Charlotte Harbor & N. Ry. Co. v. Welles

• Decision Date: 31 July 1919
• Citation: 78 Fla. 227,82 So. 770
• Court: Florida Supreme Court
• Parties: CHARLOTTE HARBOR & N. RY. CO. v. WELLES et al., Board of Com'rs for De Soto County.

82 So. 770

78 Fla. 227

CHARLOTTE HARBOR & N. RY. CO. v. WELLES et al., Board of Com'rs for De Soto County.

Florida Supreme Court

July 31, 1919

Rehearing Denied Aug. 13, 1919.

Appeal from Circuit Court, De Soto County; John S. Edwards, Judge.

Bill by the Charlotte Harbor & Northern Railway Company, a corporation, against W. G. Welles and others, constituting the Board of County Commissioners for De Soto County, to enjoin the maintenance of a special road and bridge district. From a decree dismissing the bill on demurrer, complainant appeals. Affirmed.

Syllabus by the Court

SYLLABUS

The reference in section 1 of chapter 6208, Laws of Florida, Acts of 1911, to 'territory embraced wholly or in part in one or more road districts,' has reference to road districts as constituted at the time of the passage of the act, and does not refer to the creation of 'special road and bridge districts' either partly or wholly within another special road and bridge district.

Chapter 7750, Laws of Florida of the Extraordinary Session of 1918 invested in the county commissioners of the several counties of the state the authority to create into a special road and bridge district 'territory embraced wholly or in part in one or more road districts, or wholly or in part in one or more special road and bridge districts.'

The Legislature has plenary power to crystallize policies opinions, ideas, and sentiments into statute law, limited only by constitutional prohibitions. Courts do not substitute their will for the will of the Legislature, and 'judicial tribunals cannot interfere with the legislative discretion however onerous it may be.' The Legislature had the power to include in Laws 1911, c. 6208, a provision authorizing county commissioners to create into special road and bridge districts 'territory embraced wholly or in part in one or more special road and bridge districts'; and, having such power, it also could pass a subsequent act validating any special road and bridge district which had been previously consituted in 'territory embraced wholly or in part in one or more special road and bridge districts,' as was done when it enacted chapter 7750, Laws of Florida, Acts of the Extraordinary Session 1918, validating special road and bridge districts theretofore created in 'territory embraced wholly or in part in one or more special road and bridge districts.'

Chapter 7750, Laws of Florida, is a curative act, general in its nature, and not only invested the county commissioners of the several counties with the power to create special road and bridge districts in their respective counties in any 'territory embraced wholly or in part in one or more special road and bridge districts,' but it contains a further provision specially validating all special road and bridge districts theretofore created in 'territory embraced wholly or in part in one or more special road and bridge districts,' and declares its provisions shall have not only prospective force and effect, but also retroactive force and effect. This act is constitutional, and deals with a subject-matter over which the Legislature had entire control, and the fact that it is also retroactive in force and effect does not render it unconstitutional.

Chapter 8024, Laws of Florida, Acts of 1919, is a special act passed for the special purpose of legalizing, validating establishing, and creating 'Charlotte Harbor Special Road and Bridge District,' in De Soto county, and legalizing and validating the assessment made for the construction of roads and bridges therein, and validating and legalizing all warrants issued within said district for and in payment of expenses incident to the creation and establishment thereof, and the building of roads and bridges therein. It becomes the duty of this court to take judicial notice of this validating act, and to give it due recognition and effect.

