Jones v. Brent York & Adams Cnty.

• Docket Number: 2022AP1128
• Decision Date: 07 July 2023
• Parties: Brenda Jones, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Brent York and Adams County, Defendants-Respondents.
• Court: Wisconsin Court of Appeals

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Brenda Jones, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Brent York and Adams County, Defendants-Respondents.

No. 2022AP1128

Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, District IV

July 7, 2023

This opinion will not be published. See Wis. Stat. Rule 809.23(1)(b)5.

APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for Adams County, No 2021CV52 TODD L. ZIEGLER, Judge. Affirmed.

Before Blanchard, P.J., Kloppenburg, and Fitzpatrick, JJ.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in Wis.Stat. Rule 809.23(3).

PER CURIAM.

¶1 Brenda Jones appeals an order of the Adams County Circuit Court granting summary judgment in favor of Adams County ("the County") and Brent York (collectively, "the defendants") based on Jones' failure to comply with the statutory notice requirements set forth under Wis.Stat § 893.80(1d) (2021-22).^[1] As pertinent to this appeal § 893.80(1d) requires that a plaintiff such as Jones provide certain government entities and their employees with written notice of injury prior to initiating a lawsuit against such defendants based on that injury. Sec 893.80(1d)(a). However, the plaintiff need not provide written notice of injury if the defendants had "actual notice" of the plaintiff's claim and the plaintiff "shows to the satisfaction of the court" that defendants were not prejudiced by the plaintiff's failure to provide notice of injury. Id. Jones concedes that she did not provide written notice of injury under § 893.80(1d)(a). Nonetheless, Jones argues that summary judgment should not have been granted. First, Jones contends that the defendants waived the requirements of § 893.80(1d)(a), and we reject that contention. Second, Jones argues that there are genuine issues of material fact as to whether the defendants were prejudiced by her failure to provide written notice of injury. We disagree and conclude that Jones has not rebutted the prima facie case of prejudice established by evidence submitted by the defendants by presenting evidence that raises any genuine issue of fact as to whether the defendants were prejudiced. Therefore, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 There is no dispute as to the following material facts.

¶3 Jones' house burned in 2013. Brent York, an investigator for the Adams County Sheriff's Department at that time, investigated the cause of the fire.

Based in part on York's investigation, Jones was charged with arson in connection with the fire. After a two-day jury trial in which both York and Jones testified, Jones was convicted of arson in May 2016. Jones filed a postconviction motion, and a circuit court granted a new trial based on ineffective assistance of Jones' trial counsel. In November 2018, before the new trial began, the State dismissed all charges against Jones.

¶4 In August 2019-over nine months after the criminal charges against Jones were dismissed-Jones filed a lawsuit in federal court against York and the Adams County Sheriff's Department. In that lawsuit, Jones alleged that York provided false testimony about his investigation and violated Jones' rights under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), by withholding or losing exculpatory evidence. Based on these allegations, Jones asserted various federal civil rights claims as well as state law claims for malicious prosecution, supervisor liability, intentional and negligent misrepresentation, and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Jones did not provide the defendants with statutory notice of her claims or the circumstances of her claims under Wis.Stat. § 893.80(1d)(a) before filing the federal lawsuit.

¶5 In October 2019, while her lawsuit was pending in federal court, Jones served the County with a letter giving notice of her claims (the "Notice Letter"). Jones' Notice Letter quoted her federal complaint verbatim and included a claim for itemized damages.

¶6 In answer to Jones' federal court complaint, the defendants asserted a number of affirmative defenses, including that Jones' state law claims were barred because she failed to comply with the notice requirements of Wis.Stat. § 893.80(1d). The defendants filed a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of Jones' federal civil rights claims on the merits and relinquishment to state court of the federal court's supplemental jurisdiction over Jones' state law claims. In April 2021, the federal court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismissed Jones' federal civil rights claims with prejudice. The court did not consider the merits of the defendants' argument about lack of notice under § 893.80(1d) and, instead, relinquished to state court supplemental jurisdiction over Jones' state law claims and dismissed those claims without prejudice.

