Johnson v. State, 83965

• Citation: 631 N.Y.S.2d 795,166 Misc.2d 333
• Decision Date: 11 August 1995
• Docket Number: No. 83965,83965
• Parties: Kenneth G. JOHNSON, Claimant, v. STATE of New York, Defendant. (Claim)
• Court: New York Court of Claims

Page 795

631 N.Y.S.2d 795

166 Misc.2d 333

Kenneth G. JOHNSON, Claimant, v. STATE of New York, Defendant. (Claim No. 83965.)

Court of Claims of New York.

Aug. 11, 1995.

Stephen J. Waite & Associates (Brian Rohan, of Counsel), Albany, for Claimant.

Dennis C. Vacco, Attorney-General (Dennis M. Acton of Counsel), for Defendant.

JOHN L. BELL, Judge.

On September 27, 1990, claimant and his spouse were returning to the United States from a trip to Montreal, Canada. They were stopped by a federal customs inspector at the Champlain Port of Entry, located on Interstate 87 in the Town of Champlain, Clinton County. Claimant was instructed to a secondary inspection area, where he exited his vehicle and was asked a series of questions. According to the claim, a computer check was conducted by customs inspectors of claimant's New York State driver's license and the State Department of Motor Vehicles (hereinafter DMV) reported his license as being suspended. Claimant states that he attempted to explain that an error must have occurred but that he was ignored. ¹

It is not necessary for purposes of this motion to set forth in detail the myriad acts purportedly perpetrated upon claimant in the ensuing hours. Briefly stated, claimant contends that the federal officers subjected him to, inter alia, verbal abuse, threats, a barrage of racially disparaging remarks and epithets directed at his African-American ancestry, and an intrusive strip search done in the presence of several customs officers, including a female officer. Since the information available to customs officers indicated that claimant had been operating a vehicle with a suspended license, they summoned a State trooper to the scene. Claimant was taken into custody by the trooper, who handcuffed claimant and transported him to appear before a town justice. He was released on $200 bail and, together with his wife, boarded a bus for Albany.

The following morning, September 28, 1990, claimant purportedly went to an office of the DMV in Albany and was able to obtain documentation confirming that his driver's license was clear of all suspensions or revocations. Claimant then returned to Champlain to secure a return of his bail money and his motor vehicle. He states that he proceeded to the customs station and attempted to elicit the names of all individuals involved in the incident. Claimant contends that customs officers refused to provide the information and that he was subjected to further verbal harassment and threats by customs officers and a State trooper.

Claimant subsequently commenced an action in Supreme Court, Albany County, in which he named eight customs officers and two troopers as defendants. ² Pursuant to 28 USC § 1442(a)(1), the case was removed by the federal defendants to the United States District Court for the Northern District of New York. In the federal lawsuit, claimant alleged the following causes of action against the State defendants: (1) violation of his constitutional rights; (2) conspiracy to deprive him of his constitutional rights; (3) intentional infliction of emotional distress or, alternatively, prima facie tort; (4) unlawful detention and false imprisonment; and (5) assault and battery.

Claimant also commenced the instant lawsuit in the Court of Claims, naming as defendants the State of New York, DMV and the State Police. ³ He asserted the same basic theories as set forth in the federal court action but added a cause of action premised upon purported negligence by both DMV for incorrectly reporting his license as suspended, and the State Police, for improperly training, instructing, and supervising its personnel resulting in conduct that allegedly deprived claimant of constitutional rights.

A number of motions seeking summary judgment were filed in the federal court action. Hon. Neal P. McCurn issued a decision finding, inter alia, that summary judgment for the State was appropriate as to all causes of action asserted against its troopers (Johnson v. Harron, No. 91-CV-1460, 1995 WL 319943 [N.D.N.Y. May 23, 1995]. Defendant now moves to dismiss the instant claim, asserting res judicata and alternatively, that the allegations of negligence fail to state a cause of action. Claimant has cross-moved for summary judgment against defendant upon the ground that it was negligent as a matter of law for DMV to provide incorrect information about his driver's license to federal customs officers.

