Johnston v. South Carolina Dept. of Labor

• Decision Date: 25 August 2005
• Docket Number: No. 26015.,26015.
• Citation: 617 S.E.2d 363
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: James F. JOHNSTON, III, Respondent, v. SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, LICENSING, AND REGULATION, SOUTH CAROLINA REAL ESTATE APPRAISERS BOARD, Petitioner.

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617 S.E.2d 363 James F. JOHNSTON, III, Respondent,
v.
SOUTH CAROLINA DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, LICENSING, AND REGULATION, SOUTH CAROLINA REAL ESTATE APPRAISERS BOARD, Petitioner. No. 26015. Supreme Court of South Carolina. Heard June 14, 2005. Decided July 25, 2005. Rehearing Denied August 25, 2005.

Kenneth P. Woodington, of Davidson, Morrison and Lindemann, P.A., of Columbia; and Lynne W. Rogers, of South Carolina Department of Labor, Licensing and Regulation, of Columbia, for petitioner.

John S. Nichols, of Bluestein & Nichols, L.L.C., of Columbia, for respondent.

Justice MOORE.

Following petitioner's (the Board's) issuance of an order fining and suspending respondent, respondent appealed to the Administrative Law Court (ALC). The ALC reversed the Board's order and found the Board's failure to serve written notice within the statutorily-mandated time period divested

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the Board of subject matter jurisdiction.¹ The circuit court affirmed the ALC and the Court of Appeals affirmed in a 2-1 decision. Johnston v. S.C. Dep't of Labor, Licensing, and Reg., S.C. Real Estate Appraisers Bd., Op. No.2003-UP-688 (S.C. Ct.App. filed November 24, 2003). We reverse and remand.

FACTS

Respondent was a licensed real estate appraiser. In April 2000, the Board brought charges against respondent alleging he violated the South Carolina Real Estate Appraisers Registration, Licensing and Certification Act, S.C.Code Ann. §§ 40-60-2, et seq., and violated the 1997 Uniform Standards of Professional Appraisal Practice. The allegations stemmed from a complaint regarding a real estate appraisal done by another appraiser, Kyle Smith, which respondent signed as a supervising appraiser.

After an administrative hearing on the matter, the Board found respondent had committed the alleged violations and imposed a one thousand dollar fine and suspended respondent's license for one year. The written decision was issued on October 23, 2000. Pursuant to statute, the Board was required to serve written notice of its decision on respondent within thirty days of issuing a final order. See S.C.Code Ann. § 40-60-150(C)(3) (Supp.2004). Two weeks after the Board's written decision was issued, on November 6, 2000, the Board mailed written notice of its decision by certified mail, "Return Receipt Requested," to an address containing an incorrect zip code. An unknown person accepted the letter and signed the name "T. Griffin" to the receipt. This card was returned to the Board with T. Griffin's signature.

On December 7, 2000, respondent learned the Board had posted his name on their website as being under suspension. After respondent's inquiry, a copy of the written decision was given to respondent by a Board employee. While this notice constituted proper service, pursuant to Rule 5(b)(1), SCRCP, on respondent, notice was not served on respondent until two weeks after the statutorily-prescribed time period had expired.

ISSUE

Did the Court of Appeals err by finding the Board's failure to serve notice of its decision within the 30-day time period prescribed in S.C.Code Ann. § 40-60-150(C)(3) (Supp.2004) deprived the Board of subject matter jurisdiction?

DISCUSSION

The Board argues the Court of Appeals erred by finding that because the Board failed to comply with the time frame required by § 40-60-150(C)(3), its inaction deprived the Board of subject matter jurisdiction.

The cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the Legislature. Hodges v. Rainey, 341 S.C. 79, 533 S.E.2d 578 (2000). When a statute's terms are clear and unambiguous on their face, there is no room for statutory construction and a court must apply the statute according to its literal meaning. Carolina Power & Light Co. v. City of Bennettsville, 314 S.C. 137, 442 S.E.2d 177 (1994).

Section 40-60-150(C)(3)...