Jones v. Class

• Citation: 1998 SD 55,578 N.W.2d 154
• Decision Date: 27 May 1998
• Docket Number: No. 20064,20064
• Parties: Eric D. JONES, a/k/a Jerome Michael Jackson, Petitioner and Appellant, v. Joseph P. CLASS, Warden of the South Dakota Penitentiary, Appellee.
• Court: Supreme Court of South Dakota

Page 154

578 N.W.2d 154

1998 SD 55

Eric D. JONES, a/k/a Jerome Michael Jackson, Petitioner and Appellant, v. Joseph P. CLASS, Warden of the South Dakota Penitentiary, Appellee.

No. 20064.

Supreme Court of South Dakota.

Argued March 25, 1998.

Decided May 27, 1998.

Gregg S. Greenfield of Boyce, Murphy, McDowell and Greenfield, Sioux Falls, for petitioner and appellant.

Mark W. Barnett, Attorney General, Frank Geaghan, Assistant Attorney General, Pierre, for appellee.

GILBERTSON, Justice.

¶1 Petitioner Eric Jones (Jones) appeals the denial of his application for writ of habeas corpus. We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURE

¶2 On March 7, 1991, Connie Strozdas (Strozdas) was walking towards an entrance to the Empire Mall in Sioux Falls, South Dakota, when a man approached her and grabbed on to her purse. Strozdas resisted, a brief struggle ensued, and the man punched Strozdas in the face breaking her nose. Strozdas screamed for help. While on the ground she memorized the license plate number of the car the perpetrator and another man entered. A couple in the parking lot observed the struggle and gave a general description to the police.

¶3 Two days later, on March 9, 1991, a Washington state patrolman radioed a communication concerning the license plate number on a speeding car. He was informed that the vehicle was stolen and activated his lights to get the driver to pull over. Rather than stop, the vehicle accelerated and led the police on a 70 mile chase reaching speeds of 120 m.p.h. The vehicle was finally stopped after it ran over a spike strip that the police had laid out. During the search of the vehicle, police found several items in the purse of Marin Bird Song, an occupant of the vehicle, including Strozdas' driver's license, checkbook, and social security card. The vehicle's three occupants, Jones, James Scott, a/k/a James Smith, and Bird Song were arrested for felony eluding and possession of stolen property. Strozdas subsequently identified Jones as her attacker in a photographic lineup. Jones and Scott were extradited to South Dakota and tried in the same proceeding. Both men were found guilty of first degree robery and sentenced to twenty-five years in the penitentiary.

¶4 Jones and Scott both appealed. This Court summarily affirmed Jones' conviction. SDCL 15-26A-87.1; State v. Jones, 498 N.W.2d 220 (S.D.1993). This Court affirmed Scott's, a/k/a Smith's, conviction on direct appeal. State v. Smith 494 N.W.2d 390 (S.D.1992). We also denied Scott habeas relief. Scott v. Class, 532 N.W.2d 399 (S.D.1995). Jones appeals the denial of his writ of habeas corpus raising the following issues for our review:

1. Whether Jones was denied his due process rights and his right to confront witnesses in the admission of what he claims to be extremely prejudicial evidence.

2. Whether Jones was denied a fair trial due to alleged juror bias and juror misconduct.

3. Whether Jones was denied effective assistance of trial counsel.

4. Whether Jones was denied effective assistance of appellate counsel.

5. Whether Jones' constitutional right against self-incrimination was violated.

6. Whether the lack of transfer orders is a jurisdictional defect entitling Jones to habeas corpus relief.

7. Whether the trial court erred in denying Jones' motion to sever his trial from Scott's trial.

8. Whether Jones was denied a fair trial due to alleged judicial bias.

9. Whether Jones was denied his due process rights and right against cruel and unusual punishment due to the sentencing judge's unfamiliarity with the case.

10. Whether the cumulative effects of all of the alleged errors violated Jones' due process rights.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶5 Our standard of review for a habeas corpus appeal is well established. The habeas petitioner has the initial burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he is entitled to relief. Black v. Class, 1997 SD 22, p 5, 560 N.W.2d 544, 546 (citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 469, 58 S.Ct. 1019, 1025, 82 L.Ed. 1461, 1469 (1938); Loop v. Class, 1996 SD 107, p 14, 554 N.W.2d 189, 191; Two Eagle v. Leapley, 522 N.W.2d 765, 768 (S.D.1994)). The habeas court's findings are given "considerable deference" and we will not reverse these findings unless they are clearly erroneous. Id. (citations omitted).

Habeas corpus is not a substitute for direct review. Because habeas corpus is a collateral attack upon a final judgment, our scope of review is limited.... Habeas corpus can be used only to review (1) whether the court had jurisdiction of the crime and the person of the defendant; (2) whether the sentence was authorized by law; and (3) in certain cases whether an incarcerated defendant has been deprived of basic constitutional rights.

