Jones v. City of Arcadia

• Decision Date: 27 June 1941
• Citation: 147 Fla. 571,3 So.2d 338
• Parties: JONES v. CITY OF ARCADIA.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

3 So.2d 338

147 Fla. 571

JONES v. CITY OF ARCADIA.

Florida Supreme Court

June 27, 1941

Rehearing Denied Aug. 2, 1941.

En Banc.

Appeal from Circuit Court, DeSoto County; W. T Harrison, judge.

H. G Jones, of Arcadia, for appellant.

Leitner &amp Leitner, of Arcadia, for appellee.

BUFORD, Justice.

Two suits were filed by the City of Arcadia in the Circuit Court in and for DeSoto County, Florida, one against Mourning Jones and C. O. Johnson and the other against Mourning Jones and C. A. Lindsey, to foreclose certain tax certificates evidencing liens for unpaid municipal ad valorem taxes for the years 1926 and 1936, inclusive. The suits were consolidated. On final hearing decree was entered in favor of plaintiff.

The defendants interposed motions to dismiss and the defendant Jones interposed counterclaim. Motion to dismiss was denied. Counterclaim was stricken. Motions were amended and again stricken. Answers and counterclaims were filed. Portions of the answers were stricken and the amended counterclaim was stricken. Portions of the answers stricken constituted no defense to the cause of action. The counterclaim was untenable.

The bill of complaint was not without equity. It alleged sufficient facts to show the plaintiff entitled to the relief prayed under the public statutes, the contents of which the court was bound to take judicial cognizance.

The record shows that the City of Arcadia had the power granted by the legislature to levy taxes for municipal purposes. That the City of Arcadia proceeded to levy taxes for the several years referred to, supra, and that the taxes were not paid for either of such years. There were irregularities in the assessments and it may be conceded that these irregularities, if not duly cured by appropriate proceedings, were sufficient to constitute a lack of due process of law. However, all irregularities not amounting to a denial of due process of law were cured by the provisions of Chapter 16309, Special Acts of 1933, and by Chapter 19683, Special Acts of 1939, which were enacted for that purpose.

The proceedings with due notice and opportunity to be heard upon the merits of the tax claims afforded due process of law in enforcing the tax liens pursuant to the statutes, Chapter 6323, Acts of 1911.

The court below and this court is vound to take judicial cognizance of such acts of the legislature. See Charlotte Harbor & Northern Ry. Co. v. Welles, et al., 78 Fla. 227, 82 So. 770; Howarth v. City of DeLand, 117 Fla. 692, 158 So. 294; Atlantic Coast Line Ry. Co. v. Holliday, 73 Fla. 269, 74 So. 479; Amos v. Mosely, 74 Fla. 555, 77 So. 619, L.R.A.1918C, 482; Cranor v. Board of County Commissioners of Volusia County, 54 Fla. 526, 45 So. 455. And it is not necessary that those acts be pleaded, but it is sufficient that the pleading of the party who seeks to rely upon the statute shall set forth the facts which bring the case within it. See Dade County v. Miami, 77 Fla. 786, 82 So. 354; Atlantic Coast Line Ry. Co. v. State, 73 Fla. 609, 74 So. 595. The lack, if any, of due process of law in connection with the assessment of the tax is overcome by the provisions of the Charter Act, cited infra, requiring the enforcement of the tax to be by proceedings in chancery with notice duly served on the property owner. See Redman v. Kyle et al., 76 Fla. 79, 80 So. 300, and Anderson v. City of Ocala, 67 Fla. 204, 64 So. 775, 778, 52 L.R.A.,N.S., 287, in which we said:

'If the proceeding to enforce the assessment is in the nature of a judicial proceeding in which notice is given to the property owner and a full opportunity is given him to be heard upon the merits, such proceeding constitutes due process of law and no prior notice seems to be necessary.'

The record in this case shows that the defendants were duly served in the tax lien foreclosure suits and that they were given opportunity to be heard on all questions controlling the determination of the issues properly presented. While the record shows that some of the assessments were based upon an inflated valuation there is no showing of discrimination as between those property owners and others like situated, and it also shows that the municipality voluntarily agreed to accept less than the amount of the tax as shown by the assessment roll.

The final decree adjudicated the amount due for taxes and attorney's fees under the provisions of the statute, Chapter 6323, Acts of 1911, authorizing the tax liens of the City of Arcadia to be enforced by suits in chancery.

On the entire record no reversible error is made to appear and, therefore, the decree is affirmed.

So ordered.

BROWN, C. J., and WHITFIELD, TERRELL and ADAMS, JJ., concur.

THOMAS, J., agrees to conclusion.

CHAPMAN J., dissents.

CHAPMAN, Justice (dissenting).

