Johnson v. State

• Decision Date: 20 April 2017
• Docket Number: No. SC13–711,SC13–711
• Citation: 215 So.3d 1237
• Parties: Clyde Edward JOHNSON, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

215 So.3d 1237

Clyde Edward JOHNSON, Petitioner,

v.STATE of Florida, Respondent.

No. SC13–711

Supreme Court of Florida.

April 20, 2017

Baya Harrison, III, Monticello, Florida, for Petitioner

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida; and Wesley Heidt, Bureau Chief, and Kellie A. Nielan, Assistant Attorney General, Daytona Beach, Florida, for Respondent

QUINCE, J.

This case is before the Court for review of the decision of the Fifth District Court of Appeal in Johnson v. State , 108 So.3d 1153 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013), which certified conflict with the decision of the First District Court of Appeal in Floyd v. State , 87 So.3d 45 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012). We have jurisdiction. See Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. For the following reasons, we quash the decision of the Fifth District and remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Clyde Edward Johnson pleaded guilty to one count of armed burglary of a dwelling, three counts of armed kidnapping, one count of attempted first-degree murder, and one count of sexual battery using force or a weapon. He was sentenced to six concurrent life sentences. After the United States Supreme Court issued its decision in Graham v. Florida , 560 U.S. 48, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010), Johnson filed a motion to correct his illegal sentences. The trial court set aside Johnson's life sentences and held an evidentiary hearing to support resentencing. On February 12, 2012, the trial judge resentenced Johnson to 100 years in prison for the first count and 40 years on each remaining count, to run concurrently. Johnson appealed the 100–year sentence. The Fifth District Court of Appeal affirmed Johnson's sentence, stating that Graham does not apply to term-of-years sentences. Johnson , 108 So.3d at 1153–54 (citing Henry v. State , 82 So.3d 1084 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012) ). The Fifth District certified conflict and we granted review.

The United States Supreme Court's decision in Graham held that Florida's practice of sentencing juvenile offenders to life sentences for nonhomicide crimes violated the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. Graham , 560 U.S. at 74–75, 130 S.Ct. 2011. In 2014, the Legislature passed chapter 2014–220, Laws of Florida, which provided judicial review for juvenile offenders who were tried as adults and received more than 20 years' incarceration, with exceptions. Later, this Court, in a unanimous decision, decided that juveniles who receive term-of-years sentences that do not provide a meaningful opportunity for early release based on maturity and rehabilitation during their natural lives are entitled to resentencing pursuant to chapter 2014–220, Laws of Florida. Henry v. State , 175 So.3d 675, 680 (Fla. 2015), cert. denied , ––– U.S. ––––, 136 S.Ct. 1455, 194 L.Ed.2d 552 (2016). Then, in Kelsey , a majority of this Court applied the reasoning in Henry to juveniles whose life sentences had been vacated pursuant to Graham , but who had not been resentenced under the new juvenile sentencing guidelines. Kelsey v. State , 206 So.3d 5, 8–9 (Fla. 2016). We conclude that reading these three cases together provides that juvenile nonhomicide offenders are entitled to sentences that provide a meaningful opportunity for early release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation during their natural lifetimes and that gain time fails to meet those requirements.

In this Court's discussions of Graham , we have underscored the United States Supreme Court's emphasis on the status of the juvenile nonhomicide offender and the nature of the offense committed. See Henry , 175 So.3d at 678 (citing Graham , 560 U.S. at 69, 130 S.Ct. 2011 ). Accordingly, our focus has not been on the length of the sentence imposed, but the status of the offender and the possibility that he or she will be able to grow into a contributing member of society. In other words, although Graham focused on life sentences as applied to juveniles, in Henry , we applied Graham 's categorical rule as creating a special class of citizens, to wit: juvenile nonhomicide offenders.

