Johnson v. Village of Cohasset
| Citation | 263 Minn. 425,116 N.W.2d 692 |
| Decision Date | 17 August 1962 |
| Docket Number | No. 38629,38629 |
| Parties | Melvin JOHNSON, Appellant, v. VILLAGE OF COHASSET, Respondent. |
| Court | Supreme Court of Minnesota (US) |
Syllabus by the Court
1. Under Minn.St. 197.46, in an appeal to district court by honorably discharged veteran in public employment from decision of board created to determine charges of incompetency or misconduct made against him by his public employer, functions of district court are same as those applicable upon its review by certiorari of decision of any public administrative board.
2. Such functions cannot be performed by district court unless record of evidence and proceedings upon which board based its order, including transcript of testimony, is submitted in the appeal. Where such record discloses that order of board is without evidentiary support, court should remand proceedings to board with directions to vacate it. Where no transcript of testimony upon which such order is based is presented on appeal, district court has no choice but to remand with directions as described.
3. Section 197.46 does not impose upon honorably discharged veteran in public employment, against whom charges of incompetency or misconduct have been made by governmental agency employing him, the affirmative obligation of Showing that charges are untrue.
On appeal to district court from decision of a board hearing such charges, governmental agency must demonstrate from record of hearing that board's decision is adequately supported by evidence and hence would have obligation of furnishing necessary personnel and facilities for taking and transcribing any testimony submitted at board hearing.
Plaintiff, an honorably discharged veteran, was within rights guaranteed under § 197.46 in insisting that stenographic report of testimony at hearing be taken and in refusing to proceed until facilities and personnel therefor were provided by defendant.
4. The word 'hearing' as used in § 197.46 requires that honorably discharged veteran be accorded full hearing with privilege of confronting and cross-examining witnesses against him and submitting testimony of witnesses in rebuttal thereto. Even if on appeal burden of proof rested upon party attacking order of administrative board, where there is No evidence to support order, it cannot be accepted as equivalent in itself to facts not shown to exist.
5. Section 197.46 is designed to protect honorably discharged veteran in public employment from insecurity of political spoils system. A board created under this section to hear charges of incompetency or misconduct against such veteran should be impartial. Accordingly, governmental subdivision should no more appoint to such board one of its officials than should veteran under attack name himself as a member thereof.
6. Honorably discharged veteran in public employment retains position until discharged therefrom in accordance with requirements of § 197.46; and there is no provision therein authorizing his suspension pending determination of charges of misconduct or incompetency made against him. Where such veteran has been wrongfully separated from employment, contrary to § 197.46, he is entitled to wages which would have been earned from date of wrongful separation from employment until he is validly discharged under § 197.46, subject to mitigation under principles customarily applied in breach of employment contracts.
Benton & Weber, John P. Weber, Grand Rapids, for appellant.
Paul M. Shaw, Deer River, for respondent.
Action by Melvin Johnson, an honorably discharged veteran of the armed forces of the United States of America, against the village of Cohasset for judgment commanding and requiring defendant village to afford him an impartial hearing on his discharge by the village from his position as bartender of its municipal liquor store; and for payment of his salary until such time as his employment may be lawfully terminated under Minn.St. 197.46, which provides in part:
After defendant had first suspended and then discharged plaintiff without any attempted compliance with the above statute, it served upon him formal written notice which set forth charges of misconduct on his part by reason of which it sought to terminate his employment. Pursuant to agreement and a court order, the parties set September 9, 1961, as the date for a hearing thereon in accordance with § 197.46. On the date and time set for such 'hearing,' plaintiff appeared with his counsel but then discovered that the board created to hear and act upon the written charges filed against him proposed to do so without sworn testimony and without a reporter or stenographer available to take notes of the testimony from which a transcript could be later prepared. Plaintiff refused to proceed with the hearing, and no further proceedings were conducted. On September 13 the village council adopted a resolution discharging plaintiff for failing to proceed with the hearing.
In its findings in this action the trial court set forth that:
'* * * on June 14, 1961, defendant notified * * * plaintiff by * * * mail * * * that by action of the Village Council plaintiff had been suspended for a period of five days for the following reasons:
'1. Drinking while on the job.
