Angeles, CA, for Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO REMAND [17]

OTIS D. WRIGHT, II, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION

On February 5, 2020, Plaintiff Dexter Johnson ("Johnson") initiated this action in the Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles against Defendants Starbucks Corporation ("Starbucks"), Jane Doe and John Doe ("Doe Defendants"), and Roes 1–10. (Notice of Removal ("Notice") ¶¶ 3, 5, ECF No. 1.) Starbucks removed this matter based on alleged diversity jurisdiction and Johnson moves to remand. (Notice ¶ 1; Mot. to Remand ("Mot."), ECF No. 17.) For the reasons below, the Court finds it lacks subject matter jurisdiction and consequently must REMAND .¹

II. BACKGROUND

Starbucks employed Johnson as a shift supervisor at its West Hills location until November 2018. (Decl. of Rachael S. Lavi ("Lavi Decl.") Ex. A ("First Am. Compl." or "FAC") ¶¶ 9, 18, ECF No. 1-3.) As a shift supervisor, Johnson ensured the store was clean and welcoming for all Starbucks patrons, and thus interacted with homeless patrons who frequented the establishment. (FAC ¶ 9.)

In September 2018, Johnson called the police regarding a homeless man who occupied the Starbucks bathroom for an "extended amount of time." (FAC ¶¶ 9–10.) Johnson alleges that, after this incident, a group of homeless individuals including Jane Doe, the homeless man's female companion, began to harass him. (FAC ¶ 10.) Jane Doe called Johnson "a freak, and weirdo," and stated Johnson "liked to go into the bathroom to look at guys." (FAC ¶ 10.) Johnson alleges he once asked a group of homeless individuals, including Jane Doe, to leave the outside Starbucks patio seating area, and as they left, one of the men called Johnson a "fag." (FAC ¶ 12.)

Johnson alleges he felt unsafe at work because the homeless individuals displayed "aggressive behavior, overt animosity," and made "loud and insulting comments" because of his sexual orientation. (FAC ¶ 13.) Johnson reported the conduct and his fear to Starbucks and also repeatedly called mall security for help. (FAC ¶¶ 13–14.) Johnson asked Starbucks for a transfer, to which Starbucks stated it would "look into it." (FAC ¶ 14.) Johnson did not receive the requested transfer. (See FAC ¶ 14.)

Subsequently, in November 2018, Starbucks fired Johnson for ordering a subordinate to "falsely change her timecard" after missing a break. (FAC ¶ 16.) Johnson alleges he told the employee to alter her timecard because he was "distracted, worried" and "fear[ed]" his current work environment. (FAC ¶ 15.)

On February 5, 2020, Johnson filed the operative FAC in the Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles. (Notice ¶ 3; see FAC; Decl. of Timothy E. Kearns Ex. C, ECF No. 17-1.) Johnson asserts his first cause of action against all Defendants for harassment on the basis of sexual orientation, pursuant to California Government Code section 12940, et seq. (FAC ¶¶ 20–26.) Johnson asserts his second through fifth causes of action against Defendants Starbucks and Roes 1–10, also pursuant to California Government Code section 12940, et seq. : discrimination based upon sexual orientation, retaliation, failure to take all reasonable steps to prevent harassment, discrimination, and retaliation, and wrongful termination in violation of California Public Policy. (FAC ¶¶ 27–52.)

On March 6, 2020, Starbucks removed this action to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction on the grounds that (1) Starbucks is a Washington corporation with its principle place of business in Washington; (2) Johnson is a citizen of California; and (3) the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. (Notice ¶¶ 1, 9–11.) Starbucks contends the Court should disregard Doe Defendants’ California citizenship. (Notice ¶ 14; Opp'n to Mot. ("Opp'n") 3–5, ECF No. 18.).

On April 1, 2020, Johnson moved to remand on grounds including that Doe Defendants are real, yet to be identified, citizens of California whose citizenship the Court cannot ignore, and thus their presence defeats the Court's diversity jurisdiction. (See Mot.) Johnson seeks attorneys’ fees for his motion to remand. (Mot. 11.)

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal courts have subject matter jurisdiction only as authorized by the Constitution and Congress. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 ; see also Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co. , 511 U.S. 375, 377, 114 S.Ct. 1673, 128 L.Ed.2d 391 (1994). When a suit is filed in state court, the suit may be removed to federal court only if the federal court would have had original jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). Federal courts have original jurisdiction where an action arises under federal law or where there is complete diversity of citizenship between the parties and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. Id. §§ 1331, 1332(a).

