Jones v. Barnhart, CIV.A. 03-G-2355-W.
| Decision Date | 19 May 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. CIV.A. 03-G-2355-W.,CIV.A. 03-G-2355-W. |
| Citation | 318 F.Supp.2d 1102 |
| Parties | Geneva C. JONES, Plaintiff, v. Jo Anne B. BARNHART, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama |
Darryl W Hunt, Clark & James LLC, Birmingham, AL, for Geneva C. Jones, plaintiff.
Alice H. Martin, U.S. Attorney, Edward Q. Ragland, U.S. Attorney's Office, Birmingham, AL, Mary Ann Sloan, Roy F. Satterwhite, III, Social Security Administration-Office of General Counsel, Atlanta, GA, for Jo Anne B. Barnhart, Commissioner of Social Security Administration, defendant.
Plaintiff brings this action pursuant to the provisions of section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, [hereinafter the Act], 42 U.S.C. § 405(g),1 seeking judicial review of a final adverse decision of the Commissioner of Social Security [hereinafter Commissioner]. Application for a period of disability and disability insurance benefits under sections 216(i) and 223 of the Social Security Act, as amended, was filed July 21, 2000, as was an application for SSI as provided under Section 1601 of the Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381 et seq. These applications were denied initially and upon reconsideration. Request for a hearing before an administrative law judge [hereinafter ALJ] [Jerry C. Shirley] was granted, and a hearing was held September 12, 2001. The ALJ's decision to deny benefits was handed down November 29, 2001. Plaintiff's request for review by the Appeals Council was denied June 26, 2003. An appeal to this court followed.
Plaintiff is a 56 year old female with a twelfth grade education. Past relevant work is as a seamstress/sewing machine operator and clothing inspector. She last worked July 1, 2000, because of trouble with her back. Although she has many medical problems she claims her main medical problem is pain.
In describing her pain plaintiff says she has trouble lifting and bending. Pain is present when she sits and walks. The maximum length of time she is able to sit without pain is 20 minutes. Standing relieves some of the pressure. She is able to sit back down after about 20 minutes. Plaintiff is able to stand about five minutes before she feels sharp pain down her leg and back. She sometimes describes the pain as "burning." Walking is painful. Pain radiates from her lower back down her right leg and into the foot.
Medical problems documented in the record include the following:
1) Hidradenitis Suppurative with multiple drainage and irrigations;2
2) Numerous rectal operations with very painful rectal abscesses with chronic fistula;
3) Marked peri-anal disease;
4) Anemia;
5) Gastroesophageal reflux disease [GERD], once described as severe gastroesophageal reflux disease with moderate distal esophagitis;
6) Irritable bowel disease/colitis/gastritis;
7) Acute pancreatitis with gastritis;
8) Peripheral neuropathy;3 9) Chronic low back pain with diagnoses of degenerative disc disease and sciatica;
10) Hypertension;
11) Chronic obstructive pulmonary disease;
12) Vertigo with dizziness and lightheadedness;
13) Depression;
14) Social anxiety disorder.4
Plaintiff's treating physician Dr. Kimberly Hillman5 completed a "Clinical Assessment of Pain" form in which she rated plaintiff's pain. She opined that plaintiff's pain is present to such an extent as to be distracting to adequate performance of daily activities or work. Physical activity greatly increases pain to such a degree as to cause distraction from tasks or total abandonment of them. Drug side effects can be expected to be severe and to limit her effectiveness due to distraction, inattention, drowsiness, etc. Dr. Hillman stated that plaintiff has underlying medical conditions consistent with the pain she experiences. ALJ Shirley discounted Dr. Hillman's evaluation with the following words:
Dr. Hillman completed a pain assessment form and the undersigned finds it is inconsistent with her own treating records. The undersigned notes the claimant's pain has been described as "mild" and/or "minimal" by both consultative examiner and by Dr. Hillman. Also, the treatment records of Dr. Hillman do not indicate any clinical testing being performed to explain the reason for the claimant's alleged pain. The assessment of Dr. Hillman is apparently based, primarily on the claimant's subjective complaints and not on his clinical findings as reflected in the record..6 Accordingly, the undersigned assigns little weight to the opinion of Dr. Hillman concerning the level of the claimant's pain and finds that the claimant may reasonably be expected to have moderate or less pain. The claimant's allegations of pain and her treatment records are found to be inconsistent by the undersigned7
As to the ALJ's assertion that Dr. Hillman's assessment is based on plaintiff's subjective complaints of pain, even were there not visible objective signs, not all diseases are diagnosed objectively. In discussing subjective pain, our circuit has said the following:
The Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have emphatically rejected the notion that to be disabling subjective claims of pain must be supported by objective medical evidence or by clinical or laboratory findings. Walden v. Schweiker, 672 F.2d 835, 840 (); Benson v. Schweiker, 652 F.2d 406, 408-09 (5th Cir.1981) () Ware v. Schweiker, 651 F.2d 408, 412 (5th Cir.1981) ()
Wiggins v. Schweiker, 679 F.2d 1387, 1390-91 (11th Cir.1982).
