Johnston v. City of Bloomington

• Decision Date: 02 October 1979
• Docket Number: No. 51126,51126
• Citation: 395 N.E.2d 549,77 Ill.2d 108,32 Ill.Dec. 319
• Parties: , 32 Ill.Dec. 319 James W. JOHNSTON et al., Appellees, v. The CITY OF BLOOMINGTON et al., Appellants.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 549

395 N.E.2d 549

77 Ill.2d 108, 32 Ill.Dec. 319

James W. JOHNSTON et al., Appellees, v. The CITY OF BLOOMINGTON et al., Appellants.

No. 51126.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Oct. 2, 1979.

David L. Stanczak and H. Paxton Bowers, Bloomington, and Randall B. Ehlers, of Bane, Allison & Saint, P. C., Bloomington, for appellants.

George L. Chesley, of DePew, Grimes & Chesley, Bloomington, for appellees.

Richard R. Wagner, Asst. State's Atty., Bloomington, for amicus curiae, County of McLean.

GOLDENHERSH, Chief Justice:

Plaintiffs, James W. Johnston, individually and as a representative of all those similarly situated, and William Fike, appealed from the judgment of the circuit court of McLean County entered upon allowance of the motion to dismiss filed by defendants, the city of Bloomington, a municipal corporation, and Paul W. Krueger, its treasurer. The appellate court reversed and remanded (61 Ill.App.3d 209, 18 Ill.Dec. 538, 377 N.E.2d 1174), and we allowed defendants' petition for leave to appeal. In counts I and III of the complaint plaintiffs Johnston and Fike, respectively, alleged that, in one instance, he pleaded guilty, and in the other was found guilty, of a violation of chapter 32, section 29, of the Bloomington Municipal Code, hereafter referred to as the speeding ordinance, and paid fines. Count II purports to be a class action brought on behalf of all persons who had paid fines for prosecutions under the ordinance. It is alleged in each count that on January 6, 1976, the circuit court of McLean County, in a separate action, declared the ordinance unconstitutional, and plaintiffs seek to recover the fines paid.

The basis for the circuit court's holding the speeding ordinance unconstitutional cannot be determined from the record. The parties are in agreement that no appeal was taken from that judgment, and it appears that shortly after the judgment was entered the city council amended the ordinance, presumably in an effort to obviate the infirmities upon which the circuit court judgment was based.

The judgment was entered upon allowance of the motion to dismiss the complaint, and the allegations of the complaint must therefore be taken as true. (Acorn Auto Driving School, Inc. v. Board of Education (1963), 27 Ill.2d 93, 187 N.E.2d 722.) Relying primarily on our decision in People v. Meyerowitz (1975), 61 Ill.2d 200, 335 N.E.2d 1, plaintiffs contend that the effect of an ordinance which has been held unconstitutional is the same as though it had never existed and that judgments of conviction based upon it are void and can be collaterally attacked at any time; that fines paid under a void ordinance were not voluntarily paid for the reason that certain rights of the plaintiff would have been severely affected had the fines or penalties not been paid; and that because defendants did not appeal from the judgment finding the ordinance unconstitutional, they are now precluded from relitigating its validity.

Defendants contend that civil judgments obtained under an ordinance later ruled unconstitutional are not rendered void; that the ruling by a circuit court that an ordinance is unconstitutional does not effect collateral estoppel and is not binding on other circuit courts; and that plaintiffs are not entitled to the return of fines voluntarily paid. Although People v. Meyerowitz (1975), 61 Ill.2d 200, 335 N.E.2d 1, would control if the judgments under which the fines were paid were criminal in nature it does not follow that it applies here. The prosecution of municipal ordinance violations is hybrid in nature (City of Danville v. Clark (1976), 63 Ill.2d 408, 348 N.E.2d 844), and as the court observed in Village of Maywood v. Houston (1956), 10 Ill.2d 117, 119, 139 N.E.2d 233, 234: "The proceeding is not strictly or exclusively civil or criminal, but resembles both in some respects. For this reason, problems in this area cannot be solved by a mere labeling process, and the decisions of the courts, in Illinois and elsewhere, do not always have apparent logical consistency." Although ordinances of the type here involved have long been considered quasi-criminal in character, they have been viewed as civil in form. (City of Danville v. Clark (1976), 63 Ill.2d 408, 411, 348 N.E.2d 844; City of Danville v. Hartshorn (1973), 53 Ill.2d 399, 401, 292 N.E.2d 382; City of Chicago v. Lawrence (1969), 42 Ill.2d 461, 466, 248 N.E.2d 71; ...