The final decree assigned as error here decreed the payment by the appellant, Mourning Jones, of the sum of $5,309.26, as the amount due for taxes and attorney's fees due to the City of Arcadia as delinquent taxes for the years 1926 to 1936, inclusive, on the South 20 feet of Lot 3 and Lots 4 and 5 and Lots 6 to 13 of Block 1 of the original survey of the City of Arcadia. After suit was filed, the City Council reduced the valuation of the assessments on the property described in the final decree, with other property, and waived the payment of interest. While the two tax certificate foreclosure suits embracing land other than described in the final decree were by agreement of counsel and order of court dismissed prior to the entry of the final decree.

The testimony shows the reduced valuations made by the City Council of Arcadia after the institution of suit were viz:

                 ValuationYear Description Blk. as Reduced. Taxes1926 Lots 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 5a, 5b. 1. $25,000.00 $650.001926 Lots 6 to 13 both inc. 1. 22,000.00 572.001927 Lots 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 5a, 5b. 1. 25,000.00 500.001927 Lots 6 to 13 both inc. 1. 22,000.00 440.001928 Lots 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 5a, 5b. 1. 25,000.00 500.001928 Lots 6 to 13 both inc. 1. 21,000.00 420.001929 Lots 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 5a, 5b. 1. 20,000.00 400.001929 Lots 6 to 13 both inc. 1. 21,000.00 420.001930 Lots 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 5a, 5b. 1. 13,333.00 266.651930 Lots 6 to 13 both inc. 1. 14,000.00 280.001931 Lots 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 5a, 5b. 1. 13,333.00 266.601931 Lots 6 to 13 both inc. 1. 14,000.00 280.001932 Lots 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 5a, 5b. 1. 10,666.00 213.321932 Lots 6 to 13 both inc. 1. 11,000.00 220.001933 Lots 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 5a, 5b. 1. 9,333.00 196.661933 Lots 6 to 13 both inc. 1. 10,500.00 210.001934 Lots 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 5a, 5b. 1. 8,000.00 160.001934 Lots 6 to 13 both inc. 1. 9,000.00 180.001935 Lots 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 5a, 5b. 1. 8,000.00 220.001935 Lots 6 to 13 both inc. 1. 9,000.00 247.001936 Lots 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 5a, 5b. 1. 8,000.00 192.001936 Lots 6 to 13 both inc. 1. 13,000.00 312.00
                

The authority to sustain the City Council in reducing the valuations does not appear in the briefs.

It may be safe to assum that the City Council of Arcadia acted similarly to the Supreme Court of Florida when it stated that it would take judicial notice of the 1925 'land boom', its disastrous collapse and the extreme deflation in Florida's real estate; that the boom prevailed in Florida during 1925 and bursted in 1926. See City of Coral Gables v. State, 128 Fla. 874, 176 So. 40; Gryzmish v. Krim, 126 Fla. 191, 170 So. 717; Smith v. Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co., 116 Fla. 390, 156 So. 498, 95 A.L.R. 508.

Regardless of the legal authority of the City Council to reduce the valuations for the years 1926 to 1936, inclusive, there is some evidence to support the conclusion that it was inequitable and unjust to maintain a suit to foreclose its tax certificates on wild and inflated assessments made during the boom period and subsequent years. There is likewise in the record no evidence to acquaint this court with the net income on the property described in the final decree for the years 1926 to 1936. The defendant failed to pay taxes during these years and the high assessments may have been a justification from a financial point of view, but the courts could have reviewed these high assessments and entered such decree as the facts and the law would justify. See City of West Palm Beach v. Eppelman, 132 Fla. 686, 181 So. 894.

On February 5, 1940, appellant filed an answer and counterclaim in which it was denied that the tax rolls of the City of Arcadia as applicable to the defendant's property were lawfully assessed for the years 1926 to 1936, inclusive. The assessment rolls for the years 1926 and 1927 were not prepared or made by the Tax Collector of the City of Arcadia, but by a committee of citizens thereof appointed by the City Council and instructed to prepare the rolls. The rolls as prepared by the Citizen's Committee raised the assessment roll containing all the property of the City of Arcadia to approximately ten million dollars, but at a subsequent year the City Council reduced it thirty per cent due to the collapse of the Florida land boom. That the annual assessment rolls thereof since 1926 and 1927 to 1935, inclusive, were on valuations that were fictitious, confiscatory and unconscionable and were made in violation of Section 1 of Article 9 of the Florida Constitution. The Assessment rolls for the years 1926 to 1932 were never revised, corrected or equalized by the City Council of Arcadia. That the assessment rolls for the respective years are unlawful, confiscatory, and unconstitutional.

The answer tenders the further issue that the City of Arcadia during the years 1926 to 1932, inclusive, made no effort to assess the taxable personal property and intangible property of the said city. That no effort was made to collect or to enforce the payment of taxes against delinquent personal property of said city for the years named in ...