Jones v. Buckner, 2:12–cv–2749–LSC.

• Decision Date: 09 August 2013
• Docket Number: No. 2:12–cv–2749–LSC.,2:12–cv–2749–LSC.
• Parties: Ahmad R. JONES, Plaintiff, v. Nancy T. BUCKNER, et. al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama

963 F.Supp.2d 1267

Ahmad R. JONES, Plaintiff,

v.Nancy T. BUCKNER, et. al., Defendants.

No. 2:12–cv–2749–LSC.

United States District Court,

N.D. Alabama,

Southern Division.

Aug. 9, 2013.

Lee W. Loder, Loder PC, Birmingham, AL, for Plaintiff.

Jennifer M. Bush, Sharon E. Ficquette, Alabama Department of Human Resources, Legal Office, Montgomery, AL, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION

L. SCOTT COOGLER, District Judge.

I. Introduction

This is a case based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 28 U.S.C. § 2201, Alabama Code § 6–6–222, and Alabama common law. Ahmad R. Jones (“Plaintiff”) claims that the actions of Nancy T. Buckner (“Buckner”), Alicia J. Fields (“Fields”), and Tyisha Thompson (“Thompson”) (collectively, “Defendants”) resulted in various constitutional, statutory, and state common law injuries when a ministerial error caused a complaint for paternity to be filed against him. Plaintiff alleges that his lack of notice resulted in a default adjudication of paternity, and the Defendants' inaction after learning of their error continued to cause injury. Before the Court is Buckner's Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 12), and Fields and Thompson's Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. 30.) Both motions have been fully briefed and are ripe for decision.

II. Background

The Alabama Department of Human Resources (“DHR”), among other things, helps families establish paternity, obtains orders for payment of child support, and secures compliance with child support court orders. Buckner serves as Commissioner of the DHR. On February 24, 2011, Nina Miles (“Miles”) told Thompson, a case worker for the DHR, and C. Johnson (“Johnson”), legal counsel for the DHR, that the father of her child was Armad Jones. Thompson failed to verify the correct spelling of Armad Jones' name, and affixed Plaintiff's social security number and date of birth to their files after searching for Armad Jones' information on either the National Crime Information Center (“NCIC”) database, a state database, or through credit records. One month later, the DHR filed a complaint for paternity in the Family Court of Jefferson County, Alabama, on behalf of Miles, alleging that Plaintiff was the father of her child.

A default judgment was entered against Plaintiff adjudicating him as the father of Miles' child, resulting in a court order establishing paternity (“Paternity Order”). Plaintiff became aware of the Paternity Order when the DHR attempted to collect child support by garnishing his tax refund. Plaintiff contacted a DHR case worker, and informed the worker that he was not the father. Despite this, the DHR continued to enforce the Paternity Order against Plaintiff, causing his name to be reported in state and federal “dead beat dad” databases.

On or about March 9, 2012, Plaintiff again contacted the DHR, notifying them in writing that they had failed to take any corrective action. Less than one month later, Fields, a DHR caseworker, confirmed that Plaintiff was not the father and that the DHR had incorrectly spelled Armad Jones' name and associated Plaintiff's identifying information with their files. Despite this, Fields and Thompson took no corrective action. In fact, Fields caused an income withholding order (“IWO”) to be issued on June 11, 2012, garnishing Plaintiff's wages, and a delinquency to be reported to national credit bureaus on July 20, 2012. At some point, Plaintiff filed a grievance regarding the paternity determination. On August 1, 2012, the Family Court of Jefferson County reversed the Paternity Order, terminated the IWO, suspended current child support, reduced Plaintiff's child support arrears balance to zero, and ordered the DHR to return any money being held—including money held for a 2011 tax refund offset. (Doc. 4–2 at 10.) ¹ Following this disestablishment of paternity, Plaintiff's passport was denied and his credit reports continue to list the erroneous information.

Plaintiff filed the present action on August 21, 2012 (Doc. 1), and amended his complaint on September 14, 2012 (Doc. 7), alleging several claims against the Defendants based on § 1983, state law, and federal as well as state declaratory judgment statutes. Initially, this action was brought against the State of Alabama, Buckner, Fields, Thompson, and Johnson. However, Plaintiff has since moved to dismiss the State of Alabama, Buckner in her individual capacity, and Johnson. (Docs. 17, 33.) Further, he has given notice of withdrawal of his claims based on intentional conduct. (Doc. 17.) The only remaining defendants are Buckner in her official capacity, and Fields and Thompson in their official and individual capacities.

