Jones v. City of New York
| Decision Date | 29 May 1990 |
| Citation | 161 A.D.2d 518,555 N.Y.S.2d 788 |
| Parties | Nancy JONES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The CITY OF NEW YORK, et al., Defendants-Respondents. |
| Court | New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division |
A.D. Goodfarb, New York City, for plaintiff-appellant.
L.H. Young and K.N. Rashbaum, New York City, for defendants-respondents.
Before KUPFERMAN, J.P., and ROSS, ELLERIN, WALLACH and SMITH, JJ.
Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Diane A. Lebedeff, J.), entered March 24, 1989, which, inter alia, on the motion of defendants One Fifth Avenue Apartment Corporation, Sulzberger-Rolfe, Inc. and Nina Donovan, dismissed the second, third and seventh causes of action as against all defendants, unanimously modified, on the law, to reinstate such causes as against defendant City of New York, the City's cross-claims against the non-municipal defendants on these causes of action are reinstated and deemed converted to third-party claims against the non-municipal defendants, and, as so modified, the order is otherwise affirmed, without costs.
Plaintiff is a resident of New York and California. While in New York, she resided with a tenant-shareholder of the defendant cooperative apartment corporation. The tenant-shareholder died. Subsequently, while the plaintiff was in the apartment, the police were summoned apparently by the building superintendant. The plaintiff was searched and forcibly directed to leave the apartment, which was subsequently sealed. The plaintiff later returned to the apartment, allegedly with a court order allowing her access, and found it ransacked.
The second and third causes of action state claims for wrongful eviction. The seventh cause of action states a claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Both are governed by a one-year Statute of Limitations, and the plaintiff does not dispute that she failed to serve the non-municipal defendants within one year. She now claims that her causes of action were for prima facie tort, which remain viable for three years. There is no merit to this claim, which seems to be asserted only in the hope of avoiding the effect of the Statute of Limitations (See, Milone v. Jacobson, 78 A.D.2d 548, 549, 432 N.Y.S.2d 30). Here, complete relief is available within the traditional tort causes of action for wrongful eviction and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Accordingly, the causes of action cannot be regarded as claims for prima facie tort (See, Springer v....
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