Jones v. CCBCC, Inc.

• Decision Date: 18 December 2019
• Docket Number: Civil Case No. SAG-19-0467
• Parties: DONNELL JONES, Plaintiff, v. CCBCC, INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maryland

DONNELL JONES, Plaintiff, v. CCBCC, INC., Defendant.

Civil Case No. SAG-19-0467

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

December 18, 2019

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Plaintiff Donnell Jones ("Plaintiff") filed this case against his former employer, CCBCC, Inc. ("Defendant"), alleging disability discrimination, failure to accommodate, and wrongful termination in violation of Maryland state law.¹ ECF 1-3. Discovery is now concluded, and the parties have filed cross-motions for summary judgment, along with various oppositions, replies, and supplements. ECF 26, 27, 28, 29, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46. I have reviewed the filings, and have determined that no hearing is necessary. See Loc. R. 105.6 (D. Md. 2018). For the reasons that follow, I will deny Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF 38, and grant Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF 42.

I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff began working for Coca-Cola Refreshments ("CCR") in October, 2002, in a position requiring him to hold a Commercial Driver's License ("CDL").² ECF 42-3 (Borella Dep.)at 23:20-23; ECF 42-4 (Plaintiff Dep.) at 10:2-7; 39:12-40:2. As a delivery merchandiser, Plaintiff drove a truck to deliver Coca-Cola products to customers in Maryland. ECF 42-4 at 107:4-109:1. At all relevant times, Plaintiff suffered from a detached retina in his right eye, which left him unable to pass the physical examination administered to CDL holders. ECF 42-5, Response 16. CCR required Plaintiff to obtain Maryland's intrastate vision waiver to maintain his position, which he did, last renewing his waiver in 2017. ECF 42-4 at 102:11-103:4; 111:5-11. During his entire tenure as a delivery merchandiser, Plaintiff performed his job duties without incident, and earned positive performance evaluations. ECF 42-2 (Padgett Dep.) at 36:13-22; ECF 43-18 (Cook Dep.) at 60:3-12; ECF 26-9 (Waters Dep.) at 21:10-21.

In April, 2016, Defendant acquired CCR. ECF 42-2 at 10:3-19. Plaintiff became an employee of Defendant as part of that transition. Id. (responding "I am" when asked if he is aware that Plaintiff transferred from Coca-Cola Refreshments to Defendant). Plaintiff's daily job remained the same after the transition, including his job description, his truck, his supervisors, and his compensation. ECF 42-4 at 158:17-159:5 (responding "That is correct" when questioner stated that his job description as a delivery merchandiser "didn't change" and that he had the same supervisors).

Defendant, as an interstate motor carrier, requires its drivers to comply with safety requirements imposed by the United States Department of Transportation ("USDOT"), including the USDOT vision waiver for employees unable to pass the required vision test. ECF 42-2 at 13:13-24; 24:14-20. In January, 2017, Plaintiff underwent his first required USDOT medical evaluation as an employee of Defendant, and he failed to meet the visual acuity requirement. ECF 43-22. Defendant's risk management company, Hireright, Inc. ("Hireright"), notified Defendant that Plaintiff would need the federal USDOT vision waiver in order to continue driving. ECF 42-4 at50:3-14; ECF 43-22 (email from Hireright stating, "So unfortunately for now his exam will report as unqualified until a copy of a Federal Vision Exemption is provided."). Upon notification that Plaintiff did not meet the relevant requirements, Defendant immediately removed Plaintiff from the role of delivery merchandiser, and informed him that he would need to obtain the interstate vision waiver. ECF 42-4 at 50: 2-14 ("And he explained to me that I could no longer drive."); see also ECF 42-3 at 110:17-25; ECF 42-7 (Wine Decl.) ¶ 4.

At Plaintiff's suggestion, Defendant allowed him to work by training new delivery merchandisers. ECF 42-4 at 50:15-51:11. As such, Plaintiff trained drivers from January 12, 2017 through February 9, 2017. Id. at 56: 16-21. Eventually, however, the training role was no longer needed. ECF 26-10 (Waters Dep.) at 60:6-16 (explaining that the company typically does not have a training position available). On February 9, 2017, Defendant provided Plaintiff with a letter noting that he did not have an approved Federal Vision Waiver, and stating:

At this time, you are being placed on a 60 day unpaid personal leave of absence. During this time, you are allowed to apply for open position [sic] for which you are qualified following our standard interview and selection process. . . . If at the end of 60 days, you have not been selected for another role then you will, at that time, be separated from the company.

