Johnson v. State
| Decision Date | 23 September 1963 |
| Docket Number | No. 5082,5082 |
| Citation | 236 Ark. 917,370 S.W.2d 610 |
| Parties | Bennie Lee JOHNSON, Appellant, v. STATE of Arkansas, Appellee. |
| Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
Felver A. Rowell, Jr., Morrilton, for appellant.
Bruce Bennett, Atty. Gen., by Leslie Evitts, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., Little Rock, for appellee.
Appellant was convicted of the crime of forgery, sentenced to five years in the penitentiary, and has appealed.
First, appellant argues that the trial court should have granted his motion for a mistrial because of the method used by the prosecuting attorney in cross-examining the defendant about the commission of other offenses. When the defendant takes the stand, as in the case at bar, he is subject to the same rules of evidence as other witnesses, and for the purpose of throwing light on his credibility, he may, in good faith, be asked about other crimes he may have committed and other convictions, but he cannot be asked if he has been charged, indicted, or accused of other crimes. Sullivan v. State, 171 Ark. 768, 286 S.W. 939; Mathis v. State, 191 Ark. 1053, 89 S.W.2d 599; Morrison v. State, 191 Ark. 720, 87 S.W.2d 50; Kennedy v. Quinn, 166 Ark. 509, 266 S.W. 462.
If the defendant denies that he has committed other crimes he cannot be impeached by showing that he has given false answers. Montague v. State, 213 Ark. 575, 211 S.W.2d 879. Here, the defendant was asked on cross-examination about other convictions which he readily admitted, but he denied other crimes for which apparently there had been no trial or conviction. The prosecuting attorney asked the defendant specifically if he had cashed a check in Lucille Brent's Cafe. He answered 'no'. The prosecuting attorney then said:
The prosecuting attorney then proceeded to question the accused about other check writing offenses. The record is not exactly clear at this point as to whether the State's attorney was using the alleged records in such manner as to lead the jury to believe that he was examining the accused from official records of charges against him, but apparently this was being done. The attorney for appellant then stated that if other records were to be introduced, he would like to discuss the matter in chambers. Finally, the Court and counsel retired to chambers and there, in the course of the discussion, the prosecuting attorney said: 'I, at the time of this objection, am doing nothing more or less than looking at old information sheets with which the man was charged, specific checks and the specific name * * *'. The Court then asked: 'Are these convictions according to the witness?' The prosecuting attorney replied: 'They are charges.' The Court sustained the defendant's objection, but did not grant the motion for a mistrial.
In view of the fact that the cause is being reversed on the question of the sufficiency of the evidence, we do not deem it necessary to rule on the above assignment of error any more than to point out that although it is proper for the State's attorney, in good faith, to ask the defendant on cross-examination about the commission of, or the conviction for, other offenses, he should not attempt to get before the jury in an indirect way, or otherwise, the fact that the defendant has been charged, indicted, or accused of other crimes.
The appellant was charged by felony information with forging the name of James Odam to a check drawn on the Morrilton Security Bank in the sum of $38.00. Billy F. Davidson, Assistant Cashier of the First State Bank (not the Morrilton Security Bank on which the check was drawn) was called by the State as a witness regarding the alleged forged check. The name of James Odam appeared on the check as maker and the name James Payne appeared on the back of the check as endorser. The witness, Mr. Davidson, testified:
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