Lodermeier v. Class, 1996 SD 134, p 3, 555 N.W.2d 618, 621-22 (citing Loop, 1996 SD 107 at p 11, 554 N.W.2d at 191).

ANALYSIS AND DECISION

¶6 1. Whether Jones was denied his due process rights and his right to confront witnesses in what he claims to be the admission of extremely prejudicial evidence.

¶7 Jones claims that several items of evidence were improperly admitted at trial and were unfairly prejudicial to him. Evidentiary rulings made by the trial court are presumed correct and are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Goodroad, 1997 SD 46, 563 N.W.2d 126.

It is a rare evidentiary question that rises to the lofty heights of a constitutional violation.... The habeas petitioner must establish an error which demonstrates a violation of due process. This burden is much greater than that required on direct appeal and is even greater than the showing of plain error on direct appeal.

Loop, 1996 SD 107 at p 23, 554 N.W.2d at 193 (citing Mendoza v. Leapley, 5 F.3d 341, 342 (8thCir.1993); Hicks v. Scurr, 671 F.2d 255, 259 (8thCir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 968, 103 S.Ct. 295, 74 L.Ed.2d 278 (1982)).

¶8 Over objection by counsel, the trial court admitted testimony from a police officer that Jones had used up to seven different aliases. The habeas court concluded it was relevant to show a criminal pattern but even if it was error, Jones has failed to establish prejudice. To admit these aliases was error as they have no relevancy to the charge. However, we agree with the habeas court that this error was not prejudicial under our habeas standards.

¶9 Jones contends the trial court erred by admitting testimony that a false social security card, bearing the name "Jerome M. Jackson," was found in his possession at the time of his arrest. Jones further argues the trial court also erred by admitting testimony that when arrested, police officers found several credit card receipts in the car, with charges made on other people's cards. However, Jones' counsel did not object at trial and in fact utilized this now challenged evidence in his strategy to show the state was prosecuting the wrong people.

¶10 Moreover, Jones challenged this evidence on different grounds on direct appeal. ¹ Jones argued on direct appeal the police officers who searched the vehicle did not have probable cause and therefore, the trial court erred by denying his motion to suppress all of the evidence obtained from the search.

The inquiry is not 'whether the trial court erred in admitting the particular testimony,' but 'whether the admissions resulted in a trial so fundamentally unfair as to deny [the habeas applicant] due process of law. In making this determination we must review the totality of the facts in the case and analyze the fairness of the particular trial under consideration.' To justify the grant of habeas corpus, the error must be 'so "gross" ... "conspicuously prejudicial" ... or otherwise of such magnitude that it fatally infected the trial and failed to afford [the habeas applicant] the fundamental fairness which is the essence of due process.'

Loop, 1996 SD 107 at p 23, 554 N.W.2d at 193 (citing Rainer v. Dep't of Corrections, 914 F.2d 1067, 1072 (8thCir.1990) (citations omitted), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1099, 111 S.Ct. 993, 112 L.Ed.2d 1077 (1991)). We found no error in the admission of this evidence when we considered the matter on direct appeal and we find no error here.

¶11 2. Whether Jones was denied a fair trial due to juror bias and juror misconduct.

¶12 We utilize the clearly erroneous standard when reviewing a trial court's factual determination regarding juror misconduct. State v. Wilkins, 536 N.W.2d 97, 99 (S.D.1995) (citing Shamburger v. Behrens, 418 N.W.2d 299, 303 (S.D.1988)). "A finding is 'clearly erroneous' when after reviewing all of the evidence, we are left with a definite and firm conviction that a mistake was made." State v. Almond, 511 N.W.2d 572, 574 (S.D.1994) (citing Selle v. Pierce, 494 N.W.2d 634, 636 (S.D.1993)).

¶13 The trial court's legal decision, as applied to the facts, is reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. Id; Shamburger, 418 N.W.2d at 303. "[A]n abuse of discretion refers to a discretion exercised to an end or purpose not justified by, and clearly against reason and evidence." Almond, 511 N.W.2d at 572 (citations omitted). In applying the abuse of discretion standard, "we do not determine whether we would have made a like decision, only whether a judicial mind, considering the law and the facts, could have reached a similar decision." Id. (citations omitted).

¶14 Jones claims both juror bias and juror misconduct precluded him from receiving a fair trial. Jones alleges juror bias because one of the jurors failed to disclose, during voir dire, that her children went to school with the victim and that she had previously been a neighbor to the victim's fiance. The juror informed the trial judge the next day who then met with the juror and attorneys. After the trial judge was convinced the juror could remain impartial, he allowed her to remain on the panel. See State v. Volk, 331 N.W.2d 67, 70 (S.D.1983) (noting trial court's broad discretion in rulings regarding alleged juror bias). Jones' counsel was...