¶7 In May 2021, Jones filed a complaint in the circuit court that asserted the same facts and state law claims that she alleged in her federal lawsuit. The defendants moved to dismiss Jones' claims on multiple grounds, including that she failed to provide proper notice under Wis.Stat. § 893.80(1d)(a). As pertinent to this appeal, § 893.80(1d)(a) requires that a plaintiff provide a written "notice of injury" to certain government entities and their employees before filing a lawsuit against those parties. Clark v. League of Wis. Muns. Mut. Ins. Co., 2021 WI.App. 21, ¶12, 397 Wis.2d 220, 959 N.W.2d 648 (citing § 893.80(1d)(a)). This notice can be satisfied in one of two ways: (1) by serving a "formal notice of injury" within 120 days of the event giving rise to the claim; or (2) by proving that the defendants had "actual notice" of the claim and that "the delay or failure to give the requisite [formal] notice has not been prejudicial" to the defendants. Id., ¶¶13-14 (citing § 893.80(1d)(a)). In their motion to dismiss, the defendants argued that Jones did not satisfy these notice requirements because she failed to provide formal notice of injury within 120 days of the events giving rise to her claims. The defendants also argued that each was prejudiced by Jones' failure to provide formal notice of injury.

¶8 The circuit court treated the defendants' motion to dismiss as a motion for summary judgment and granted summary judgment in the defendants' favor.^[2] Accordingly, the court dismissed Jones' claims with prejudice. Jones appeals.

¶9 Additional material facts are provided in the following discussion.

DISCUSSION

¶10 On appeal, Jones argues that her claims are not barred by the notice requirements of Wis.Stat. § 893.80(1d) because the defendants waived their argument regarding § 893.80(1d). Jones also argues that, even if the defendants did not waive that argument, her claims are not barred by § 893.80(1d) because the defendants had "actual notice" of those claims and she has established that the defendants were not prejudiced by her failure to provide formal notice of injury within 120 days. We begin by setting forth governing principles and our standard of review regarding summary judgment and statutory interpretation.

I. Governing Principles and Standard of Review Regarding Summary Judgment and Statutory Interpretation.

¶11 We review a circuit court's decision granting or denying summary judgment independently, but we apply the same methodology as the circuit court. Mrozek v. Intra Fin. Corp., 2005 WI 73, ¶14, 281 Wis.2d 448, 699 N.W.2d 54. On summary judgment, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Wis.Stat. § 802.08(2); see Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. Klomsten, 2018 WI.App. 25, ¶31, 381 Wis.2d 218, 911 N.W.2d 364.

¶12 In reviewing the defendants' motion for summary judgment, we apply the following methodology.^[3] We consider the defendants' affidavits and other proof to determine whether those parties have made a prima facie case for summary judgment under Wis.Stat. § 802.08(2). L.L.N. v. Clauder, 209 Wis.2d 674, 683, 563 N.W.2d 434 (1997). When, as here, the defendants are the moving parties, the defendants must establish a defense that defeats Jones' causes of action. Id. at 683 n.6. If the defendants have made a prima facie case for summary judgment, the opposing party (here, Jones) "must show, by affidavit or other proof, the existence of disputed material facts or undisputed material facts from which reasonable alternative inferences may be drawn that are sufficient to entitle the opposing party to a trial." Id. at 683. When determining whether there is a "genuine issue of material fact," the affidavits and other proof submitted by the parties "are viewed in a light most favorable" to the party opposing summary judgment. Id. at 684.

¶13 This appeal also requires us to interpret Wis.Stat. § 893.80(1d). Statutory interpretation and the application of statutes to undisputed facts are questions of law that this court reviews de novo. Landis v. Physicians Ins. Co. of Wis., Inc., 2001 WI 86, ¶¶12-13, 245 Wis.2d 1, 628 N.W.2d 893. "[S]tatutory interpretation 'begins with the language of the statute. If the meaning of the statute is plain, we ordinarily stop the inquiry.'" State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Ct. for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis.2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110 (citation omitted). "Statutory language is given its common, ordinary, and accepted meaning, except that technical or specially-defined words or phrases are given their technical or special definitional meaning." Id.

II. The Defendants Did Not Waive Their Wis. Stat. § 893.80(1d) Defense.

¶14 As noted, Jones argues that the defendants waived the right to assert a Wis.Stat. §...