Jones v. Com.

• Decision Date: 06 June 2008
• Docket Number: Record No. 071986.
• Citation: 661 S.E.2d 412
• Court: Virginia Supreme Court
• Parties: Sherod Lamont JONES v. COMMONWEALTH of Virginia.

661 S.E.2d 412

Sherod Lamont JONES v. COMMONWEALTH of Virginia.

Record No. 071986.

Supreme Court of Virginia.

June 6, 2008.

Mufeed W. Said, for appellant.

Karen Misbach, Asst. Atty. Gen. II (Robert F. McDonnell, Atty. Gen., on brief), for appellee.

Present: All the Justices.

OPINION BY Justice CYNTHIA D. KINSER.

At a bench trial in the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond, Sherod Lamont Jones was convicted of maintaining or operating a fortified drug house in violation of Code § 18.2-258.02.¹ The Court of Appeals of Virginia affirmed his conviction in a per curiam order, Jones v. Commonwealth, Record No. 3179-06-2 (June 6, 2007), and a three-judge panel of the Court of Appeals denied Jones' petition for appeal. Jones v. Commonwealth, Record No. 3179-06-2 (September 27, 2007). The issue on appeal to this Court is whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain Jones' conviction.

The evidence at trial established that a search warrant was obtained for a house in the City of Richmond that was allegedly being used to distribute controlled substances. As police officers approached the house to execute the search warrant, Jones and another individual moved a stove against the rear door of the house. They also wedged a "2 x 4" board between the stove and a stairway in the kitchen area of the house. The police gained entry by using a breaching ram to open the door. After doing so, the police observed a screwdriver shoved into the latch of the demolished door.

Jones argues on appeal, as he did before the circuit court and the Court of Appeals, that the Commonwealth failed to prove that the house had been "substantially altered from its original status" as required by Code § 18.2-258.02. Jones contends that, even if the use of the stove and 2 x 4 board were for the purpose of impeding lawful entry by a law enforcement officer, the placement of those items did not substantially alter the house from its original status. In response, the Commonwealth contends that the original status of the house did not include a door that was reinforced with a stove, a 2 x 4 board, and a latch with a screwdriver inserted into it.

The statute at issue in this appeal, Code § 18.2-258.02, provides:

Any office, store, shop, restaurant, dance hall, theater, poolroom, clubhouse, storehouse, warehouse, dwelling house, apartment or building or structure of any kind which is (i) substantially altered from its original status by means of reinforcement with the intent to impede, deter or delay lawful entry by a law-enforcement officer into such structure, (ii) being used for the purpose of manufacturing or distributing controlled substances or marijuana, and (iii) the object of a valid search warrant, shall be considered a fortified drug house. Any person who maintains or operates a fortified drug house is guilty of a Class 5 felony.

When considering a challenge to the sufficiency of evidence on appeal, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party at trial and consider all inferences fairly deducible from that evidence. Perez v. Commonwealth, 274 Va. 724, 728, 652 S.E.2d 95, 97 (2007); Viney v. Commonwealth, 269 Va. 296, 299, 609 S.E.2d 26, 28 (2005). We will not reverse the judgment of the trial court unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it. Code § 8.01-680; Bolden v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 144, 148, 654 S.E.2d 584, 586 (2008); Jackson v. Commonwealth, 267 Va. 178, 204, 590 S.E.2d 520, 535 (2004).

To decide whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain Jones' conviction for maintaining or operating a fortified drug house, it is necessary to interpret the meaning of the phrase "substantially altered from its original status" as set forth in Code § 18.2-258.02. "Statutory interpretation presents a pure question of law and is accordingly subject to de novo review by this Court." Washington v. Commonwealth, 272 Va. 449, 455, 634 S.E.2d 310, 313 (2006). In addition, "penal statutes must be `strictly construed against the State' and ... such statutes `cannot be extended by implication or construction, or be made to embrace cases which are not within their letter and spirit.'" Commonwealth, Dep't of Motor Vehicles v. Athey, 261 Va. 385, 388, 542 S.E.2d 764, 766 (2001) (quoting Berry v. City of Chesapeake, 209 Va. 525, 526, 165 S.E.2d 291, 292 (1969)). We determine the General Assembly's intent by the words used in a statute, and when a statute is unambiguous, we are bound by the plain meaning of its language. Commonwealth v. Diaz, 266 Va. 260, 264-65, 585 S.E.2d 552, 554 (2003).

The statute at issue is not ambiguous. However, the phrase "substantially altered from its original status" is not defined. Thus, we give that phrase "`its ordinary meaning, given the context in which it is used.'" Sansom v. Board of Supervisors, 257 Va. 589, 594-95, 514 S.E.2d 345, 349 (1999) (quoting Department of...