Jolly v. State

• Decision Date: 21 June 1996
• Docket Number: CR-95-0341
• Citation: 689 So.2d 986
• Parties: Watson L. JOLLY v. STATE.
• Court: Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals

Page 986

689 So.2d 986

Watson L. JOLLY v. STATE.

CR-95-0341.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama.

June 21, 1996.

Thomas Motley, Dothan, for Appellant.

Jeff Sessions, Atty. Gen., and Stephanie Billingslea, Asst. Atty. Gen., for Appellee.

PATTERSON, Judge.

The appellant, Watson L. Jolly, pleaded guilty on September 14, 1993, to the offense of leaving the scene of an accident. On that same date, he was sentenced to three years' imprisonment. That sentence was suspended, and he was placed on three years' probation. According to the probation docket in the record he was fined $250 but no restitution was ordered. Jolly did not appeal from this conviction and sentence.

On August 17, 1995, approximately 23 months after the original sentence was imposed, the state filed a motion with the trial court, seeking restitution in the amount of $1,222.26. Attached to the motion were medical bills from a Dothan hospital for services allegedly rendered to the victim from September 1, 1992, to September 30, 1992, approximately one year before the appellant's original sentencing. This motion was granted without a hearing on August 24, 1995, and notice was sent to the appellant's attorney that the appellant had 10 days to object. On August 28, 1995, the appellant's counsel filed an objection to the restitution order and filed a motion for a hearing. The hearing was set for October 16, 1995, but was later rescheduled for October 20, 1995. The record indicates that notice of all of the above actions and hearing dates was sent to the appellant's counsel.

At the October 20 hearing on the appellant's objection to the restitution order, neither the appellant nor his counsel was present, although a law clerk from counsel's office was in court to explain that the appellant's counsel was in a trial in another county and should be arriving shortly. When counsel did not arrive, the trial court took evidence regarding the restitution order and then denied the appellant's motion objecting to the restitution order. On October 25, the appellant filed a motion to reconsider or for a new trial. That motion was denied on October 26. This appeal followed on November 8, 1995.

The appellant raises three issues in this appeal: (1) Whether the trial court had jurisdiction to impose restitution approximately 23 months after the original sentence, when restitution was not part of the original sentence; (2) Whether the trial court could constitutionally order restitution in the absence of the appellant and his attorney; and (3) Whether the procedures followed in ordering restitution complied with the statutory requirement of the Restitution to Victims of Crimes Act that a hearing shall be held. See §§ 15-18-65 through -78, Code of Alabama 1975.

I.

The appellant contends that, in the absence of a timely filed post-trial motion, the trial court was without jurisdiction to order restitution beyond 30 days from the imposition of the sentence. Although we find some merit to the appellant's argument that the trial court erred in ordering restitution 23 months after the original sentence was imposed, we are constrained to disagree with the appellant that the trial court was without jurisdiction to do so. In Hill v. Bradford, 565 So.2d 208 (Ala.1990), the Alabama Supreme Court held that a restitution order added to the defendant's 10-year sentence and $5000 fine approximately 15 months after the defendant's sentencing was not invalid for jurisdictional reasons. In Hill, restitution had not been included as part of the original sentence, but was ordered after the state filed a petition for restitution approximately 14 months after the imposition of the original sentence. The Alabama Supreme Court held:

"We do not agree that the trial court lost jurisdiction to enter this restitution judgment 30 days after Hill was sentenced to a term of imprisonment, because the restitution statute makes it clear that restitution hearings are to be held as a matter of course and that restitution may be ordered in addition to any other sentence imposed and does not require that a restitution hearing be held within 30 days of a sentence of imprisonment or other criminal sanctions. Under the facts of this case, the hearing was timely and did not violate the United States Constitution. Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 521, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 2187, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972)."