Appellant filed a bill to enjoin the maintenance of a special road and bridge district, known as 'Charlotte Harbor Special Road and Bridge District,' overlapping the boundaries of a formerly created special road and bridge district, upon the theory that at the time of the creation of the special road and bridge district the county commissioners, under chapter 6208, Laws of Florida, Acts of 1911, had no authority to create a district overlapping the boundaries of another such special road and bridge district. A demurrer to the bill was sustained by the chancellor, and the bill dismissed. After the case reached this court on appeal the Legislature passed chapter 7750, Laws of Florida of the Extraordinary Session of 1918, empowering the county commissioners of the several counties of the state to create special road and bridge districts in 'territory embraced wholly or in part in one or more special road and bridge districts,' and validating the acts of the county commissioners in establishing special road and bridge districts in 'territory embraced wholly or in part in one or more special road and bridge districts,' this act being retroactive in effect as well as prospective. And later, in the regular session 1919, the Legislature passed chapter 8024, which is a special act validating the creation of the 'Charlotte Harbor Special Road and Bridge District,' and legalizing the assessments made for the construction of roads and bridges therein. Under these circumstances, it is entirely useless for this court to enter into any discussion of the questions involved in the demurrer to the bill of complaint, or to determine whether the chancellor was correct in his ruling on the demurrer and dismissing the bill, for since that order was made conditions have changed on account of the legislation just mentioned, and 'in consequence of such legislation, the complainant has no standing in court or right to any relief by reason of the matters complained of in said bill.'

COUNSEL McKay & Withers, of Tampa, and Treadwell & Treadwell, of Arcadia, for appellant.

John W. Burton, of Arcadia, for appellees.

OPINION

WILSON Circuit Judge.

The Charlotte Harbor & Northern Railway Company, as a taxpayer, on the 22d day of February, 1918, filed its bill of complaint against W. G. Welles, L. W. Whitehurst, D. L. Skipper, W. M. Whitten, and J. W. Bullock, constituting the board of county commissioners of De Soto county, Fla., seeking to enjoin the said county commissioners, from maintaining in De Soto county a special road and bridge district, known as the 'Charlotte Harbor Special Road and Bridge District,' and to restrain the assessment and collection of taxes against the property of the appellant situate within the boundaries of said special road and bridge district, and also to restrain the county commissioners from paying warrants issued, and from issuing other warrants in the said district to meet any of the obligations created in pursuance of the proposed 'Charlotte Harbor Special Road and Bridge District' project.

It is alleged in the bill that previous to the creation of the said 'Charlotte Harbor Special Road and Bridge District,' the said county commissioners had created in De Soto county what was known and designated as the 'Punta Gorda Special Road and Bridge District.'

It is further alleged that a large part of the 'Charlotte Harbor Special Road and Bridge District' overlaps the territory embraced within the 'Punta Gorda Special Road and Bridge District.' The appellant owning in the new or 'Charlotte Harbor Special Road and Bridge District,' alleges that said last-mentioned special road and bridge district has no valid existence, and that the officers are without authority to levy special taxes on its property, by reason of the fact that said district overlaps and includes territory embraced in the 'Punta Gorda Special Road and Bridge District.' No objection is made to the regularity of the proceedings creating the two districts, and the sole question involved as to the legality of the 'Charlotte Harbor Special Road and Bridge District' is the question of whether or not the formation of same partly within the territory of the 'Punta Gorda Special Road and Bridge District' renders its creation invalid.

On the 29th of March, 1918, the appellee, defendant below, filed a demurrer to the bill of complaint. In view of the conclusion we have reached it is unnecessary to write the grounds of demurrer into this opinion. It is enough to say that the first ground was general, averring a lack of equity; the second ground avers, in substance, that the bill on its face shows the 'Charlotte Harbor Special Road and Bridge District' was legally created and established; while the third and fourth grounds of the demurrer set up a claim of estoppel by laches upon the part of the complainant.

On the 17th of June, 1918, the chancellor entered final decree sustaining the demurrer and dismissing the bill of complaint. From this decree the complainant entered its appeal to this court.

There are four assignments of error. The first complains that the court erred in entering the said decree of June 17, 1918; the second complains that the court erred in sustaining the demurrer to the bill of complaint; the third complains that the court erred in dismissing the bill of complaint; while the fourth is the same as the second, stating that the court erred in not overruling the demurrer to the bill of complaint.

The first legislation in this state on the subject of creating special road and bridge districts was chapter 6208, Laws of Florida, Acts of 1911. Section 1 provided, in substance, that whenever residents of any territory embraced wholly or in part in one or more road districts, as at that time constituted, in any county of the state of Florida, desire to have such territory constituted into a special road and bridge...