Johnston v. State

• Decision Date: 30 June 2016
• Docket Number: No. 12AP–1022.,12AP–1022.
• Citation: 69 N.E.3d 5,2016 Ohio 4761
• Parties: Dale JOHNSTON, Plaintiff–Appellee, v. STATE of Ohio, Defendant–Appellant.
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

69 N.E.3d 5

2016 Ohio 4761

Dale JOHNSTON, Plaintiff–Appellee,

v.STATE of Ohio, Defendant–Appellant.

No. 12AP–1022.

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Tenth District, Franklin County.

June 30, 2016.

The Owen Firm, LLC, and James D. Owen, Columbus, for appellee.

Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Debra Gorrell Wehrle, for appellant.

SADLER, J.

{¶ 1} On October 28, 2015, the Supreme Court of Ohio in Johnston v. State, 144 Ohio St.3d 311, 2015-Ohio-4437, 42 N.E.3d 746 ("Johnston II "), reversed the decision of this court in Johnston v. State, 10th Dist. No. 12AP–1022, 2014-Ohio-1452, 2014 WL 1384608 ("Johnston I "), and remanded the case to this court to "address the assignments of error it previously determined moot." Johnston II at ¶ 25. On consideration of the remaining assignments of error, we reverse the judgment of the trial court.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

{¶ 2} In Johnston I, defendant-appellant, State of Ohio, appealed from a judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas declaring plaintiff-appellee, Dale Johnston, a wrongfully imprisoned individual pursuant to R.C. 2743.48(A). The Supreme Court accepted the state's discretionary appeal on the following proposition of law: "The divided court in the Tenth District erred when it, for the first time, held in direct contravention of the express wishes of the Ohio General Assembly, that the 2003 amendments to R.C. 2743.48 (governing an ‘error in procedure’) do not apply retroactively." Johnston II at ¶ 12. The Supreme Court set out the relevant facts and procedural history of this case as follows:

In September 1983, almost a year after the discovery of the bodies of Cooper and Schultz, a Hocking County grand jury indicted Johnston on two counts of aggravated murder with death penalty specifications. At trial, a three judge panel found him guilty of all charges and specifications and sentenced him to death on each count. The appellate court overturned Johnston's convictions and remanded the cause for a new trial. We affirmed that ruling because the trial court had abused its discretion in permitting a witness to testify about his posthypnosis recollection and the state had committed a Brady violation, Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 [83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215] (1963), by failing to disclose evidence that suggested that the victims may have been murdered at a location different from that alleged by the state and that someone else may have been responsible for the murders.

On remand, the Hocking County Common Pleas Court transferred the case to Hamilton County for trial, which then transferred to Franklin County. The parties jointly filed a motion with the trial court to determine the admissibility of the testimony of the witness who had been hypnotized. In response, the court held that the hypnotically refreshed testimony was inadmissible. The court also granted Johnston's motion to suppress statements he had made during an interrogation, along with evidence seized from him and his residence. That suppression ruling was appealed and affirmed by the Tenth District Court of Appeals on May 10, 1990. The next day, the state nolled the indictment against Johnston, and thereafter, he was released from the penitentiary.

Subsequently, Johnston filed a wrongful imprisonment claim pursuant to R.C. 2743.48, but the common pleas court dismissed it in 1993, concluding that Johnston had not proved by a preponderance of the evidence that he did not commit the murders.

On April 9, 2003, the General Assembly amended R.C. 2743.48 and expanded the definition of wrongfully imprisoned individuals to include those who had been released due to a procedural error subsequent to sentencing. Sub.S.B. No. 149, 149 Ohio Laws, Part II, 3545. Developments in the investigation of the deaths of Cooper and Schultz culminated in Chester McKnight pleading guilty to their aggravated murders on December 18, 2008.

Based on McKnight's plea, Johnston filed a second claim for wrongful imprisonment, alleging that he was innocent and also claiming that errors in procedure, including the Brady violations, resulted in his release. Both parties filed for summary judgment. The trial court accepted Johnston's procedural error argument, rejected the state's position that the 2003 amendment to R.C. 2743.48 was not retroactive, granted Johnston's motion for summary judgment, and declared Johnston to be a wrongfully imprisoned individual.

The state appealed, and the Tenth District Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and held that the amendment did not apply retroactively to Johnston's claim and that its ruling rendered moot the state's other assignments of error asserting that a six-year statute of limitations applied to Johnston's claim, that res judicata barred Johnston from relitigating his actual innocence claim, and that Johnston had not satisfied the fourth and fifth prongs of the wrongful imprisonment statute. The appellate court later denied Johnston's application for en banc consideration and his motion to certify a conflict, and it declined to consider the state's contention that the wrongful imprisonment claim also failed based on our newly released decision in Mansaray v. State, 138 Ohio St.3d 277, 2014-Ohio-750 .