"The function of a reviewing court is limited to determining whether the Secretary's findings are supported by substantial evidence considering the evidence as a whole." Mims v. Califano, 581 F.2d 1211, 1213 (5th Cir.1978). "Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance." Bloodsworth v. Heckler, 703 F.2d 1233, 1239 (11th Cir. 1983). It is such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 1427, 28 L.Ed.2d 842, 852 (1971). The court is still responsible for scrutinizing "`the record in its entirety to ascertain whether substantial evidence supports each essential administrative finding.'" Boyd v. Heckler, 704 F.2d 1207, 1209 (11th Cir.1983) (quoting Walden v. Schweiker, 672 F.2d 835, 838 (11th Cir.1982)). The Eleventh Circuit has gone on to state the following:
Our limited review does not, however, mean automatic affirmance, for although we defer to both the Secretary's factfinding and her policy judgments, we must still make certain that she has exercised reasoned decision making. To this end, we evaluate the Secretary's findings in light of the entire record, not only that evidence which supports her position.
Owens v. Heckler, 748 F.2d 1511 (11th Cir.1984).
The court must further consider whether the decision of the Commissioner contains a material error of law. In Walker v. Bowen, 826 F.2d 996, 999 (11th Cir.1987), the court held:
Despite this limited review, we scrutinize the record in its entirety to determine the reasonableness of the secretary's factual findings. Bridges, 815 F.2d at 624; Arnold v. Heckler, 732 F.2d 881, 883 (11th Cir.1984). No similar presumption of validity attaches to the Secretary's legal conclusions, including determination of the proper standards to be applied in evaluating claims. Wiggins v. Schweiker, 679 F.2d 1387, 1389 (11th Cir.1982).
Having evaluated the evidence, the court holds that substantial evidence does not support the decision denying disability benefits. Improper legal standards were applied. The ALJ failed to apply the pain standard set by the Eleventh Circuit. The ALJ failed to give proper credence to the opinion of the treating physician. The ALJ failed to consider the combination of plaintiff's impairments.
Whenever a claimant asserts disability through testimony of pain or other subjective symptoms, the Eleventh Circuit standard requires:
1. evidence of an underlying medical condition and either
2) objective medical evidence confirming the severity of the alleged pain arising from that condition or
3) that the objectively determined medical condition is of such severity that it can reasonably be expected to cause the alleged pain.
Holt v. Sullivan, 921 F.2d 1221, 1223 (11th Cir.1991). See also Elam v. Railroad Retirement Board, 921 F.2d 1210, 1215 (11th Cir.1991); Lamb v. Bowen, 847 F.2d 698, 702 (11th Cir.1988); Hand v. Heckler, 761 F.2d 1545, 1548 (11th Cir.1985).
More recently, in Wilson v. Barnhart, 284 F.3d 1219, 1225 (11th Cir.2002), the court announced the pain standard as follows:
In order to establish a disability based on testimony of pain and other symptoms, the claimant must satisfy two parts of a three-part test showing: (1) evidence of an underlying medical condition; and (2) either (a) objective medical evidence confirming the severity of the alleged pain; or (b) that the objectively determined medical condition can reasonably be expected to give rise to the claimed pain.
In Brown v. Sullivan, 921 F.2d 1233 (11th Cir.1991), the court said:
The claimant's subjective testimony supported by medical evidence that satisfies the standard is itself sufficient to support a finding of disability. Hale...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Britni L. v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin.
...2020) (remanding for further consideration where the record contained contradictory medical opinions); but see Jones v. Barnhart, 318 F. Supp. 2d 1102, 1107-08 (N. D. Ala. 2004) (remanding for an award of benefits when the record, including the opinion of the claimant's treating physician, ......