'2. Being intoxicated while working.
'3. Being negligent in the duties of a bartender.
'* * * on June 20, 1961, defendant notified plaintiff by mail that plaintiff was discharged from his duties as bartender of the defendant's liquor store. * * *
'* * * on August 24, 1961, this Court * * * ordered a hearing pursuant to M.S.A. 197.46, requiring the defendant to appoint a member to the board * * *.
'* * * pursuant thereto plaintiff appointed a board member, defendant appointed a board member * * *, the two such members agreed upon a third member, and the board so composed agreed to meet * * *.
'* * * the board and the attorneys for plaintiff and defendant met in the Village Hall on September 9, 1961, at which time plaintiff was also present. * * *
'* * * when said meeting was about to convene defendant, its attorney, and all the board members were notified that plaintiff would not proceed because defendant did not provide a court reporter at defendant's expense and did not provide a qualified notary public to swear the witnesses. * * * That * * * defendant then determined there was no need for such a hearing. That defendant did * * * by resolution on September 13, 1961, summarily dismiss and discharge * * * plaintiff '* * * plaintiff's failure to take part in said hearing was without cause and was arbitrary and unreasonable.
'* * * plaintiff is not entitled to any wages after the 30th day of June, 1961, * * *.
'* * * M.S.A. 197.46, and other laws of Minnesota relating to veterans preference, do not provide for a court reporter nor for a notary public to be present for the hearing; * * *.'
In its conclusions the trial court determined that plaintiff had been granted a hearing under § 197.46 and, by his actions in failing to take part therein, he had waived all rights thereto so that defendant was under no legal obligation to reinstate him or to pay him any further wages or give him any further hearing.
In a memorandum, the basis for this determination was set forth as follows:
'The Court is not entirely convinced that plaintiff has lost all of his rights under the Veterans Preference Act by his actions herein. * * * it is the Court's opinion that the plaintiff has acted in an arbitrary and unreasonable manner, and in doing so the Court believes that his actions indicate an intentional delay of the proceedings for the purpose of obtaining wages. * * *
'* * * it appears that if the procedure as outlined in * * * M.S.A. 197.46, is to be followed it could result in plaintiff, or any other individual in his position, delaying hearings without just cause with the hope that should he be denied his position and be legally discharged therefrom that he would be able to collect wages up until the time that a hearing has actually been held and findings made thereon.
'If this matter should ultimately reach the Supreme Court it would be well for the Court to make certain observations, such as:
1. Minn.St. 197.46 accords an honorably discharged veteran a right of appeal...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State ex rel. Beam v. Fulwiler
...Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 33 S.Ct. 185, 57 L.Ed. 431 (1913); Johnson v. Village of Cohasset, 263 Minn. 425, 116 N.W.2d 692 (1962). These protections have been affirmed by this court in our requirement that commission hearings be held in good......
-
Wilson v. City of Minneapolis, 41211
...the trial judge properly applied it. See, State ex rel. Higgins v. Elsberg, 157 Minn. 177, 195 N.W. 902. Compare Johnson v. Village of Cohasset, 263 Minn. 425, 116 N.W.2d 692; and State ex rel. Jenson v. Civil Service Comm., 268 Minn. 536, 130 N.W.2d 143, certiorari denied, 380 U.S. 943, 85......
-
Brown v. City of Yankton, 16078
...21-29-10; SDCL 21-29-12. Brown cites several cases to support his claim for damages from date of dismissal. Johnson v. Village of Cohasset, 263 Minn. 425, 116 N.W.2d 692 (1962); State ex rel. Lund v. City of Bemidji, 209 Minn. 91, 295 N.W. 514 (1940). While these cases permit damages from t......
-
Winberg v. University of Minnesota, Nos. CX-91-2009
...discharged veterans in public employment from the ravages and insecurity of a political spoils system." Johnson v. Village of Cohasset, 263 Minn. 425, 435, 116 N.W.2d 692, 699 (1962). Veterans preference laws have been held to be remedial statutes that are to be liberally construed to accom......