III. Standard

A defendant may move to dismiss a complaint pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) if the plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. “When considering a motion to dismiss, all facts set forth in the plaintiff's complaint' are to be accepted as true and the court limits its consideration to the pleadings and exhibits attached thereto.' ” Grossman v. Nationsbank, N.A., 225 F.3d 1228, 1231 (11th Cir.2000) (quoting GSW, Inc. v. Long County, 999 F.2d 1508, 1510 (11th Cir.1993)). Further, all “reasonable inferences” are drawn in favor of the plaintiff. St. George v. Pinellas County, 285 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th Cir.2002).

While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the “grounds” of his “entitle[ment] to relief” requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact).

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) (internal citations omitted).² The plaintiff must plead “enough facts to state a claim that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955. Unless a plaintiff has “nudged [his] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible, [the] complaint must be dismissed.” Id.

“[U]nsupported conclusions of law or of mixed fact and law have long been recognized not to prevent a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal.” Dalrymple v. Reno, 334 F.3d 991, 996 (11th Cir.2003) (quoting Marsh v. Butler County, Ala., 268 F.3d 1014, 1036 n. 16 (11th Cir.2001)). And, “where the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not ‘show[n]’—‘that the pleader is entitled to relief.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1950, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2)). Therefore, the Supreme Court suggested that courts adopt a “two-pronged approach” when considering motions to dismiss: “1) eliminate any allegations in the complaint that are merely legal conclusions; and 2) where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, ‘assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.’ ” American Dental Ass'n v. Cigna Corp., 605 F.3d 1283, 1290 (11th Cir.2010) (quoting Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1950).

Importantly, “courts may infer from the factual allegations in the complaint ‘obvious alternative explanation[s],’ which suggest lawful conduct rather than the unlawful conduct the plaintiff would ask the court to infer.” Id. (quoting Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1951–52). However, “[a] complaint may not be dismissed because the plaintiff's claims do not support the legal theory he relies upon since the court must determine if the allegations provide for relief on any possible theory.” Brooks, 116 F.3d at 1369.

IV. Discussion

Plaintiff brings all Counts against the Defendants in their official capacities, and against Fields and Thompson in their individual capacity. The Court will address the individual capacity claims first.

A. Claims against Fields and Thompson in their Individual Capacities

1. § 1983 Claims

Fields and Thompson argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity as to Plaintiff's § 1983 claims asserted against them in their individual capacity. Qualified immunity shields governmental officers from “liability for civil damages if their actions did not violate ‘clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.’ ” Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739, 122 S.Ct. 2508, 153 L.Ed.2d 666 (2002) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818, 102 S.Ct. 2727, 73 L.Ed.2d 396 (1982)).

To support their qualified immunity defense, Fields and Thompson “must first prove that [they were] acting within the scope of [their] discretionary authority when the allegedly wrongful acts occurred.” Mathews v. Crosby, 480 F.3d 1265, 1269 (11th Cir.2007). A defendant acts within his discretionary authority when the acts in question “are of a type that fell within the employee's job responsibilities.” Holloman ex rel. Holloman v. Harland, 370 F.3d 1252, 1265 (11th Cir.2004). To determine this, the Court must ask whether Fields and Thompson were “(a) performing a legitimate job-related function (that is, pursuing a job-related goal), (b) through means that were within [their] power to utilize.” Id. “To that end, ‘a court must ask whether the act complained of, if done for a proper purpose, would be within, or reasonably related to, the outer perimeter of an official's discretionary duties.’ ” Gray ex rel. Alexander v. Bostic, 458 F.3d 1295, 1303 (11th Cir.2006) (quoting Harbert Int'l v. James, 157 F.3d 1271, 1282 (11th Cir.1998)).

Fields and Thompson argue that they were acting within the scope of their discretionary authority based on Alabama Code § 38–10–3, which provides that the DHR “shall operate child support programs as may be required under the provisions of Title IV–D [of the Social Security Act], including, but not limited to, locating absent parents, establishing paternity,...