Jones v. Boykan

• Decision Date: 06 February 2013
• Docket Number: SJC–11095.,SJC–11276
• Parties: Lucy JONES & others v. Ronald BOYKAN & others.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

464 Mass. 285
982 N.E.2d 1093

Lucy JONES & others ¹
v.
Ronald BOYKAN & others.²

SJC–11276, SJC–11095.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts,
Hampden.

Argued Oct. 2, 2012.
Decided Feb. 6, 2013.

[982 N.E.2d 1095]

Garry Teixeira for Lucy Jones & others.

Patricia Bobba Donovan (Lisa C. deSousa, Associate City Solicitor, with her) for Ronald Boykan & others.

Present: IRELAND, C.J., SPINA, CORDY, BOTSFORD, & GANTS, JJ.

BOTSFORD, J.

[464 Mass. 286]This case arises out of a violent altercation in 1999 involving the plaintiffs, Lucy Jones, Nicole Jones, William Owens, and Sierra Jones, and the defendant, Officer Ronald Boykan of the Springfield police department (department). More than thirteen years later, with a procedural history that features missteps by many, the case arrives before us on limited further appellate review. See Jones v. Boykan, 79 Mass.App.Ct. 464, 947 N.E.2d 87 (2011)( Jones II ). In Jones II, the Appeals Court ordered the reinstatement of a 2004 default judgment against Boykan and the defendant city of Springfield (city). Id. at 471, 947 N.E.2d 87. We also have before us on direct appellate review an order of the Superior Court dated March 30, 2012, that amended the 2004 default judgment to correct a clerical error and that reinstated it. For the reasons we explain hereafter, we conclude that the case must be remanded to the Superior Court for another hearing to assess damages.

1. Background. The Appeals Court's decision describes the factual background underlying this case. See Jones II, 79 Mass.App.Ct. at 465, 947 N.E.2d 87. In summary, the plaintiffs filed a complaint in the Superior Court in June, 2003, alleging that in June of 1999, Boykan, acting in his capacity as a Springfield police officer, entered the plaintiffs' convenience store, forced his way into a restricted area of the store, arrested two of the plaintiffs, Nicole ³ and Owens, and beat all of the plaintiffs. Nicole and Owens were charged with disorderly conduct and assault and battery on a police officer, but ultimately were acquitted of these crimes [464 Mass. 287]by a jury. In the meantime, the plaintiffs lost their business—the store—and suffered physical and emotional injuries.

The plaintiffs, representing themselves, filed their complaint in the Superior Court on June 12, 2003. We summarize below the procedural history that followed the filing of the complaint.

The complaint named Boykan and the department as defendants and contained claims for assault and battery, violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1994), and violation of G.L. c. 93A.

By September 23, 2003, the plaintiffs had served the defendants by hand delivery and certified mail. Although Boykan

[982 N.E.2d 1096]

was served at his place of business, the police station, rather than at his last known residence as directed by Mass. R. Civ. P. 4(d)(1), as amended, 370 Mass. 918 (1976), he concedes that he had actual notice of the complaint in 2003.

The defendants did not answer the complaint. Instead, they served on the plaintiffs a motion to dismiss under Mass. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), 365 Mass. 754 (1974), to which the plaintiffs served an opposition. The defendants, however, never filed the motion or the plaintiffs' opposition with the court.

The docket reflects that between September, 2003, and July, 2004, the defendants received notice of filings and court events in the action on at least nine occasions. The defendants, however, failed to respond to the complaint, provide discovery, or appear for any motion hearings, the final pretrial conference, the hearing on the plaintiffs' request for default, or the subsequent hearing to assess damages.

A default against the defendants was entered in June, 2004. After a hearing to assess damages held on July 21, at which the plaintiffs were represented by counsel for the first time and where the defendants again failed to appear despite notice, the judge ordered a default judgment “without prejudice” to be entered against the defendants pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(2), as amended, 423 Mass. 1401 (1996). The default judgment awarded the plaintiffs damages in the amount of $1 million, the figure listed on the plaintiffs' civil action cover sheet. It appears from the docket entries that the court sent notice to the defendants on July 26 that judgment in the amount of $1 million was to enter; a default judgment in that amount ultimately was entered on the docket on August 9, 2004.