565 So.2d at 210. Although the Court held that the trial court did not lose jurisdiction to essentially increase a sentence by ordering restitution beyond 30 days after the imposition of the original sentence, it cited as authority for that proposition the restitution statute and Barker v. Wingo, a case dealing solely with the issue of the accused's right to a speedy trial. We recognize that the relevant restitution statute does not affirmatively state that the hearing must be held within 30 days of sentencing or that the hearing can be held outside the 30-day period. ¹

While we are required to follow the holding of Hill v. Bradford, we believe that it conflicts with other Alabama caselaw. In reaching that conclusion, we first note that the legislature intended for restitution to be a criminal penalty. "[I]t is clear that the Alabama legislature ... intended that restitution be incorporated into the traditional sentencing procedure and that it be imposed as a criminal, not civil, penalty. 'Restitution is a permissible penalty imposed on the defendant as part of sentencing.' " Rice v. State, 491 So.2d 1049, 1052 (Ala.Cr.App.1986) (quoting United States v. Watchman, 749 F.2d 616, 617 (10th Cir.1984)). Even though restitution looks somewhat like a civil penalty because restitution generally is awarded to the specific victim of the crime rather than to the state, it is still a criminal penalty. Because restitution is properly a part of the sentencing, the tardy imposition of restitution in Hill and in the present case in effect increased each appellant's respective sentence.

However, by apparently permitting the trial court to increase a legal sentence if that increase is the addition of restitution, the Hill ruling appears to contravene the constitutional principles of double jeopardy and due process. It has been held that once a legal sentence has been imposed, as opposed to when a convict has actually begun serving his sentence, ² it cannot be increased.

"It is more consonant, we think, with the spirit of the concept of due process of law and the prohibition of double jeopardy, to say that when a valid sentence has been imposed, deliberately and intentionally, formal allocution has been conducted, and judgment of conviction and sentence entered of record, it cannot, in the absence of fraud or another [compelling] reason ... be so changed at any time thereafter as to increase the severity of the sentence, rather than to make a time limit thereon dependent upon the vagaries of when the sentence commences to run."

Brown v. State, 376 So.2d 1382, 1391 (Ala.Cr.App.1979). ³ As noted in Brown, "once a valid sentence is imposed upon a defendant, the trial court loses the power" to increase that sentence. Id. at 1385 (quoting People v. Johnson, 60 Mich.App. 371, 230 N.W.2d 438 (1975)). Thus, while the Hill Court considered the question of the trial court's jurisdiction in regard only to the 30-day jurisdictional limit ⁴ and the issue of the right to a speedy trial, the trial court was without the power to increase the sentence because of the principles double jeopardy--an issue not explicitly considered by the Hill Court.

Other jurisdictions also considered the issue of belated restitution orders. See Harris v. State, 261 Ga. 859, 413 S.E.2d 439 (1992), Kaess v. State, 748 P.2d 698 (Wyo.1987), and Grice v. State, 528 So.2d 1347 (Fla.App.1988).

II. & III.

For the purposes of the disposition of this appeal, we will address the second and third issues raised by the appellant together: Whether the trial court erred in ordering restitution before holding a hearing pursuant § 15-18-67; and whether the trial court erred by ordering restitution in the absence of the appellant or his attorney.

The initial restitution order was improperly granted because there was no hearing before to the restitution order was issued.

"Section 15-18-67, Code of Alabama 1975, provides that the court 'shall hold' a restitution hearing to determine pecuniary loss to a crime victim, at which time '[t]he defendant, the victim or victims, or their representatives ... as well as the district attorney shall have the right to be present and be heard upon the issue of restitution ... ' (emphasis added in Williams ) See also Rule 10(a)(5), Ala. Cr.Crim. P. Temp. ('[Restitution] ... shall be determined by the court from evidence presented at the sentence hearing if not stipulated by the parties.')

"Because a defendant has the right to the presence of counsel at sentencing, Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 88 S.Ct. 254, 19 L.Ed.2d 336 (1967); Ex parte Anderson, 434 So.2d 737 (Ala.1983), the court may not proceed without counsel or a waiver of counsel. In the absence of defendant's waiver of counsel or a stipulation by the parties as to the amount of restitution, neither of which appears of record here, the trial court was not authorized by the constitution (U.S. Const. Amend VI) or by statute (Ala. Code, § 15-18-67) to order restitution in the absence of the defendant and his attorney."

Williams v. State, 506 So.2d 368, 372 (Ala.Cr.App.1986) (emphasis original).

For this reason, this case must be remanded for a hearing consistent with the requirements of the Restitution to Victims of Crimes Act. As instructions to the trial court, we adopt the following:

"[T]his case is remanded to the trial court with instructions that, unless the parties agree upon the amount of restitution, see Humber v. State, 481 So.2d 452, 453 (Ala.Cr.App.1985), an evidentiary hearing shall be conducted at which the State is given the opportunity to prove, by legal evidence...