Leighdon Henry, a juvenile offender who was tried as an adult, was convicted of multiple nonhomicide crimes and sentenced to life plus an additional sixty years. Henry , 175 So.3d at 676. After Graham issued, Henry's life sentence was vacated and he was resentenced to thirty years to run consecutively to the originally imposed sixty year sentence. Id. On appeal, we concluded "Graham prohibits the state trial courts from sentencing juvenile nonhomicide offenders to prison terms that ensure these offenders will be imprisoned without obtaining a meaningful opportunity to obtain future early release during their natural lives based on their demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation." Id. at 680. We reasoned that the "Supreme Court's long-held and consistent view that juveniles are different" supported the conclusion that "the specific sentence that a juvenile nonhomicide offender receives for committing a given offense is not dispositive as to whether the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment is implicated." Id. Accordingly, we determined that Graham was not limited to certain sentences, but rather was intended to ensure that "juvenile nonhomicide offenders will not be sentenced to terms of imprisonment without affording them a meaningful opportunity for early release based on a demonstration of maturity and rehabilitation." Id. In light of this reasoning, we concluded that the Eighth Amendment, as read through Graham , requires a review mechanism for evaluating this class of offenders because "any term of imprisonment for a juvenile is qualitatively different than a comparable period of incarceration is for an adult." Id. Our holding in Henry was not predicated on the term of the sentence, but on the status of, and the opportunity afforded, the offender.¹

In Kelsey , we considered whether the remedy espoused in Henry applied to juvenile offenders who were resentenced from life to term-of-years sentences after Graham , for crimes committed before chapter 2014–220's July 1, 2014, effective date, but who did not receive the benefit of chapter 2014–220's review mechanism. Thomas Kelsey was 15 years old when he burglarized an apartment and raped the pregnant victim at knifepoint in the presence of her two small children. Kelsey , 206 So.3d at 6. Kelsey pleaded guilty and received two life sentences and two concurrent twenty-five year terms for four nonhomicide offenses on March 26, 2010. Id. At a resentencing hearing held after the United States Supreme Court issued Graham , the trial court imposed concurrent sentences of forty-five years. Id. at 6–7. The First District affirmed. Id. On review in this Court, we opined, "After we made clear that Graham does indeed apply to term-of-years sentences, we have declined to require that such sentences must be ‘de facto life’ sentences for Graham to apply." Id. at 10 (citing Guzman v. State , 183 So.3d 1025, 1026 (Fla. 2016) ). Accordingly, we have determined that Graham prohibits juvenile nonhomicide offenders from serving lengthy terms of incarceration without any form of judicial review mechanism.

In the present case, Clyde Johnson was originally sentenced to six concurrent life sentences and, after those sentences were set aside pursuant to Graham , resentenced to one 100–year term and five concurrent forty-year terms.² On appeal, where Johnson argued that the 100–year term still violated Graham , the Fifth District affirmed, relying solely on its previous opinion in Henry , a decision this Court reversed.

See Henry , 175 So.3d at 680. The Johnson opinion, in its entirety, states:

Clyde Edward Johnson challenges his 100–year sentence on a charge of burglary of a dwelling while armed, arguing that the sentence violates Graham v. Florida , 560 U.S. 48, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010), as he was under 18 years old at the time of the offense. [FN1] As our court has already rejected the argument that a term of years sentence violates Graham in Henry v. State , 82 So.3d 1084 (Fla. 5th DCA 2012), rev. granted, 107 So.3d 405 (Fla. 2012), we affirm. We certify that this decision conflicts with Floyd v. State , 87 So.3d 45 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012) and Adams v. State , (Fla. 1st DCA 2012).

[FN1] Johnson was originally sentenced to life on this charge, and to concurrent life sentences on five related charges: three counts of armed kidnapping to facilitate a felony; one count of attempted first degree murder with a firearm; and, one count of sexual battery using force or a weapon (firearm). All six life sentences were set aside following the United States Supreme Court's decision in Graham . The 100–year sentence challenged in this appeal was imposed at Johnson's resentencing. As for the other five counts, the trial court resentenced Johnson to concurrent 40–year sentences, which are not challenged on appeal.]

Johnson v. State , 108 So.3d 1153, 1153–54 (Fla. 5th DCA 2013).

The Florida Corrections Code provides several forms of allowable gain time. As defined by this Court:

Gain time is allowed by the state to encourage a prisoner to mend his ways, to conduct himself in an orderly fashion while paying his debt to society and by his conduct to earn the privilege of release earlier than the terminal date fixed by his sentence. A prisoner's right to accrued gain time is not absolute but is conditioned upon satisfactory service of the sentence as required by the statute.

Nicholas v. Wainwright , 152 So.2d 458, 461 (Fla. 1963) (citation omitted). The statutes permit the accrual, forfeiture, and reinstatement of gain time, with different rules applying based on when an offense was committed, the type of gain time available on the sentence, and the type of offense committed. See §§ 944.275, 944.28, 944.281 Fla. Stat. The Florida Department of Corrections defines gain time as "an inmate's opportunity to earn a reduction (if eligible) in his/her overall sentence imposed by the court."³ Gain time...