[464 Mass. 288]On August 4, 2004, before the actual entry of judgment, the defendants filed an emergency motion under Mass. R. Civ. P. 60(b), 365 Mass. 828 (1974), to vacate judgment and to move for reconsideration. In that motion, the defendants argued that their inaction constituted excusable neglect under rule 60(b)(1); the judgment was void under rule 60(b)(4), because the complaint was served untimely and improperly; and the judgment should be vacated under rule 60(b)(6), to accomplish justice due to the defendants' valid statute of limitations and factual defenses.

The motion judge denied the defendants' motion in a memorandum of decision and order dated October 22, 2004, concluding that the grounds cited by the defendants for relief under rule 60(b) lacked merit, and that “[j]ustice would not be served by relieving the defendants from their conscious, extended, and unjustified inattention to this case.” The judge explained that pursuant to the misnomer rule, the fact that the complaint named the Springfield police department as a defendant instead of the city was not fatal to the plaintiffs' claims against the city, because the city was the intended defendant and had been served, and had waived the defense of misnomer by not raising it in a responsive pleading. The judge also concluded that the plaintiffs actually had intended to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994 & Supp. II), and not § 1982, and pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P. 8(f), 365 Mass. 749 (1974) ( “[a]ll pleadings shall be so construed as to do substantial justice”), ruled that the complaint shall be read to reference § 1983.

On November 2, 2004, the defendants filed a second motion pursuant to rule 60(b), combining it with an emergency motion for reconsideration of the October 22, 2004, order. In the second motion, the defendants repeated their earlier, rejected claims and added some new ones. Specifically, they argued that their conduct constituted

[982 N.E.2d 1097]

excusable neglect under rule 60(b)(1); relief was warranted pursuant to rule 60(b)(3), because the judgment was based on the plaintiffs' fraud; improper service on Boykan and misnomer of the city rendered the judgment void against these defendants under rule 60(b)(4); and the motion judge erred in failing to hear evidence or make requisite factual findings in arriving at the $1 million damages assessment.

In a memorandum of decision and order dated June 30, 2005, [464 Mass. 289]the motion judge declined to adopt the defendants' claims under rule 60(b)(1) and (3). However, the judge allowed the defendants' motion to vacate the entire judgment of default against Boykan pursuant to rule 60(b)(4), concluding that Boykan had not waived proper service of process. The judge also vacated the assessment of damages against the city, concluding that he had erroneously entered judgment in the amount sought by the plaintiffs “based entirely on the request and representations of the plaintiffs' counsel,” and therefore the award was not based on competent evidence. The motion judge ordered that a new hearing be held to assess damages against the city.

The damages hearing against the city was scheduled for March 23, 2006. There were hearings held in the case on March 23 and March 30, but the motion judge did not assess damages on either date. Instead, on both hearing dates the defendants argued extensively to the judge that the plaintiffs would not be entitled to recover damages against the city in connection with the default judgment because the plaintiffs' complaint failed to state any claim for which relief could be granted, citing Productora e Importadora de Papel, S.A. de C.V. v. Fleming, 376 Mass. 826, 383 N.E.2d 1129 (1978)( Productora ). After much discussion, the motion judge offered the plaintiffs the opportunity to file an amended complaint in light of the defendants' arguments.

The plaintiffs filed an amended complaint on April 25, 2006, again naming Boykan and the department as defendants and setting forth the same claims presented in their original complaint in addition to a claim for false arrest. Their second amended complaint filed on June 26 formally added the city as a defendant.

The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs' amended complaint. On July 27, 2006, a different Superior Court judge dismissed all the plaintiffs' claims, except the tort claims of Lucy and Sierra against Boykan and the § 1983 claim of Lucy against Boykan, for failure to comply with the applicable statutes of limitations and to state a claim on which relief can be granted. On February 16, 2007, a third judge in the Superior Court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on Lucy's and Sierra's remaining claims against Boykan. An amended final judgment dismissing the amended complaint entered on April 12, 2007. The plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal in the Superior Court [464 Mass. 290]on May 9, 2007, but a judge in that court dismissed the notice of appeal as untimely. The Appeals Court reversed the dismissal of the notice of appeal, Jones v. Boykan, 74 Mass.App.Ct. 213, 905 N.E.2d 132 (2009)( Jones I ),S.C., Jones II, supra, and the appeal proceeded thereafter in the Appeals Court.

On May 11, 2011, the Appeals Court issued its decision on the plaintiffs' appeal. Jones II, supra at 464, 947 N.E.2d 87. The court concluded that the motion judge's June 30, 2005, memorandum of decision and order, in which he had vacated the default judgment against Boykan under rule 60(b), and ordered a new hearing to assess damages against...