Johnson v. State

• Decision Date: 27 July 2012
• Docket Number: No. 29A02–1111–CR–1020.,29A02–1111–CR–1020.
• Citation: 971 N.E.2d 216
• Parties: Damon Tyree JOHNSON, Appellant–Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee–Plaintiff.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

971 N.E.2d 216

Damon Tyree JOHNSON, Appellant–Defendant,

v.STATE of Indiana, Appellee–Plaintiff.

No. 29A02–1111–CR–1020.

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

July 27, 2012.

Appeal from the Hamilton Superior Court; The Honorable Daniel J. Pfleging, Judge. Cause No. 29D02–0907–FB–131.

Stephenie K. Gookins, Campbell Kyle Proffitt LLP, Noblesville, IN, Attorney for Appellant.

Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Ian McLean, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys For Appellee.

MEMORANDUM DECISION—NOT FOR PUBLICATION

FRIEDLANDER, Judge.

Following a jury trial Damon Tyree Johnson was convicted of Armed Robbery,¹ a class B felony. Johnson presents two issues for our review:

1. Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it limited Johnson's cross-examination of his accomplice?

2. Is the evidence sufficient to support Johnson's conviction for robbery as a class B felony?

We affirm.

On the evening of July 9, 2009, Brian Spurlock, Chris Allan, Jos McGann, Cory Renfro, and Jessica Reyes were hanging out together in Noblesville, Indiana. Brian was driving his mother's white SUV and the others were passengers. At some point late in the evening, the group decided to try to get some “weed.” Transcript at 231. Chris Allan knew someone who could provide them with the desired marijuana, but the group first needed to get some money. Chris contacted Antwon Baker, a/k/a T.J., because Baker owed him money. Baker directed the group to the Marilyn Ridge subdivision, where he lived, so they could meet up. Johnson also lived in that subdivision and when Chris made contact with Baker, Baker was at Johnson's residence.

When Spurlock and the others arrived at the Marilyn Ridge subdivision, Baker met them at the entrance and directed Spurlock to proceed to a park within the subdivision. After a few minutes, Baker approached Spurlock, who was sitting in the driver's seat of the SUV. Spurlock noticed that Baker's eyes were shifting and that he appeared to be looking around the area. Spurlock then heard the metal sliding of a gun off to the rear of the car and was immediately approached by a man wearing a red ski mask. That man, later identified as Johnson, placed the gun to the side of Spurlock's head and demanded money. The others in the SUV exited the vehicle and ran away from the scene. Baker opened the car door and then he and the masked man went through Spurlock's pockets, taking approximately $150 in cash. Spurlock asked that they leave him with his identification, and Baker tossed Spurlock's wallet and cards on the pavement. Johnson and Baker fled, meeting at Baker's residence, where they divided the money.

A 911 call alerted Noblesville police to a man with a firearm in the Marilyn Ridge subdivision. Officers arrived at the scene of the robbery and encountered Spurlock, who gave a statement to police. The officers also interviewed the others who had returned to Spurlock's vehicle after fleeing while the robbery was in progress. The officers detained Baker, who was eventually interviewed by Noblesville Police Detective Cynthia Rodriguez. In his statement, Baker denied involvement in the robbery, but made several statements that implicated Johnson.

During their investigation, the police obtained warrants to search Johnson's home the morning of July 10. During the search, officers discovered a black sweatshirt and a costume spider-man mask. At Baker's residence, officers found a gray sweatshirt. Officers did not find a gun or weapons of any kind at either residence and no weapons were located during a search of the community park.

In July 2009, the State charged Johnson with one count of armed robbery, a class B felony. The State also filed a juvenile charge of robbery against Baker, who was sixteen years old at the time. After Baker was charged with a second robbery stemming from a separate incident, the charge in the instant case was waived to adult criminal court. Baker ultimately entered into a plea agreement with the State to plead guilty to a single charge of class C felony robbery for the first charged offense (i.e., his involvement in the instant case). The State agreed to dismiss the second charge of robbery pending against him and to a sentencing cap of six years with two years suspended, with placement for the executed portion to be argued. As part of the plea agreement, Baker agreed to testify at Johnson's jury trial in this case regarding his and Johnson's participation in the robbery.