(Citations omitted.) Id. at ¶ 6–11.

{¶ 3} In reversing the decision of this court in Johnston I, the Supreme Court concluded in Johnston II that "[t]he 2003 amendment to R.C. 2743.48 expanded the definition of a wrongfully imprisoned individual to include those able to demonstrate a procedural error occurring subsequent to sentencing that resulted in the inmate's release and applies retroactively to permit litigation of claims on that basis."Id. at ¶ 24. Accordingly, the Supreme Court reversed the decision of this court and remanded the case for us to consider the state's remaining assignments of error.

{¶ 4} This court subsequently issued a journal entry stating, pursuant to the mandate of the Supreme Court reversing the judgment of this court, this matter is hereby resubmitted to the court for consideration of appellant's first, third, fourth, and fifth assignments of error.

{¶ 5} The parties submitted no supplemental memoranda to this court following remand, nor did they request further argument. Accordingly, we will decide the appeal based on the written briefs previously submitted by the parties and without further oral argument. The assignments of error remanded to this court for consideration read as follows:

[1.] The trial court committed reversible error by declaring the six (6) year statute of limitations for wrongful imprisonment cases, pursuant to Nelson v. State, 5th Dist. No. 2006 AP 10 0061, 2007-Ohio-6274 [2007 WL 4170886], ¶ 21, did not apply to Appellee.

[3.] The trial court committed reversible error by declaring Appellee was not barred by the doctrine of res judicata from re-litigating his actual innocence claim, previously passed upon by a court of competent jurisdiction in 1993.

[4.] The trial court committed reversible error by declaring Appellee satisfied the fourth prong of the wrongful imprisonment statute, R.C. § 2743.48(A)(4).

[5.] The trial court committed reversible error by declaring Appellee satisfied the fifth prong of the wrongful imprisonment statute, R.C. § 2743.48(A)(5).

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

{¶ 6} The trial court granted Johnston's motion for summary judgment and declared him a wrongfully imprisoned individual pursuant to R.C. 2743.48. Summary judgment is proper only when the party moving for summary judgment demonstrates that (1) no genuine issue of material fact exists, (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, and (3) reasonable minds could come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, that party being entitled to have the evidence most strongly construed in that party's favor. Civ.R. 56(C) ; State ex rel. Grady v. State Emp. Relations Bd., 78 Ohio St.3d 181, 183, 677 N.E.2d 343 (1997).

{¶ 7} Appellate review of a summary judgment motion is de novo. Helfrich v. Allstate Ins. Co., 10th Dist. No. 12AP–559, 2013-Ohio-4335, 2013 WL 5450931, ¶ 7, citing Helton v. Scioto Cty. Bd. of Commrs., 123 Ohio App.3d 158, 162, 703 N.E.2d 841 (4th Dist.1997). " ‘When reviewing a trial court's ruling on summary judgment, the court of appeals conducts an independent review of the record and stands in the shoes of the trial court.’ " Id., quoting Mergenthal v. Star Banc Corp., 122 Ohio App.3d 100, 103, 701 N.E.2d 383 (12th Dist.1997).

III. LEGAL ANALYSIS

A. Third Assignment of Error (Res Judicata)

{¶ 8} Because the state's third assignment of error raises the question whether the 1993 judgment in Johnston's prior wrongful imprisonment action bars him from relitigating the claim in this case, we will consider the third assignment of error first. In its third assignment of error, the state argues that the trial court erred when it found that res judicata did not bar Johnston's second action for wrongful imprisonment based on a claim of actual innocence.

{¶ 9} There is no dispute that in State v. Johnston, Hocking C.P. No. 91–CIV–186 (Aug. 9, 1993), Johnston sought a declaration of wrongful imprisonment based on a claim of actual innocence, and Judge McQuade entered judgment in favor of the state as to that claim. " ‘The doctrine of res judicata encompasses the two related concepts of claim preclusion, also known as * * * estoppel by judgment, and issue preclusion, also known as collateral estoppel.’ " State ex rel. Nickoli v. Erie MetroParks, 124 Ohio St.3d 449, 2010-Ohio-606, 923 N.E.2d 588, ¶ 21, quoting O'Nesti v. DeBartolo Realty Corp., 113 Ohio St.3d 59, 2007-Ohio-1102, 862 N.E.2d 803, ¶ 6. "Under the doctrine of res judicata, ‘[a] valid, final judgment rendered upon the merits bars all subsequent actions based upon any claim arising out of the transaction or occurrence that was the subject matter of the previous action.’ " Kelm v. Kelm, 92 Ohio St.3d 223, 227, 749...