Johnson v. Wainwright, 39559

• Decision Date: 13 July 1970
• Docket Number: No. 39559,39559
• Citation: 238 So.2d 590
• Parties: Roderick JOHNSON, Petitioner, v. Louie L. WAINWRIGHT, Director, Division of Corrections, State of Florida, Respondent.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 590

238 So.2d 590

Roderick JOHNSON, Petitioner, v. Louie L. WAINWRIGHT, Director, Division of Corrections, State of Florida, Respondent.

No. 39559.

Supreme Court of Florida.

July 13, 1970.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 14, 1970.

Roderick Johnson, in pro. per.

Earl Faircloth, Atty.Gen., and Horace A. Knowlton, III, Asst.Atty.Gen., for respondent.

PER CURIAM.

This matter recurring on the petition for habeas corpus, the writ issued, and the answer of the respondent, and it appearing upon further consideration that the writ was improvidently issued, the writ of habeas corpus is discharged and the cause dismissed.

It is so ordered.

ROBERTS, DREW, THORNAL and CARLTON, JJ., concur.

ERVIN, C.J., dissents with opinion.

ERVIN, Chief Justice (dissenting).

The following is a summary of the factual posture of this cause as gleaned from the documents submitted.

On April 13, 1967, an information was filed in the Criminal Court of Record of Orange County charging Petitioner Johnson with the offense of robbery. He was arraigned and entered a plea of not guilty. On May 8, 1967 Petitioner appeared before the trial judge and in the presence of his court-appointed attorney changed his plea from not guilty to guilty. The following colloquy appears in the transcript of this hearing:

"MR. ROBERTSON: Your Honor, as to Information Number 99082, I have a motion to make. A plea of not guilty has been entered as to this Information, and I would move the Court to allow the withdrawal of that plea and institute a plea of guilty.

"THE COURT: Roderick Johnson, you have heard the statement of your attorney to the request to enter a plea of guilty as to Information 99802, charging you with robbery.

"THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

"THE COURT: Is that your personal, voluntary desire?

"THE DEFENDANT: Yes.

"THE COURT: Are you entering a plea without the promise of leniency by anyone?

"THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

"THE COURT: Nothing has been promised you in any way, shape or form to enter this plea.

"THE DEFENDANT: No, sir.

"THE COURT: Based upon your advice and of consultation with your counsel, do you voluntarily enter a plea of guilty to this charge?

"THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.

"THE COURT: Based upon the statement of the Defendant, the Court will accept his plea of guilty to Information Number 99802, and set aside the previous plea of not guilty. ***"

Following the acceptance of Petitioner's guilty plea, witnesses were called and Petitioner was adjudged guilty and sentenced to twenty-five years imprisonment.

Petitioner apparently did not attempt to directly appeal his conviction, but in September, 1968 filed a motion to vacate judgment and sentence under Rule One (now R.Cr.P. 1.850, 33 F.S.A.). The trial court denied this motion and an appeal to the Fourth District Court of Appeal resulted in the following decision:

"Defendant questions the denial of his motion to vacate judgment and sentence pursuant to Criminal Procedure Rule One (now Rule 1.850, 33 F.S.A.) on the ground that the record does not show that the trial court informed him as to the consequences of his guilty plea.

"After carefully reviewing the record, in light of the law applicable at the time Johnson entered the guilty plea, we find his argument without merit.

"Affirmed on the authority of Reddick v. State, Fla.App.1966, 190 So.2d 340." Johnson v. State, Fla.App.1969, 226 So.2d 855.

As a basis for relief sought in the instant petition for habeas corpus, Petitioner contends the trial court erred in accepting his guilty plea without inquiring as to whether Petitioner understandingly as well as voluntarily entered his plea. Petitioner in effect asserts that it was constitutionally incumbent on the trial court, prior to acceptance of the guilty plea, to advise Petitioner of the consequences of his plea in terms of his right to trial by jury and the permissible range of sentence for the offense charged. Petitioner further contends he is entitled to the relief sought since the record fails to show affirmatively that the trial court advised Petitioner of his constitutional rights and the consequences of his guilty plea prior to acceptance thereof. Petitioner cites Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969), in support of the latter contention. As factual support for the above contentions, Petitioner alleges that at the time he entered his guilty plea, he did not know the consequences of such a plea and that had he known he would or could have received the sentence imposed, he would have requested a jury trial, assuming the court had properly advised him of his constitutional rights and the effect of a guilty plea thereon.

In its return to this cause, Respondent asserts Petitioner's sole right to relief hinges on the question of whether the holding in Boykin v. Alabama, supra, requires retroactive application. Respondent submits the Boykin case was decided June 2, 1969 and should not be retroactively applied to encompass the instant arraignment proceedings relevant to Petitioner's guilty plea which occurred on May 8, 1967. In a supplemental return, Respondent has submitted an affidavit of Petitioner's trial counsel to the effect Petitioner was "personally interviewed numerous times by the Affiant and was advised that he had a right to a trial by jury and was further informed that the maximum sentence that could be received by him was a life imprisonment."

In order to propertly resolve the instant controversy, I think it is imperative inititially to lay bare if possible the precise import of Boykin v. Alabama, supra.

In the Boykin case the United States Supreme Court noted that a plea of guilty in a state criminal proceeding involves the waiver of several Federal constitutional rights, i.e., the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to trial by jury, and the right of confrontation. The Court further noted the recognized principle that the question of effective waiver of a Federal constitutional right is governed by Federal standards. Joining these two propositions, the Court explicitly recognized that a plea of guilty must be voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently made in order to satisfy requirements of Federal due process. ¹ The foregoing enumerated principles of the Boykin case, however, do not represent the evolution of a new Federal constitutional rule. Rather, they represent only a codified analysis or, at best, a mere refinement of previously announced Federal standards. See Machibroda v. United States, 368 U.S. 487, 82 S.Ct. 510, 7 L.Ed.2d 473 (1962); Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 68 S.Ct. 316, 92 L.Ed. 309 (1948); Kercheval v. United States, 274 U.S. 220, 47 S.Ct. 582, 71 L.Ed. 1009 (1926). Thus, prior to the arrival of Boykin, supra, the confines of prevailing principles of Federal due process, which are equally controlling in state criminal proceedings, required guilty pleas to be made voluntarily, intelligently, and understandingly as a prerequisite to validity. Therefore, so far as concerns application of the above delineated Federal requirements to the instant controversy, it seems to me this Court is not faced with the issue of retroactivity.

I now pass to the evolutionary feature of the Boykin decision, i.e., the precise holding of Boykin, the attempted application of which to the present case directly postures the retroactivity issue. After reviewing principles pertaining to waiver of Federal constitutional rights, the United States Supreme Court in the Boykin case concluded reversible...