Johnson v. Williams, 02-19-00089-CV
| Decision Date | 27 November 2019 |
| Docket Number | No. 02-19-00089-CV,02-19-00089-CV |
| Parties | ROBERT S. JOHNSON, Appellant v. JEFF WILLIAMS, MAYOR; THE CITY OF ARLINGTON, TEXAS; ZACK MAXWELL; AND FAITH BUSSEY, Appellees |
| Court | Court of Appeals of Texas |
On Appeal from the 352nd District Court Tarrant County, Texas
Before Gabriel, Birdwell, and Womack, JJ.
In this suit, Arlington resident Robert S. Johnson has challenged the legality of an amendment to Arlington's city charter. Johnson contended that citizens committed fraud in handling a petition drive, and the resulting amendment should therefore be voided. The trial court granted pleas to the jurisdiction and dismissed Johnson's claims.
On appeal, Johnson contends that he alleged a valid election contest that endowed the trial court with jurisdiction. But under the type of claim that Johnson has raised, the wrongful act must be committed by an "election officer or other person officially involved in the administration of the election." The citizens who circulated the petition do not qualify as such, and Johnson has therefore failed to make out a viable claim. And because Johnson's proposed alternative—to replead a new cause of action against a different party—would be both belated and likely futile, the trial court did not err in dismissing the suit without the opportunity to replead. We therefore affirm as modified.
Arlington residents initiated a petition drive for an amendment to the city charter that would impose term limits on the mayor and the city council. A summary appended to the petition explained that the amendment would not require early removal of any current councilmembers who were already over the proposed term limit. When the petition obtained the required signatures, the city council placed it on the ballot as"Proposition E," where it won by a vote of 61,701 For to 36,908 Against. The text of the petition was subsequently enacted as an amendment to Arlington's city charter.
After the enactment, Johnson filed suit against Arlington and its mayor, Jeff Williams. Johnson asserted that due to careless drafting, the amendment did require early removal of two councilmembers after all, contrary to what the petition summary promised. Johnson asserted that because the summary misled petition signers, the petition's circulators had committed fraud, and the resulting amendment should be struck down.
Arlington, Williams, and two intervenors1 filed pleas to the jurisdiction and motions for summary judgment. The trial court granted the pleas and dismissed Johnson's claims for want of jurisdiction; in the alternative, the trial court granted summary judgment against Johnson. He appeals.
We begin with Johnson's third issue, in which he contends that the trial court erred by granting the pleas to the jurisdiction. He asserts that his petition stated a viable election contest that is sufficient to establish jurisdiction, and the trial court therefore erred in concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the cause.
We review de novo a trial court's ruling on a plea to the jurisdiction. Tex. Dep't of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226, 228 (Tex. 2004). Our jurisdictional analysis begins with the plaintiff's live pleadings, see id. at 226, for it is the pleader's initial burden to allege facts that affirmatively demonstrate the court's jurisdiction to hear the cause. City of Westworth Vill. v. City of White Settlement, 558 S.W.3d 232, 239 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2018, pet. denied). We construe the pleadings liberally in the plaintiff's favor and look to the pleader's intent. Id.
"Elections are political matters, and the courts may take jurisdiction of political matters only if the law has specifically granted such authority." Thiel v. Oaks, 535 S.W.2d 1, 2 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1976, no writ) (citing Lund v. Alanis, 381 S.W.2d 955, 956 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1964) (per curiam), writ dism'd, 384 S.W.2d 123 (Tex. 1964) (per curiam)). Where the law has provided a mode of deciding election contests, designed to be final, the courts have no authority to adjudicate such cases other than what the law may give to them. Wright v. Fawcett, 42 Tex. 203, 206 (1874); see also Cuellar v. Maldonado, Nos. 13-14-00228-CV, 13-14-00230-CV, 2014 WL 2158135, at *3 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburg May 16, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.).
Id. § 221.003(a) (emphasis added); City of Granite Shoals v. Winder, 280 S.W.3d 550, 557 (Tex. App.—Austin 2009, pet. denied). "[A] challenge that does not concern whether the outcome of the election was incorrect for one of the four reasons listed in the statute is, by definition, not an election contest." Granite Shoals, 280 S.W.3d at 557.
Under Johnson's theory of the case, the petition circulators engaged in fraud when they spread a dishonest summary falsely stating that their petition would not force any city councilmembers out of office early. However, for Johnson's claim to constitute an election contest under this fraud theory, the petition circulators must qualify as "an election officer or other person officially involved in the administration of the election." Tex. Elec. Code Ann. § 221.003(a)(2). Johnson does not contend that petition circulators formally qualify as election officers. Thus, the success of Johnson's appeal hangs on whether a petition circulator qualifies as an "other person officially involved in the administration of the election." Id.
The statute does not define this phrase, and we therefore resort to principles of statutory construction to determine its meaning. In construing statutes, our primary objective is to give effect to legislative intent. Silguero v. CSL Plasma, Inc., 579 S.W.3d 53, 59 (Tex. 2019). We look first to the plain language as the most reliable guide to that intent, construing the text in light of the statute as a whole. Id. The statutory terms bear their common meaning, unless the text provides a different meaning or the common meaning leads to an absurd result. Id. The statutory words must be interpreted considering the context in which they are used, not in isolation. Id.
We begin with the common meaning of the words "other person officially involved in the administration of the election." One dictionary defines the word "officially" as "with official authorization; formally." Webster's Third New Int'l Dictionary Unabridged 1567 (2002). The most apt definition of "involve" is "to draw in as a participant." Id. at 1191. Finally, in this situation, "administration" is the act of administering, which the same dictionary defines as "to manage the affairs of" or "to direct or superintend the execution, use, or conduct of." Id. at 27. Combining these definitions, the common meaning of the phrase in question might be approximated as "a formally authorized participant in managing the affairs of an election."
Johnson has not alleged any facts suggesting that the petition circulators were given formal authority to manage the affairs of the election, and he has not explained on appeal how they had any formal authority. If the charter-amendment statute is any indication, the petition circulators had no such authority. See Tex. Loc. Gov't CodeAnn. § 9.004. That statute defines the process by which petition circulators may seek to amend a city charter. The charter-amendment statute does not speak of any one petition circulator who is given even a slight measure of official clout in this process; rather, it speaks of a grassroots effort by a group of "qualified voters," with no overlay of authority:
The governing body shall submit a proposed charter amendment to the voters for their approval at an election if the submission is supported by a petition signed by a number of qualified voters of the municipality equal to at least five percent of the number of qualified voters of the municipality or 20,000, whichever number is the smaller.
Id. § 9.004(a). When the signature minimum is satisfied and the petition is submitted, the work of the circulators is complete. Id. The petition is then handed off to bona fide officers who begin the administration in earnest. See id. § 9.004(b)-(e) (). To be sure, the petition circulators shape the content of an election in the same way that a candidate for office shapes the ballot by placing her name before the voters. But like a candidate, a petition circulator does not manage the affairs of the election, he submits his proposal to the management of others with formal administrative authority over the election. Thus, the mechanics of the charter-amendment statute suggest that the petition circulators are not "officially involved in the administration of the election," according to the plain meaning of that phrase. See Tex. Elec. Code Ann. § 221.003(a)(2).
Our plain-language interpretation of this phrase is reinforced by the context in which it sits. Again, this form of election contest is defined by whether "an election officer or other person officially involved in the administration of the...
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