Johnson v. State

• Decision Date: 25 August 1998
• Docket Number: No. A98A1087.,A98A1087.
• Citation: 506 S.E.2d 234,234 Ga. App. 116
• Parties: JOHNSON v. The STATE.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

506 S.E.2d 234

234 Ga. App. 116

JOHNSON v. The STATE.

No. A98A1087.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

August 25, 1998.

David C. Butler, Marietta, for appellant.

Benjamin F. Smith, Jr., District Attorney, Debra H. Bernes, W. Thomas Weathers III, Nancy I. Jordan, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellee.

ANDREWS, Chief Judge.

Christopher Alan Johnson appeals from the denial of his motion for new trial after being convicted of theft by taking (motor vehicle). He contends the court erred in admitting his statement that he had just stolen the vehicle and that evidence of his character was improperly admitted.

1. Viewed with all inferences in favor of the jury's verdict, the evidence was that Dr. Hester had left his red soft top Jeep CJ5 at Kennesaw Auto for service. When Hough, the owner of Kennesaw Auto, left those premises Saturday, September 14, 1996, around 2:00 p.m., the Jeep was sitting on his lot and he had the key to it in his pocket. He had planned to test drive it but did not due to bad weather.

Kennesaw Officer Tolbert was patrolling in her marked patrol car at approximately 5:50 a.m. September 15 when she saw a red Jeep soft top rapidly exit the parking lot of Kennesaw Auto without stopping or slowing before entering the roadway. The Jeep was accelerating rapidly and fishtailing as it headed northbound on Main Street. Officer Tolbert called for backup and began following the Jeep because of prior incidents of people breaking into cars at Kennesaw Auto and stealing radios.

The Jeep began signaling a right turn onto Knightsbridge Road about a half-mile from the auto center, and Officer Tolbert activated her blue lights. The Jeep immediately veered back onto Main Street and accelerated, causing the driver to have trouble controlling it. Officer Tolbert activated her siren and pursued the Jeep another .7 mile until the Jeep struck the right curb, blowing both passenger side tires, crossed into the southbound lane, went into the ditch and flipped several times. The Jeep came to rest on its wheels facing southbound and was still slowing as Johnson was ejected from the driver's side door, landing face down on the pavement. The second occupant, Harmon, was thrown out of the passenger's side door, suffering a broken leg and arm. Johnson's injuries appeared more serious, including internal injuries resulting in bleeding from his nose and ears. Officer Tolbert opined that these injuries were caused by Johnson's colliding with the steering wheel in the accident.

Johnson did not move after being ejected, while Harmon stood and made a motion that indicated to the officer that he was going to do something. Officer Tolbert handcuffed Harmon for a moment, believing he was preparing to flee, but when he complained of pain in his arm and she realized he was not going to flee, she released him. She testified that she cuffed him "for my safety. I had no idea what his intentions were. He was not under arrest; however, I was conducting an investigation."

As she was handcuffing Harmon, Officer Riley arrived. Johnson apparently recognized him, asking "Riley, is that you?" Officer Riley recognized Johnson, and Johnson asked him for help. Officer Riley advised that the ambulance was on the way and asked Johnson why he had run. Johnson answered that they had just stolen the Jeep. Asked who was driving, Johnson said he was. Medical personnel arrived, and both Johnson and Harmon were taken to the hospital where they were later charged.

The evidence was legally sufficient. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).

2. Johnson's first enumeration is that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress¹ evidence of his statements to Officer Riley, arguing that Miranda warnings were required. "In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), the United States Supreme Court held that a person taken into official police custody or otherwise deprived by police of their freedom of action in any significant way must be advised of their constitutional rights. In its decision, however, the Supreme Court failed to set forth what was meant by `in custody.' But, it later addressed this issue in Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 104 S.Ct. 3138, 82 L.Ed.2d 317 (1984).

In that case, the Supreme Court formulated an objective test to determine whether a detainee is `in custody.' That test is whether a reasonable person in the detainee's position would have thought the detention would not be temporary. Id. at 442, 104 S.Ct. 3138. The Supreme Court also held that the safeguards prescribed by Miranda become applicable only after a detainee's `freedom of action is curtailed to a "degree associated with formal arrest." (Cit.)' Id. at 440, 86 S.Ct. 1602. The rationale behind the holding is that although an ordinary traffic stop curtails the freedom of action of the detained motorist and imposes some pressures on the detainee to answer questions, such pressures do not sufficiently impair the detainee's exercise of his privilege against self-incrimination so as to require that he be advised of his constitutional rights." State v. Pastorini, 222 Ga.App. 316, 317(1), 474 S.E.2d 122 ( 1996). See also Hardin v. State, 269 Ga. 1, 3(2)(a), 494 S.E.2d 647 (1998).

The issue of whether one is in custody for Miranda purposes is a mixed question of law and fact, and the trial court's determination will not be disturbed unless it is clearly erroneous. Hendrix v. State, 230 Ga.App. 604, 605(1), 497 S.E.2d 236 (1998).

Here, Johnson, who had known Officer Riley for two years, testified that he got hit in the head, had substantial chest injuries, and had no recollection of the events after the wreck or the next four weeks. Johnson was on the ground bleeding and not moving when he asked Officer Riley for help. It was obvious to the officers that he was seriously injured, and medical assistance had already been summoned when Officer Riley asked him why he had run. After Officer Riley told Johnson the EMTs were on the way, one of the officers asked who was driving and Johnson responded he was.

Johnson argues that he was not free to leave because he had been pursued by Officer Tolbert with activated lights and siren, he attempted to elude the officer, reaching speeds of 70 mph in a 35-mph zone, and wrecked. Additionally, Harmon had been handcuffed, although only momentarily, and Johnson was physically unable to leave the scene.

There is no question that, under the circumstances, Officer Tolbert had sufficient basis upon which to make a Terry² stop of the car prior to the wreck to investigate her suspicions regarding Kennesaw Auto. Once the wreck occurred, however, the officers were faced with also investigating the accident,³ and that is the primary context for our consideration of the Miranda custody issue.

In Morrissette v. State, 229 Ga.App. 420, 424(2)(b), 494 S.E.2d 8 (1997), Morrissette lost control and flipped his vehicle, injuring his passengers. When Officer Nix responded to the accident, Morrissette identified himself as the driver and the officer noticed a strong odor of alcohol. He decided to call an officer more experienced in DUIs and placed Morrissette in the rear of his patrol car for approximately five minutes to await that officer. The door handles had been removed from the rear doors, making them difficult to open from inside.

There, this Court concluded that, even though Morrissette had no apparent way of leaving the scene and had a legal duty to remain at...