ECF 43-28. Supervisory employees, Terry Waters and Craig Cook, met with Plaintiff on February 10, 2017, and instructed him to apply for open non-driving positions with the company. ECF 42-4 at 61:18-63:21. However, Plaintiff refused to sign the February 9, 2017 letter, left after work on February 10, 2017, and did not apply for any open positions. ECF 42-4 at 61: 21- 62: 6; ECF 42-5, Response 19.

On February 21, 2017, Plaintiff emailed the Human Resource ("HR") portal, stating:

This is my request for reasonable accommodations - while I am able to do my job duties, the company has added a new technical requirement - while that is being fixed, I request accommodations of assignment to other duties.

ECF 43-15. Plaintiff's email did not mention a disability. HR responded that it had forwarded his request to the appropriate HR representative, and that Plaintiff should expect a response soon thereafter. Id.; ECF 42-4 at 74:16-21; 75:1-6.

HR employees attempted to reach Plaintiff by telephone for several days. ECF 42-7 ¶ 5 ("After receiving Donnell Jones's February 21 request for accommodation, CCCI made several attempts to contact Mr. Jones to discuss his request."); ECF 43-17 (text exchanges between Plaintiff and Human Resources). On March 6, 2017, a Human Resource Business Partner, Angenella Fleming, spoke to Plaintiff by telephone. ECF 42-4 at 129:6-130:2. Following the conversation, Plaintiff texted Fleming to ask whether, if he received his interstate waiver while on leave, he could return to his prior position as delivery merchandiser without having to reapply. ECF 43-17. Fleming confirmed Plaintiff's understanding. ECF 42-4 at 76: 2-12.

In April, 2017, USDOT denied Plaintiff's application for an interstate vision waiver. ECF 42-4 at 77:3-21. Because Plaintiff could not fulfill the requirements to serve as a delivery merchandiser, and had not applied for any other positions, Defendant terminated his employment. See ECF 42-3 at 44:12-22. According to Plaintiff, he did not receive a letter of termination, and he emailed HR multiple times in April and May, 2017, inquiring about his job status. ECF 43-16.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Under Rule 56(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is appropriate only "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." The moving party bears the burden of showing that there is no genuine dispute of material facts. See Casey v. Geek Squad, 823 F. Supp. 2d 334, 348 (D. Md. 2011) (citing Pulliam Inv. Co. v. Cameo Props., 810 F.2d 1282, 1286 (4th Cir. 1987)). If the moving party establishes that there is no evidence to support the non-movingparty's case, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to proffer specific facts to show a genuine issue exists for trial. Id. The non-moving party must provide enough admissible evidence to "carry the burden of proof in [its] claim at trial." Id. at 349 (quoting Mitchell v. Data Gen. Corp., 12 F.3d 1310, 1315-16 (4th Cir. 1993)). The mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the non-moving party's position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find in its favor. Id. at 348 (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251 (1986)). Moreover, a genuine issue of material fact cannot rest on "mere speculation, or building one inference upon another." Id. at 349 (quoting Miskin v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 107 F. Supp. 2d 669, 671 (D. Md. 1999)).

Additionally, summary judgment shall be warranted if the non-moving party fails to provide evidence that establishes an essential element of the case. Id. at 352. The non-moving party "must produce competent evidence on each element of [its] claim." Id. at 348-49 (quoting Miskin, 107 F. Supp. 2d at 671). If the non-moving party fails to do so, "there can be no genuine issue as to any material fact," because the failure to prove an essential element of the case "necessarily renders all other facts immaterial." Id. at 352 (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Coleman v. United States, 369 F. App'x 459, 461 (4th Cir. 2010) (unpublished)). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a court must view all of the facts, including reasonable inferences to be drawn from them, "in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587-88 (1986) (quoting United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962)).

III. ANALYSIS

Plaintiff's Complaint contains three Counts, each brought pursuant to Maryland's Fair Employment Practices Act ("FEPA"), Maryland Code, State Gov't, Title 20 § 606: (1) discrimination on the basis of actual and/or perceived disability and/or record of impairment; (2)failure to accommodate; and (3) wrongful termination. In relevant part, FEPA provides that an employer may not:

fail or refuse to hire, discharge, or otherwise discriminate against any individual with respect to the individual's compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment because of . . . disability unrelated in nature and extent so as to reasonably preclude the performance of the employment.

§ 20-606(a)(1)(i). For each of Plaintiff's claims, then, he first must establish that he had a disability, in order to invoke FEPA's protections. See Peninsula Regional Medical...