Courts strictly construe the removal statute against removal and "federal jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance." Gaus v. Miles, Inc. , 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). This "strong presumption" against removal demands that a court resolve all ambiguity in favor of remand to state court. Id. (quoting Nishimoto v. Federman-Bachrach & Assocs. , 903 F.2d 709, 712 n.3 (9th Cir. 1990) ); see Matheson v. Progressive Specialty Ins. Co. , 319 F.3d 1089, 1090 (9th Cir. 2003) ("Where doubt regarding the right to removal exists, a case should be remanded to state court."). "If at any time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction [over a case removed from state court], the case shall be remanded." 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c).

IV. DISCUSSION

Starbucks and Johnson both agree that complete diversity exists as between them, as Starbucks is a citizen of Washington and Johnson is a citizen of California. (Mot. 5; Opp'n 1.) However, the parties disagree on whether the presence of Doe Defendants defeats this Court's diversity jurisdiction. Starbucks contends the Court should disregard the California citizenship of Jane Doe and John Doe because they are (1) fictitious Doe defendants and (2) fraudulently joined. (See Opp'n 1.) In contrast, Johnson argues Jane Doe and John Doe are not fictitious, but instead real parties not fraudulently joined, and therefore their citizenship destroys the Court's jurisdiction. (See generally Mot.)

The Court first addresses whether Doe Defendants’ citizenship should be disregarded before turning to whether they are fraudulently joined.

A. Citizenship of Doe Defendants

In 1988, Congress passed the Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice Act, which amended 28 U.S.C. § 1441 to address "the issue of Doe defendants for purposes of diversity jurisdiction and remand." Goldsmith v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc. , No. CV 20-00750-AB (JCx), 2020 WL 1650750, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 3, 2020) ; see also Gardiner Family, LLC v. Crimson Res. Mgmt. Corp. , 147 F. Supp. 3d 1029, 1034, 1036 (E.D. Cal. 2015) (discussing the amendment and its consequences). Today, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(1) states that, when jurisdiction is based solely on diversity, "the citizenship of defendants sued under fictitious names shall be disregarded."

However, the issue remains "convoluted and unsettled," due in large part to exceptions created by the Ninth Circuit. Goldsmith , 2020 WL 1650750, at *3 (citing Robinson v. Lowe's Home Ctrs., LLC , No. 1:15-cv-1321-LJO (SMSx), 2015 WL 13236883, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2015) ). While some courts find the language of § 1441 preclusive, see Goldsmith , 2020 WL 1650750, at *4, others find a distinction exists between "fictitious" and real party Does that requires greater scrutiny, see Gardiner Family , 147 F. Supp. 3d at 1036. Courts that consider this distinction assess whether the "[p]laintiffs’ description of Doe defendants or their activities is specific enough as to suggest their identity, citizenship, or relationship to the action." Gardiner Family , 147 F. Supp. 3d at 1036 ; see also Sandoval v. Republic Servs., Inc. , No. 18-cv-01224-ODW (KSx), 2018 WL 1989528, at *3–4 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 2018) ("[W]hen a plaintiff's allegations give a definite clue about the identity of the fictitious defendant ... the court should consider the citizenship of the fictitious defendant."); Robinson , 2015 WL 13236883, at *3 (considering whether allegations "provide a reasonable indication" of Doe defendants’ "identity, the relationship to the action, and their diversity-destroying citizenship).

Here, Johnson argues that the Doe Defendants are real individuals whose liability and relationship to the suit is fully alleged. (See Mot. 1–9.) Johnson alleges both Doe Defendants are not wholly fictitious but real parties, California citizens whose "real names and identities are unknown."

(FAC ¶¶ 6–8.) Jane Doe is described as the "female companion" of the man Johnson reported to the police. (FAC ¶ 10.) Johnson alleges Jane Doe knew he was gay and called him "a freak, and weirdo, and said he ‘liked to go into the bathroom to look at guys’ " to insult him because of his sexual orientation. (FAC ¶¶ 10, 22.) Johnson describes John Doe as one of the homeless men, and alleges he called Johnson a "fag" after Johnson asked him, Jane Doe, and other homeless individuals to leave the Starbucks outdoor seating area. (FAC ¶¶ 12, 22.) These allegations demonstrate that both Doe Defendants are not merely fictitious defendants; rather they are real parties known to Johnson whose liability and relation to the suit is fully alleged in the FAC. (See generally FAC.) Thus, their citizenship should not be disregarded.

Because the FAC alleges sufficient facts regarding Doe Defendants to establish they...