The doctrine of res judicata, or claim preclusion, is designed to provide finality to a matter once it has been decided (Matter of Reilly v. Reid, 45 N.Y.2d 24, 28, 407 N.Y.S.2d 645, 379 N.E.2d 172). Fundamental notions of fairness to the parties, as well as judicial economy, mandate that at some point litigation must come to an end (id.; Good Health Dairy Prods. Corp. v. Emery, 275 N.Y. 14, 9 N.E.2d 758). The doctrine incorporates a transactional analysis to bar new litigation not only of matters actually in litigation but also any causes of action that could have been raised and received a fair consideration in the prior action (O'Brien v. City of Syracuse, 54 N.Y.2d 353, 445 N.Y.S.2d 687, 429 N.E.2d 1158; Schuylkill Fuel Corp. v. Nieberg Realty Corp., 250 N.Y. 304, 306-307, 165 N.E. 456; Lanuto v. Constantine, 215 A.D.2d 946, 627 N.Y.S.2d 144).

Claimant does not seriously contest the applicability of res judicata as to the causes of action addressed directly by the federal court that were also alleged in the claim filed in the Court of Claims. He does contend, however, that his negligence cause of action is not barred by the doctrine. Defendant argues that transactional analysis precludes claimant from pursuing a negligence claim in this court.

When claimant commenced his action in Supreme Court, Albany County, such court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the negligence cause of action premised upon acts of employees or agents of the State (see, Court of Claims Act § 8). Claimant thus commenced the companion claim currently before the court. Subsequently, however, claimant's Supreme Court action was removed to federal court and defendant contends that all claims implicating liability of the State could have been joined for consideration by the federal court under the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction.

The judicially-created concept of pendent jurisdiction (see, e.g., United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218) has been recently codified (28 USC § 1367) and the current nomenclature for the doctrine is supplemental jurisdiction. Simply stated, supplemental jurisdiction allows a federal court in a case pending before it to assume jurisdiction over and dispose of matters, such as a state law claim, which could not be brought before it if standing alone (28 USC § 1367; United Mine Workers of America v. Gibbs, supra ). The issue before this court is whether claimant's negligence cause of action fell within the federal court's supplemental jurisdiction and, if so, whether it was incumbent upon claimant to assert the cause of action in federal court in order to avoid res judicata consequences in the Court of Claims.

Since the action that was removed to federal court did not name employees of DMV or the State as defendants, claimant would have had to amend his complaint to add new parties, as well as the additional cause of action premised upon negligence. The liberal amendment policy of Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure applies to removed actions (see, e.g., Tabacalera Cubana, S.A. v. Faber, Coe & Gregg, 379 F.Supp. 772, 776; R.F.D. Group v. Rubber Fabricators, 323 F.Supp. 521). Moreover, while case law precluded the use of supplemental jurisdiction as a basis to add parties to an action (see, Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 109 S.Ct. 2003, 104 L.Ed.2d 593), such case law was expressly overruled by Congress in subdivision a of 28 USC § 1367. It is thus apparently permissible to amend a complaint removed to federal court to add both a new cause of action and a new party, even when the jurisdiction over the new party is based on supplemental jurisdiction.

Two pivotal problems nevertheless preclude adopting the argument urged by defendant that claimant was obligated to pursue his negligence claim in federal court. The first is that supplemental jurisdiction is discretionary (see, Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 545, 94 S.Ct. 1372, 1383, 39 L.Ed.2d 577; Trivits v. Wilmington Institute, 417 F.Supp. 160, 169). It is not feasible for this court to speculate that a federal court would have exercised its discretion to allow the negligence cause of action under its supplemental jurisdiction and then use such speculation as a basis to foreclose a claim under the doctrine of res judicata. The more fundamental problem, which was not addressed by either party, is whether the negligence cause of action was precluded from consideration in federal court by the Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution.

The Eleventh Amendment, which became effective in 1798, was passed in response to strong public reaction to the Supreme Court's decision in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 1 L.Ed. 440, allowing a citizen of one state to sue another state in federal court even though the state had not consented to be sued. The Amendment provides:

"The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."

It has been construed by the Supreme Court to also bar a suit in federal court against a state by its own citizens (see, e.g., Florida Dept. of State v. Treasure Salvors, 458 U.S. 670, 102 S.Ct. 3304, 73 L.Ed.2d 1057; Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662). Moreover, the Eleventh Amendment cannot be circumvented by invoking supplementary jurisdiction (see, Pennhurst State...