Johnson v. State, 70524

• Decision Date: 25 March 1986
• Docket Number: No. 70524,70524
• Citation: 501 N.Y.S.2d 253,131 Misc.2d 630
• Parties: Jewel F. JOHNSON, Claimant, v. The STATE of New York, Defendant. Claim
• Court: New York Court of Claims

Page 253

501 N.Y.S.2d 253

131 Misc.2d 630

Jewel F. JOHNSON, Claimant, v. The STATE of New York, Defendant.

Claim No. 70524.

Court of Claims of New York.

March 25, 1986.

Goodstein & West, New Rochelle (Eileen West, of counsel), for claimant.

Robert Abrams, Atty. Gen., Albany (Eileen E. Bryant, Asst. Atty. Gen., of counsel), for defendant.

MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER

HAROLD E. KOREMAN, Presiding Judge.

Claimant, Jewel F. Johnson, seeks recovery for damages caused by defendant's failure to file a Retirement System member's change of beneficiary form with the Comptroller. Due to this alleged negligence claimant, the beneficiary designated in the unfiled form, was denied payment of a substantial death benefit. Upon a review of the facts before us and the law as it pertains to accrual of claims, we find that the subject action is time barred.

According to claimant's pleadings and affidavits, the contents of which must be accepted for the purposes of this motion to dismiss (Sanders v. Winship, 57 N.Y.2d 391, 394, 456 N.Y.S.2d 720, 442 N.E.2d 1231), one Howard Suggs was employed by the Department of Correctional Services and became a member of the New York State Employees Retirement System on January 26, 1967, at that time designating his wife Clarissa as his beneficiary. In August 1980 Mr. Suggs, apparently motivated by an impending divorce from his wife (which was finalized on September 12, 1980), completed a change of beneficiary form naming Jewel Johnson as the primary beneficiary of his retirement benefits and delivered said form to the Correctional Services personnel office where he worked. However, said document was misfiled, lost, or otherwise misdirected as the same was never received in the Comptroller's office. Mr. Suggs died on September 22, 1982. Importantly, in order to be effective a change of beneficiary form must be received by the Comptroller prior to the death of the member (Robillard v. Levitt, 44 A.D.2d 611, 352 N.Y.S.2d 703; Retirement and Social Security Law, § 40, subd. f, para. 2, § 60); no such form had been filed at the time of Mr. Suggs' death. Subsequently, the Retirement System paid Clarissa Suggs a death benefit of $82,000, notwithstanding efforts by Miss Johnson to effect a different result, first by resort to an article 74 hearing (concluding in a denial by the Comptroller of Jewel Johnson's request for benefits [decision dated December 30, 1983] ), and thereafter through commencement of an article 78 proceeding (which was dismissed by the Supreme Court [Cobb, J., decision dated November 13, 1984] ). A notice of intention was filed on February 16, 1984 and this action was commenced with the filing of a claim on February 7, 1985.

Among defendant's various arguments in support of dismiss is the contention that the subject claim either accrued in August 1980 when the change of beneficiary form was allegedly misfiled or in September 1982 when Mr. Suggs died, and that the claim filed in February 1985 is therefore time barred. Claimant, in opposition to the motion, contends that damages became ascertainable and this claim first accrued when the Supreme Court directed payment of benefits to Clarissa Suggs. In the alternative claimant insists that the earliest possible accrual date was December 30, 1983 when the Comptroller denied her request for payment of benefits. Based on either of these propositions claimant argues that the notice of intention and claim were filed in accordance with the jurisdictional limitations contained in the Court of Claims Act ( § 10, subd. 3). It has been stated that the term "claim accrued" as used in the Court of Claims Act (section 10) is not identical with the expression "cause of action accrued" found in CPLR 203 (see, e.g., Otis Elevator v. State of New York, 52 A.D.2d 380, 383 N.Y.S.2d 920; Dufel v. State of New York, 198 App.Div. 97, 102, 189 N.Y.S. 759; Moltion v. State of New York, 193 Misc. 850, 84 N.Y.S.2d 521, affd. 277 App.Div. 835, 97 N.Y.S.2d 921, affd. sub nom Taylor v. State of New York, 302 N.Y. 177, 96 N.E.2d 765). In this regard a claim has been said to accrue when the extent of damages can be ascertained (Taylor v. State of New York, 302 N.Y. 177, 185, supra, 96 N.E.2d 765), while a "cause of action" accrues when the wrongful act occurs (Schmidt v. Merchants Despatch Transp. Co., 270 N.Y. 287, 200 N.E. 824). In our judgment this distinction should be limited in application, and should only be applied to cases where a continuing wrong prevents an evaluation of damages (Martinez v. State of New York, Court of Claims, Claim No. 64163, Memorandum-Decision and Order, September 26, 1980 Koreman, P.J.; Davis v. State of New York, 84 Misc.2d 597, revd. on other grounds 54 A.D.2d 126; see Chartrand v. State of New York, 46 A.D.2d 942, 337 N.Y.S.2d 385; compare Waterman v. State of New York, 19 A.D.2d 264, 241 N.Y.S.2d 314, affd. sub nom. Williams v. State of New York, 14 N.Y.2d 793, 251 N.Y.S.2d 30, 200 N.E.2d 212). It should not be extended to simple acts of negligence. ^* Were we to accept the accrual rule offered by claimant the period for bringing negligence actions against the State would be left open for an indeterminate period of time, clearly not the intention of the Legislature in adopting the time limitations set forth in the Court of Claims Act (Court of Claims Act, § 10; see, generally, Jones v. City University of New York, 57 N.Y.2d 984, 457 N.Y.S.2d 235, 443 N.E.2d 483, revg. 85 A.D.2d 936; Tompkins v. State of New York, 33 Misc.2d 828, 830, 227 N.Y.S.2d 475; see and compare Boland v. State of New York, 30 N.Y.2d 337, 341, 333 N.Y.S.2d 410, 284 N.E.2d 569 [discussing the "artificial" treatment accorded the accrual of claims involving continuing wrongs] ). In fact, the New York Constitution proscribes any extension of the period for commencing an action against the State beyond that which would apply to private citizens, specifically stating that "[n]o claim against the state shall be audited, allowed or paid which, as between citizens of the state, would be barred by lapse of time" (New York Constitution, art. III, § 19; see, also, Court of Claims Act, § 12, subd. 2; Trayer v. State of New York, 90 A.D.2d 263, 268-269, 458 N.Y.S.2d 262).

Neither does the fact that the negligence or the existence of damage was not discovered by claimant until some time after Mr. Suggs' death serve to extend the limitations period. A discovery accrual rule is not recognized by the courts of this State (Schmidt v. Merchants Despatch Transp. Co., 270 N.Y. 287, 200 N.E. 824, supra; Schwartz v. Heyden Newport Chemical, 12 N.Y.2d 212, 216-218, 237 N.Y.S.2d 714, 188 N.E.2d 142, supra; see and compare, CPLR 213, subd. 8; CPLR 214-a [statutory exceptions] ). Rather, an injury occurs and the action accrues when "there is a wrongful invasion of personal or property rights ... even though the injured party may be ignorant of the existence of the wrong or injury" (Schmidt v. Merchants Despatch Transp. Co., 270 N.Y. 287, 200 N.E. 824, supra; see, also, Schwartz v. Heyden Newport Chemical Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 212, 237 N.Y.S.2d 714, 188 N.E.2d 142; Steinhardt v. Johns-Manville Corp., 54 N.Y.2d 1008, 446 N.Y.S.2d 244, 430 N.E.2d 1297). In this instance the wrong was committed when the form was lost or misfiled, and the injury to claim...