A jury trial was held from October 4 to October 6, 2011. Baker, Spurlock, and McGann all testified for the State during Johnson's jury trial. While Baker was on the stand, Johnson cross-examined him at length regarding his statement to Detective Rodriguez and the terms of his plea agreement. Johnson also cross-examined Baker about the maximum sentence he could have received had he been convicted of both charged robberies. The trial court, however, did not permit Johnson to cross-examine Baker about life within the Department of Correction. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Johnson guilty as charged. The trial court subsequently sentenced Johnson to ten years with four years suspended.

1.

Johnson argues that the trial court abused its discretion in limiting his ability to cross-examine Baker, his accomplice. Specifically, Johnson contends that it was error to limit his inquiry of Baker regarding what life in jail would be like and the things he would miss if sentenced to a significant term of imprisonment. Johnson maintains that “[t]he inability to discuss the extent of Baker's loss of liberties while incarcerated [did] not allow the Defense to paint the whole picture and show the jurors exactly what ‘bang for his buck’ Baker received when he accepted a plea agreement.” Appellant's Brief at 9.

“Trial courts have wide discretion to determine the scope of cross-examination, and a trial court's decision as to the appropriate extent of cross-examination will only be reversed for an abuse of discretion.” McCorker v. State, 797 N.E.2d 257, 266 (Ind.2003). The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees a defendant the right to confront witnesses against him. McCorkerv. State, 797 N.E.2d 257 (citing Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974)). In state court proceedings, this right is secured for defendants through the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. (citing Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965)).

“The exposure of a witness's motivation in testifying is a proper and important function of the constitutionally-protected right of cross-examination.” McCain v. State, 948 N.E.2d 1202, 1206 (Ind.Ct.App.2011) (citing Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673 (1986)), trans. denied. Thus, any agreement between the witness and the state and any promises, grants of immunity, or rewards offered in return for testimony must be disclosed to the jury. Rubalcada v. State, 731 N.E.2d 1015 (Ind.2000). This serves to help the jury better assess the reliability and honesty of the witness. McCorker v. State, 797 N.E.2d 257. “The full extent of the benefit offered to a witness is relevant to the jury's determination of the weight and credibility of the witness's testimony.” Id. at 266.

As this court aptly noted years ago:

Certain basic principles apply to the testimony of an accomplice (or coconspirator). An accomplice's testimony is highly suspect, Newman v. State (1975) 263 Ind. 569, 572, 334 N.E.2d 684, 687, and should be strongly scrutinized by the trier of fact. Kelley v.. State (1984) Ind., 460 N.E.2d 137, 138. This degree of scrutiny arises from a recognition that, “[h]uman nature would tend to cause an accomplice to ‘unload’ against their partners and desire to clear themselves as much as possible of blame for a crime....” Newman, supra, 334 N.E.2d at 687. To analyze effectively the testifying accomplice's credibility, the fact finder must have before it, “a frank disclosure of any promises by the State or the prosecuting attorney to grant immunity to a witness and ... any rewards offered to a witness.” Adler v. State (1967) 248 Ind. 193, 197, 225 N.E.2d 171, 173.See Bewley v. State (1966) 247 Ind. 652, 655, 220 N.E.2d 612, 614 (improper limit on cross-examination when questions of pending financial reward from employer disallowed). This disclosure must include all relevant circumstances which caused or induced the witness's testimony. Newman, supra.

Samuels v. State, 505 N.E.2d 120, 122 (Ind.Ct.App.1987). It is well settled that the defendant is entitled to elicit the specific penalties a witness may have avoided through an agreement with the State. It is certainly relevant that the jury be permitted to consider the amount of compensation a witness expects to receive and the quantity of benefit to the accusing witness. Jarrett v. State, 498 N.E.2d 967 (Ind.1986). It is proper that the disclosure to the jury include whether the accusing witness is avoiding imprisonment and how much. Id.

Here, the trial court permitted Johnson to cross-examine Baker regarding the maximum sentences he faced had he not agreed to testify against Johnson as well as the sentence he received in exchange for his testimony. The trial court, however, sustained ...